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World trade and foreign investment have grown dramatically in the
post-war era. Levels of environmental degradation and natural resource
depletion have increased as well during that period. Some observers
consider trade liberalization and environmental degradation to be locked in
a direct cause-effect relationship.' Some commentators view this
development with concern, while others, primarily environmentalists,
view the poor fit between trade and environment with alarm.2 A few
environmentalists have even demanded an end to free trade. They argue
that with free trade comes economic growth, and with economic growth
comes unacceptable levels of pollution. Because market mechanisms do
not always take full account of environmental costs, some
environmentalists argue, a legal climate that promotes unbridled free trade
could contribute to the unrestricted, transborder movement of hazardous
products and waste.' The linkages and frictions, both legal and economic,
between trade and the environment are undeniable." Admittedly, the fit of
Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University.
See Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GA TT Article XX, J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 39-43 [hereinafter Charnovitz I]; Scott Vaughan, Trade
and Environment: Some North-South Considerations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 591 (1994);
John Hunt, Free Traders Heading for Clash with Greens, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, § I,
at 6.
2 See Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism Confronts GA TT Rules, J. WORLD TRADE
Apr. 1993, at 37; Symposium, Greening the GATT- Setting the Agenda, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 447 (1994); Symposium, Free Trade and the Environment in Latin America,
15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1992); Hamilton Southworth, III, Comment, GATT
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Environment, GATTDoc. 1529 (February 13, 1992), 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 997 (1992).
' See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992); Don't Green
GATT, ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1992, at 15.
4 See World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO], Comm. on Trade and Env't, Selected
Bibliography on Trade and Environment, Doc. WT/CTE/W/49 (1997) (visited Oct. 25,
1998) <http://www.wto.org!wto/ddf/ep/public.html>. See generally DANIEL C. ESTY,
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international trade law and international environmental law is not well-
tailored. Trade and environment policies have proceeded at times on
diverging tracks, at times on parallel tracks, and at other times on the same
track but headed on a collision course.' Many environmentalists have been
unrelenting in their World Trade Organization (WTO)-bashing, casting the
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT)-WTO system' in the
role of environmental villain. The GATT has few friends among
environmentalists, who vilify GATT and have made it their bite noire.
Two events in the 1990s galvanized environmentalists in their antipathy
toward GATT and free trade. The first was the 1991 GATT panel report
in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute between Mexico and the United States.7 The
Committee on Trade and the Environment has compiled a bibliography of over 150
works on trade and the environment. Most WTO documents and decisions are available
from the WTO web site at <http://www.wto.org> [hereinafter WTO Doc. Website].
In its 1992 report, Trade and the Environment: Conflicts and Opportunities, the
congressional Office of Technology Assessment notes that "[t]he potential for conflict
between environmental concerns and international trade is increasing." U.S. CONG.,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 3 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
' See WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1992); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GAT, The ICJ & Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994); Daniel C. Esty, GATTing the
Green, Not Just Greening the GA77, 72 FOR. AFFAIRS 32 (1993); Charles R. Fletcher,
Greening World Trade Law: Reconciling GAiT and Multilateral Environmental
Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341
(1996); Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment and Sustainable
Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535 (1992); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law: Prevention
and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GA TT, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb.
1993, at 43; Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship
Between Trade and Environmental Regulation, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1993, at 23.
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1997, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
' See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991, GAT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted, 1991) reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report]; see also Matthew Hunter
Hurlock, The GA TT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GA TT in
Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2113-17 (1992); Frederic
L. Kirgis, Jr., Environment and Trade Measures After the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (1992). See generally Steve Chamovitz, Environmental
Trade Sanctions and the GATT- An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign
Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751 (1994); Ted L. McDorman,
The GA TT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save
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second was the successful completion of the trilateral North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations among Canada, Mexico,
and the United States. Both of these developments are discussed below.
Why have the GATT-WTO system and its progeny, NAFTA,8
become the environmentalists' whipping boy?9 The short answer is that
the GATT-WTO system and NAFTA are viewed as at best indifferent to
legitimate environmental concerns and at worst hostile to them.'" What
are environmentalists' specific misgivings about the GATT-WTO system
and free trade? In a nutshell, environmentalists fear that countries with
comparatively more stringent environmental standards will relax them
under pressure from domestic industries. In an environmental version of
Gresham's law," stringent environmental standards will be lowered so that
Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477 (1991).
For an overview of U.S. legislation that authorizes the imposition of unilateral
trade sanctions on environmental grounds, see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1 sT SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE
STATUTES 131-35 (Comm. Print 1997).
' North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, U.S. - Can. - Mex.,
33 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (Parts I-II), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (Parts IV-VIII) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
9 See Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA's Link to Environmental Policies, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 21, 1993, at 19; John Dillin, Trade-Pact Foes Sound Job Loss, Populist
Alarms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 1, 4.
"0 For a comparative analysis of the way in which trade and environment issues are
resolved within the WTO, the EU, and NAFTA, see Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-
Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule
Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1997).
" The following is a non-exhaustive list of the grievances environmentalists have with
GATT:
1. GATT limits national sovereignty and thus restricts the environmental
measures a country may wish to use.
2. GATT rejects production-based grounds as a reason for excluding an
imported product.
3. GATT does not permit the imposition of countervailing duties on imports
from countries with lax environmental laws.
4. GATT encourages harmonization of product standards which will lead to a
lowering of standards rather than a ratcheting up.
5. GATT prevents export bans on products (such as tropical timber), except in
very narrowly defined circumstances.
6. GATT prevents the unilateral, extraterritorial imposition of environmental
standards by one country on another.
7. GATT's most-favored-nation obligation prohibits countries from treating one
country differently from another on the basis of different environmental policies in the
two countries.
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domestic producers can remain competitive at home, relative to imports
from countries with less demanding environmental standards, and remain
competitive abroad in export markets. 2 In addition, environmentalists
seem convinced that developed countries, long the leaders in protecting
the environment, will roll back their standards to discourage capital and
job flight to countries where environmental regulation is lax or non-
existent.
Environment and trade policies co-exist against a backdrop of
significantly different economic and legal philosophies.'3 The market
economic model of government non-interference with the free flow of
goods across national borders has shaped the GATT-WTO system. This
same model has not found a comfortable niche in international
environmental law. The market economy solution to the problem of
pollution (i.e., "externalities" in the jargon of economists) is to let the
market, not government, determine how and whether pollution is to be
abated. But a market approach to abating environmental pollution has not
worked well in practice. For that reason, international environmental law
is more reflective of an economic model that invites and arguably requires
government regulation of the market."' For example, one solution to the
8. GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms are secretive and do not permit
environmentalists to intervene to present environmental considerations in the decision
making process.
See A Catalogue of Grievances, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 26. See also Frederick M.
Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 31 (1992); Edith
Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A
Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 729 (1992).
12 See Kym Anderson, The Entwining of Trade Policy with Environmental and Labour
Standards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 435 (Will Martin
& L. Alan Winters eds., 1995); Hilary F. French, The GA 7T. Menace or Ally?, WORLD
WATCH, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 12; U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Trade Issues of the 1990s-
Part /, INT'L ECON. REV., Nov. 1994, at 17; Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 701; U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, Trade Liberalization and Pollution, INT'L ECON. REV., Mar. 1995, at 17;
The Race for the Bottom, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 90.
As Edith Brown Weiss points out, there is little empirical evidence to
substantiate the claim that countries with lax environmental standards attract foreign
industries that are heavily regulated. See Weiss, supra note 11, at 729. Environmental
costs are just one of a host of factors that figure in the decision to make a foreign
investment. Other factors include tax and labor laws, joint venture laws, political
stability, performance requirements, the ability to repatriate profits, currency stability,
and compensation in the event of expropriation.
'" See generally ROBERT REPETTO, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT POLICIES: ACHIEVING
COMPLEM ENTARITIES AND AVOIDING CONFLICTS (1993).
" See generally ALAN 0. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY
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pollution problem is to adopt the "polluter pays" principle.'5 That is, firms
that pollute should be required to pay for the clean up and either absorb the
cost or pass it on to the buyer in the form of higher prices for their goods
(i.e., "internalize the costs" in the jargon of economists). But polluters are
not likely to abate their pollution or pay for the cost of pollution controls
voluntarily. Why not? For the simple reason that they cannot rely on their
competitors voluntarily to do likewise. As a consequence, the government
must mandate that they do so.
In short, disenchanted with market economy solutions to
environmental problems, environmentalists challenge the assumption that
markets are capable of protecting the environment effectively through
prices."
This article challenges the view that the United States and other
Members of the WTO have a legal right under international law to engage
in unilateral measures to resolve trade-environment disputes. On the
contrary, as will be shown below, in light of the comprehensive legal
regime created under WTO auspices to regulate all aspects of international
trade in goods, the United States and all other WTO Members are
forbidden from imposing unilateral measures to block imports of goods
from other WTO Members in response to policies or practices that
threaten the environment or the global commons. The legal permissibility
of such unilateral measures aside, this article further rejects the view that
unilateral approaches to resolving international environmental disputes is
desirable as a policy matter, valid from a legal perspective, or necessary as
a practical matter. The article begins with an overview of the core
international environmental legal principles and treaties. It then examines
INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (1995); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies. Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 123 1-
32 (1992).
" See generally Candice Stevens, Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade
and Environment Context, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 577 (1994).
6 See Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development.- The Obstacle of
Free Trade, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 33-36 (1992); Patti A. Goldman,
Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and
Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279, 1290-92 (1992); Michael J. Kelly,
Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International Environmental
Agreements, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 447 (1997); NAFTA Implementing Legislation
Uncertain but Wilson Says No Plan to Delay Passage, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at
415-16 (March 10, 1993). See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & JEREMY J. WARFORD,
WORLD WITHOUT END: ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(1993).
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environmental issues in the GATT-WTO context, beginning with GATT
1947 and the GATT panel reports in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute. This
article then analyzes how the Uruguay Round Agreements deal with trade-
environment issues, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The work of the reactivated WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment is also analyzed.
Following the examination of environmental issues in the WTO-
GATT context, the article shifts focus to the NAFTA provisions dealing
with trade and the environment, in particular the side agreement on
environmental cooperation. It also discusses the bilateral environmental
agreements concluded between the United States and Mexico. 7 It
concludes that because a multilateral and trilateral framework for
resolving trade-environment disputes exists to which the United States has
made a legally binding commitment, multilateral and trilateral approaches
to resolving trade-environment disputes is not only the preferable solution,
but the only legitimate response.
"7 The subject of U.S. environmental protection legislation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Briefly, the United States has in place several pieces of legislation dealing with
endangered species, the international conservation of marine species, and import
restrictions under these laws. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994); International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1411-1418 (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994);
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 ("Pelly Amendment"), 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994);
High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994); Wild Bird
Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4904, 4907 (1994). The Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 sparked the Tuna/Dolphin dispute. See generally John Alton
Duff, Recent Applications of United States Laws to Conserve Marine Species Worldwide:
Should Trade Sanctions Be Mandatory?, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1 (1996); Taunya L.
McLarty, WTO and NAFO Coalescence: A Pareto Improvement for Both Free Trade and
Fish Conservation, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 469 (1996).
Litigation involving the U.S. implementation of a shrimp import ban under
amendments to the Endangered Species Act brought a WTO complaint by India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. See WTO, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58 (1996), available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4. See also Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). For an analysis of the CIT decision and the WTO dispute, see
Paul Stanton Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of
International Trade, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1996-97). See also New Rolefor NAFTA: Saving Fish?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1996, at 18; Timothy E.
Wirth, Take the Final Step to Protect Dolphins, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1996,
at 19.
380 [Vol. 22:375
ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Introduction
As a threshold matter, it is important to dispel the notion that
international environmental law, as piecemeal and fragmented as it is, is
hostile or antagonistic to international trade and growth. In a 1991 report,
the U.S. International Trade Commission identified over 160 multilateral
and bilateral agreements for the protection of the environment and
wildlife.'" Most of these agreements date from the 1970s.'9  Of these
scores of treaties and conventions, no single document emerges as the
centerpiece international environmental "constitution" analogous to GATT
1994 in the field of international trade." International environmental law
is, instead, a crazy quilt of treaties, conventions, and customary
international law.2
Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
provides that under customary international law, states are obligated to
prevent transboundary pollution that causes injury to another state.22
Polluting states that violate this rule are liable for any injury caused by
such transboundary pollution.23 Section 601 provides in part:
§ 601. State Obligations with Respect to Environment of
Other States and the Common Environment
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as
may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted
'g See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC Pub. No. 2351, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE (1991).
'9 See id.
20 See Weiss, supra note 11, at 729.
21 See generally Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, in CONFRONTING TRADE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: PROSPECTS AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 8 (1993);
Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable
Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L. & COM. 623
(1996).
22 RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 601 (1987).
23 See id.
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international rules and standards for the
prevention, reduction, and control of injury
to the environment of another state or of
areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause
significant injury to the environment of
another state or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations
under Subsection (1)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury,
resulting from such violation, to the
environment of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Outside of this customary rule of international law, no single document
universally recognized as the international environmental law
"constitution" exists. However, two closely related documents do emerge
as international environmental law manifestoes. They represent a
distillation of the basic principles of international environmental law and
policy reflected in section 601 of the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations. The first is the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment.2 The second is the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development.6
B. The Stockholm and Rio Declarations.
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations are a series of twenty-six and
twenty-seven guiding principles, respectively. Under these principles
states commit themselves to achieving the complementary goals of
promoting sustainable development and protecting the global
24Id.
25 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
26 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/5 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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environment. Neither Declaration espouses environmental protection to
the point of no economic growth. 7 In other words, neither document takes
the position of the environment uber alles. Rather, both Declarations take
a balanced approach to the trade-environment issue.
A distillation of the Declarations and their largely overlapping
principles yields two potentially conflicting concepts: national
sovereignty, on the one hand, and international cooperation, on the other.
Representative of the sovereignty/cooperation dichotomy is Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 8
With the addition of "and developmental" to the phrase "pursuant to their
own environmental policies," Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration tracks
Principle 21 's language verbatim. 29
The importance of the national sovereignty principle to the drafters
of the Rio Declaration is reflected in Principles 11 and 13.30 These two
Principles direct states to enact national legislation, rather than enter into
international conventions, to deal with issues of environmental damage,
liability, and compensation for victims of pollution.3'
27 One economist has coined the acronym BANANA ("build absolutely nothing
anywhere near anyone") to describe this position. Another popular acronym is NIMBY
("not in my back yard"), which describes a far more restrained, and far from altruistic,
environmental position. See Craig VanGrasstek, The Political Economy of Trade and the
Environment in the United States Senate, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 227, 233.
28 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at 1420.
29 See Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 876.
30 See generally Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119 (1993); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV.
599 (1995).
" Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration provides in part that "[s]tates shall enact effective
environmental legislation." Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 876. In this same
connection, Principle 13 states in part that "[s]tates shall develop national law regarding
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Relying exclusively on initiatives at the national level to address
environmental issues is not likely to produce a comprehensive or
coordinated international legal regime that adequately advances the goal of
protecting the global environment. Recognizing this shortcoming, the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations call upon states to cooperate with one
another in developing international conventions to deal with issues of
transboundary pollution.12
Besides attempting to mix the oil-and-water issues of national
sovereignty and international cooperation, the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations also wrestle with accommodating international
environmental protection and international trade. Neither Declaration is
hostile to international trade. On the contrary, as discussed below, both
documents are sensitive to the importance of an open trading system.
They show an awareness that environmental regulations ostensibly
designed to protect the environment can be a pretext for trade
protectionism.3
C. Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Three of the most important conservation and environmental
conventions use trade restrictions and import bans as the vehicles for
enforcing their terms. These conventions provide prima facie evidence for
the current debate that multilateralism works, given sufficient political
will. The first of these conventions is the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) that regulates or prohibits
international trade in the scheduled endangered species.34 The second is
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage."
Id. at 878.
32 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at 1420 (princs. 22, 24); Rio Declaration,
supra note 26, at 878 (princs. 13, 14). To further this cooperative effort, states also
commit to sharing scientific information. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at
1420 (princ. 20); Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 827 (princ. 9).
For a criticism of state sovereignty as a political obstruction to further progress
in the development of international environmental law, see Mark Allan Gray, The United
Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L. 291, 315 (1990).
"' See generally GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS (1996).
"' See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975)
[hereinafter CITES]; William C. Burns, CITES and the Regulation of International Trade
in Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical Appraisal, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203 (1990);
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the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,"5 together
with the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer.36  They provide for an eventual ban on imports of
chlorofluorocarbons and halons, and an outright ban on imports from
nonsignatory countries." The third is the Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
prohibiting or restricting the export and import of scheduled hazardous
waste." These three multilateral environmental agreements are
incorporated by reference in NAFTA.39 None has been the subject of
either a GATT or WTO panel proceeding.
1. CITES
With 144 parties, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is one of the most
widely-subscribed international conservation agreements. CITES
categorizes endangered species, and parts of those species, into three
Dale Andrew, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Experience
With the Use of Trade Measures in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), OCDE/GD(97)106 (1997) (visited Oct. 25,
1998) <http://www.oecd.org/ech/docs/envi.htm>.
" Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, UNEP Doc.
IG.53/5, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention.]
36 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force for the United States Jan.
1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol is supplemented by the
London and Copenhagen amendments that accelerate the timetable and broaden the
coverage of the Montreal Protocol. See London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991)
[hereinafter London Amendments]; Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874
(1993) [hereinafter Copenhagen Amendments].
37 See Vienna Convention, supra note 35; Montreal Protocol, supra note 36.
38 See United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes,
Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) (entered
into force May 5, 1992) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
31 See NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 104.
40 See generally Steve Chamovitz, The World Trade Organization and Environmental
Supervision, 17 INT'L ENV'T REP. 89 (1994); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Treaties and
the GATT, 1 REV. EUR. COMM. INT'L ENVTL. L. 14 (1992).
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groups depending on how close they are to extinction. 41 Appendix I lists
species currently threatened with extinction that are or may be affected by
trade.42 Appendix II lists two sub-groups of endangered species: (1) those
threatened with extinction unless trade in them is regulated, and (2) those
for which trade must be regulated if species at risk are to be protected.43
Appendix III lists other flora and fauna that are protected by signatory
countries.44
For species listed in Appendix I, export is subject to permit.45
Such permits may be granted only when the following conditions have
been met: (1) a Scientific Authority of the exporting state has advised that
such an export permit will not be detrimental to the survival of that
species; (2) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied that
the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that state;
(3) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied that any
living specimen will be shipped so as to minimize the risk of injury or
damage; and (4) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied
that an import permit (which is subject to corresponding requirements) has
been granted for the specimen. 6
Appendix II species are subject to the same export requirements,
but no corresponding import requirements are imposed.47 Appendix III
species may not be imported without a certificate of origin and an export
permit from the country that listed the species in Appendix 111.48
2. The Montreal Protocol
The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer49 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
4' See CITES, supra note 34, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245-46.
4 See id. art.II:1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
41 See id. art. 11:2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
44 See id. art 11:3, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
41 See id. art. III, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
46 See id. art. 111:2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. Violations of CITES can
result in the imposition of trade sanctions. Such sanctions were being considered by the
United States against South Korea for its alleged importation of bear gallbladders and
paws from North America. See Paula Dobbyn, Hunters Target Bears to Feed Asian
Appetite, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1997, at 3.
"7 See CITES, supra note 34, art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1095-97, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247-48.
48 See id. art. V, 27 U.S.T. at 1097-98, 993 U.N.T.S. at 248.
" Vienna Convention, supra note 35.
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Ozone Layer, together with the London and Copenhagen amendments, 50
regulate trade in ozone-depleting gases in three respects: (1) they impose
regressive import quotas on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons from
parties to the Convention and Protocol; (2) they ban imports of such
substances altogether from countries that are not signatories to the treaties;
and (3) they impose domestic production controls."
The 1990 London amendments add certain chemicals to the list of
controlled substances.52 The 162 parties to the Montreal Protocol further
agreed to terminate the domestic production and consumption of CFCs by
2000."3 They established a fund, the Multilateral Ozone Fund, to finance
technology transfers to developing countries.54
Before the ink was dry on the London amendments, it was reported
that ozone depletion was worse than thought. The parties responded by
amending the Montreal Protocol again under the Copenhagen amendments
to accelerate the phase-out of CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
chloroform by the end of 1995." The Copenhagen amendments added
methyl bromide, hydrochloroflourocarbons (HCFCs), and
hydrobromoflurocarbons (HBFCs) to the list of controlled substances.56
3. The Basel Convention
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
o Montreal Protocol, supra note 36; London Amendments, supra note 36; Copenhagen
Amendments, supra note 36.
5 See Bryce Blegen, International Cooperation in Protection of Atmospheric Ozone: The
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 413 (1988); Anne Gallagher, The "New" Montreal Protocol and the Future of
International Law for Protection of the Global Environment, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 267
(1992); John Warren Kindt & Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone
Depletion in International Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 261
(1989). See generally LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 509 (1994).
For an overview of the terms and operation of the Montreal Protocol, see WTO
Comm. on Trade and Env't, The Montreal Protocol and Trade Measures-
Communication from the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
WT/CTE/W/57 (Aug. 28,1997) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
52 See London Amendments, supra note 36, at 552-53.
3 See id. at 540.
s See id. at 549-51.
See Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 36, at 876-78.
5 See id. at 885-86.
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Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal lists certain
hazardous wastes, the exportation or importation of which the parties must
either prohibit or restrict." Export of the scheduled hazardous wastes is
prohibited to parties that prohibit their importation. In all other cases,
export to another party requires the consent of the importing party in
writing." There are 112 parties to the Convention.
The Conference of the Parties established under Article 15 of the
Convention is responsible for reviewing and evaluating its
implementation." The Conference decided in 1994 to prohibit
immediately the exportation of all hazardous waste for final disposal from
OECD countries to non-OECD countries, and to extend that export ban in
1997 to hazardous waste exported for recycling or recovery. 60 A 1992
OECD Council Decision to harmonize OECD members' control regimes
governing the movement of transboundary shipment of hazardous waste
was implemented by the United States in 1996.61
4. Other MEAs
Although full implementation of the aforementioned multilateral
agreements has been hamstrung by underfunding and a lack of
commitment on the part of signatories, two other potentially important
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) dealing with the protection
of the global commons have been established. The Convention on
7 See Basel Convention, supra note 38, art. 4, 28 I.L.M. at 661-63.
58 See id. art. 4.1, 28 I.L.M. at 661. For an overview of the terms and operation of the
Basel Convention, see WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Recent Trade-Related
Developments in the Basel Convention: Communication from the Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
WT/CTE/W/55 (Aug. 25, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
'9 See Basel Convention, supra note 38, art. 15, 28 I.L.M. at 670-71.
60 See Trade Measures in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (visited Feb. 15, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/env/docs/en/com env td9741 finale.pdfz>.
6 See Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Council, Decision of the
Council Concerning the Control of Transfrontier Movements of Wastes Destined for
Recovery Operations, C(92)39/Final (Mar. 30, 1992); Transfrontier Shipments of
Hazardous Waste for Recovery Within the OCED, 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.80-262.89 (1997).
See also Joy Clairmont, Imports and Exports of Hazardous Waste: Implementation of
OECD Council Decision C(92)39 Concerning the Transfrontier Movement of
Recoverable Wastes, 3 ENVTL. LAw. 545 (1997).
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Biological Diversity (the Biodiversity Convention), 62 and the Climate
Change Convention 63 represent continuing international efforts to protect
the global environment. The Biodiversity Convention's raison d'etre is
habitat conservation and the equitable distribution of intellectual property
rights flowing from biotechnology.' 4 The Climate Change Convention
seeks to reduce the volume of global greenhouse gas emissions in order to
slow global warming.65  Neither of these Conventions obligates or
commits the signatories to reach specific targets, although the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to the Climate Change Convention does take a modest first step
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 5.2 percent by 2012.1
These MEAs indicate that developing and developed countries so
far appear to be working at cross purposes in addressing environmental
priorities, with developing countries focused on water, housing, and
poverty reduction, and the developed countries focused on ozone
depletion, biodiversity, deforestation, and desertification.
62 See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
[hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. The Convention has been described as a
"remarkably weak instrument," principally because it lacks an adequate funding
mechanism. See GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 51, at 855. See generally WTO,
Comm. on Trade and Env't, Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Recent
Developments, Part I, Convention on Biological Diversity, WT/CTE/W/44 (Mar. 20,
1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4; WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't,
The Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Relation to Trade, WT/CTE/W/64 (Sept.
29, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
63 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 38, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
See generally Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral
Trade Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996).
6 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 62, art. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 823.
65 See Climate Change Convention, supra note 63, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
66 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997 (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/protintr.html>.
Thirty-eight industrialized countries committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Because no developing country made such a commitment, the prospects for Senate
approval of the Protocol are dim. The text of the Kyoto Protocol is available on the
Internet at <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/cop3/protocol.html> (visited Oct. 25, 1998).
See generally James Cameron & Zen Makuch, Implementation of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: International Trade Law Implications, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 116 (James Cameron et al.
eds., 1994); Fletcher, supra note 5; Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements
and the GA TT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841 (1996).
67 See Robert M. Press, A Year After Rio, North and South Still Debate Priorities,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 3.
1998] 389
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
II. THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM: A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REGIME FOR RESOLVING TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES
A. Introduction
GATT and its policy of promoting liberal trade are in a broad sense
resource conserving. By reducing trade barriers, resources are used more
efficiently because the most efficient producers, regardless of their country
of origin, are permitted to take advantage of their competitive edge.
GATT strives for equal treatment of goods, regardless of their source of
origin. GATT enforces this policy through a nondiscrimination principle
that operates at two levels: (1) nondiscrimination by an importing country
among importers, and (2) nondiscrimination between imported goods and
the domestic like product.6" At the same time, GATT does not prevent a
country from setting its own domestic priorities regarding the level of
environmental protection it wants to achieve at home.69
Broadly stated, any government regulation of or interference with
international trade that deviates from the liberal trade philosophy of GATT
is disapproved." That is true, however, only as a general matter. Despite
its commitment to the goal of liberal trade, GATT does permit government
intervention in the market to regulate or prohibit the flow of goods across
national borders under limited circumstances. Besides authorizing the
imposition of tariffs on imported goods,"1 GATT also permits deviations
from the liberal trade paradigm in several noteworthy instances.
First, notwithstanding Article XI's prohibition against quantitative
restrictions, a WTO Member facing a balance-of-payments shortfall may
impose "quantitative restrictions" (i.e., quotas) on imported goods
temporarily until its balance-of-payments position improves.72 Second,
domestic industries seriously injured by imports of competing products
may receive "safeguard" relief from their home government (known in the
United States as Section 201 escape clause relief).73 Such relief can take
68 See GATT, supra note 6, art. III.
6 See id. art. XX.
70 For a thorough legal treatment of the GATT-WTO system, see generally RAJ BHALA &
KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW (1998).
7 See GATT, supra note 6, art. II.
7: See id. art. XII.
73 See Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. 2251-2254 (1994).
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the form of a temporary increase in tariffs, the imposition of quotas, or
both, on competing imports. ' Third, under the Article XX exceptions
dealing with public health and safety measures, inter alia, and Article XXI
dealing with national security, a Member may restrict or prohibit imports."
Of the various GATT exceptions to the MFN and national
treatment commitments, the most important in the context of trade and the
environment are the Article XX exceptions.76
B. The Article XX Exceptions
In order to gain a better understanding of the scope of the Article
XX general exceptions, they must be read against the backdrop of GATT
Article 111:4, the national treatment obligation. Article II1:4 generally
obligates WTO Members not to discriminate against imports vis-a-vis the
domestic like product.77 It provides in part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use.
78
When an importing Member's health and safety standards discriminate
against imported goods in favor of the domestic like product, the exporting
71 See GATT, supra note 6, art XIX; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54.
71 See GATT, supra note 6, arts. XX, XXI. One recent use of these provisions occurred
when Nicaragua filed a complaint with the GATT Secretariat challenging a 1985 U.S.
trade embargo against Nicaragua. The United States invoked GATT Article XXI in
defense of the embargo. It was lifted in 1990 when relations between the two countries
improved. See generally Peter Kornbluh, Uncle Sam's Money War Against the
Sandinistas, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1998, at Cl; Joanne Omang, Sanctions: A Policy by
Default, WASH. POST., May 8, 1985, at AI.
76 See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX.
" See Jackson, supra note 14, at 1235-39. A parallel provision dealing with the tax
treatment of imports vis-a-vis the domestic like product is contained in GATT Article
111:2. See GATT, supra note 6. See generally Christian Pitschas, GATT/WTO Rules for
Border Tax Adjustments and the Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 24 GA. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 479 (1995).
78 GATT, supra note 6, art II1:4.
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Member may have a legitimate complaint under GATT Article XXIII that
a trade benefit has been nullified or impaired.79 Similarly, to the extent the
importing Member's health and safety regulations purport to have
extraterritorial effect, for example, by targeting the production processes
and methods (PPMs) by which the imported product was manufactured or
processed in the exporting Member, Article 111:4 also may be violated.8"
GATT imposes practically no legal constraints, however, on a Member
that has set for itself the goal of protecting its environment by regulating
domestic industries that use polluting production processes and methods."
Notwithstanding Article III's national treatment commitment and
GATT's overall liberal trade philosophy, Article XX nevertheless permits
WTO Members to restrict imports on a number of specific grounds.8 2 Of
the ten enumerated general exceptions, the public health and safety
exception, the customs enforcement exception, and the exception for
conservation of natural resources touch most directly on the enforcement
of environmental laws and regulations. 3 These three exceptions provide:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
7 See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII; Josh Schein, Comment, Section 301 and U.S.
Trade Law: The Limited Impact of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on
American Obligations Under GATT, PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J., Winter 1992, at 105, 123-
25.
80 See GATT, supra note 6, art. 111:4.
81 See Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 702.
2 Article XX exceptions relate to protection of public morals, human, plant or animal
life; national treasures; exhaustible natural resources; and importation and exportation of
gold and silver. Additionally, Article XX permits restrictions related to protection of
intellectual property rights and GATT-conforming intergovernmental commodity
agreements. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX.
83 For an overview and inventory of GATT provisions dealing with environmental issues,
see Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535 (1992).
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or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Agreement, including those relating to customs
enforcement, . . . the protection of patents, trademarks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."
Thus, in order for an importing country to impose a GATT-permissible
health or safety import measure, that measure (1) must be necessary (i.e.,
no less trade-restrictive alternative is available), (2) must not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same conditions
prevail (i.e., it must be consistent with the MFN and national treatment
obligations), and (3) must not be a disguised restriction on international
trade.85
Considering the open-textured quality of the terms "necessary,"
"arbitrarily," and "unjustifiably," the health and safety exception has the
obvious potential for being a rich source of formidable nontariff barriers to
trade. 6 For example, does the exception for human life and health cover
persons within the importing Member only, or does it extend to human
health and life globally? Can health and safety measures have
extraterritorial application? Given the vagaries of the public health and
safety exception, the potential for abuse by economically powerful
countries anxious to foist their own brand of environmental protection on
weaker trading nations is ever present.87 GATT practice generally has
been to construe the Article XX exceptions narrowly in favor of open trade
84 GATT, supra note 6, art XX.
85 See generally Charnovitz I, supra note 1; Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 713.
86 For the drafting history of GATT Article XX, see I WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 563-66 (1995) [hereinafter
GUIDE TO GATT].
"7 See Jackson, supra note 14, at 1241.
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and against protectionist barriers to trade.88
C. The Uruguay Round and the Environment
When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, not only was the
link between trade and the environment far from most negotiators' minds,
but the environment was not even on the Uruguay Round agenda. 9 Well
into the Round, the 1992 GATT Report on Trade and the Environment
was published, which concluded that trade restrictions used for
environmental purposes are likely to be counterproductive because they
reduce world prosperity.9" Environmentalists were not pleased.
Reeling from its setbacks in the two Tuna/Dolphin decisions," the
United States successfully lobbied in the late stages of the Uruguay Round
for the inclusion of environment-friendly provisions in several Uruguay
Round texts.92 Despite the many thorny and seemingly insoluble issues
vying for their attention, the Uruguay Round negotiators managed to turn
their attention to the issue of trade and the environment in the closing
months of the Round. Several Uruguay Round documents reflect the
negotiators' efforts.
First, the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization makes environmental protection a high priority for WTO
Members. The Preamble states that the Members recognize:
that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
88 See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 81-90; GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 86, at 561-96.
These three GATT Article XX exceptions and the role of GATT Article XX as an
environmental regulatory tool are discussed in Jackson, supra note 14, at 1239-45.
89 For an overview of environmental issues in the Uruguay Round, see OFFICE OF U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES, in URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, vol. 1, H.R. DOC. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1163 (1994) [hereinafter
USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES].
90 For comprehensive discussion of this report, see Hamilton Southworth, III, GA TT and
the Environment-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade and the Environment,
GATT Doc. 1529 (February 13, 1992), 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 997 (1992).
" See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS20/R (June
1994), 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II Panel Report].
92 See USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 89.
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and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development
93
The parallels with Principles 11, 12, and 16 of the Rio declaration are
striking. 94 For the first time in a multilateral legal instrument on trade, the
congruence between trade and the environment is acknowledged. The
Preamble provides that environmental protection and conservation are to
serve as markers for WTO Members along the road to trade
liberalization.95
Second, the Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment issued
at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round reiterates the views expressed in
the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, and adds the following:
[T]here should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction
between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-
discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on
the one hand, and acting for the protection of the
environment, and the promotion of sustainable
development on the other.96
In order to coordinate trade and environment policies, the ministers also
9' AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Apr. 15, 1994, 108
Stat. 4809, 4815, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
" See Rio Declaration, supra note 26, princs. 11, 12, 16.
9' See generally Christine Cuccia, Protecting Animals in the Name of Biodiversity: Effects
of the Uruguay Round of Measures Regulating Methods of Harvesting, 13 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 481 (1995); Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System:
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 175 (1996); Kelly J. Hunt, Comment, International Environmental
Agreements in Conflict with GA TT-Greening GA TT After the Uruguay Round
Agreement, 30 INT'L LAW. 163 (1996).
96 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, April 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1267
(1994).
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established the Committee on Trade and Environment.97 Its terms of
reference include identifying the "relationship between trade and
environmental measures" and making "recommendations on whether any
modifications [to the GATT-WTO system] are required." 98 The work of
the Committee is discussed later in this Section.
Third, four agreements directly bearing on environmental issues
were concluded in the Uruguay Round. They are the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,9 the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade,'" the Agreement on Agriculture,"°' and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 2  A fifth
agreement, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, 3  underscores that unilateralism is an
impermissible route for resolving trade-environment disputes."
D. The SPS Agreement
1. Introduction
Experience has shown that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
97 See id. at 1268.
98 Id.
99 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA 1 1-AIA-4 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], reprinted in RAJ BHALA,
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at
137 (1996).
o Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 11-
AIA-6 [hereinafter TBT Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at 168.
'.' Agreement on Agriculture, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 1 l-AIA-3
[hereinafter Agriculture Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at 110.
102 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA 11-12 [hereinafter SCM Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at
265. Environmental considerations are expressly mentioned in one other Uruguay
Round Agreement. Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "Members may
exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the
commercial exploitation of which is necessary . . .to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment." See M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2. An Argument for Caution, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 381 (1997).
03 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
"o4 See Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GA TT- Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 541, 566 n.131 (1994).
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measures frequently are employed when other, more traditional barriers to
trade, such as tariffs and quotas, are reduced or eliminated."' Many
countries, including the United States, often have had the unhappy
experience of negotiating tariff reductions and quota eliminations, only to
be met with a suspect SPS measure that wipes out the benefit of the earlier
bargain." Before the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) was made a
part of the GATT-WTO legal regime, Article XX(b) was the only GATT
provision-and at best a skeletal one-dealing expressly with the subject
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures."' Until the SPS Agreement, no
multilateral trade agreement existed with a fully articulated set of rules
governing a country's use of SPS measures in connection with imported
goods.' 8 The SPS Agreement fills this gap by circumscribing WTO
Members' use of such measures as a nontariff barrier to trade.
2. Coverage
The SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary
measures that may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.' °  The
SPS Agreement does not create any substantive sanitary or phytosanitary
'0o See Marsha A. Echols, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY AND
U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 191, 191 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996).
"o See Jennifer Haverkamp, Provisions of the Uruguay Round with a Potential Effect on
U.S. Environmental Laws and Regulations, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND (Inst. on
Current Issues in Int'l Trade ed. 1995).
107 See GATI, supra note 6, art XX(b).
108 By the time the Uruguay Round was concluded, one regional agreement existed
governing sanitary and phytosanitary measures, namely, NAFTA ch. 7:B. See NAFTA,
supra note 8, 32 I.L.M. at 377. Its rules are derived in large part from earlier drafts of
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See Echols,
supra note 105, at 193-94.
o9 See generally John J. Barcel6, III, Product Standards to Protect the Local
Environment-the GA TT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755 (1994); Echols, supra note 105; Robert M.
Millimet, The Impact of the Uruguay Round and the New Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures: An Analysis of the U.S. Ban on DDT, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 449 (1995).
The WTO Secretariat has published a booklet, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
(1996). It is available from the WTO's website at <http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/
spsund.htm> (visited Oct. 30, 1998).
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measures per se. Instead, the Agreement sets forth a number of general
procedural requirements to ensure that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure
is in fact a scientifically-based protection against the risk asserted by the
Member imposing the measure, and not a disguised barrier to trade."10
The Agreement expressly recognizes that Members have a
legitimate right to protect human, animal, and plant life and health, and to
establish a level of protection for life and health that they deem
appropriate."' The provisions of the SPS Agreement are designed to
preserve the ability of Members to act in this area while at the same time
guarding against the use of unjustified SPS measures that are primarily
designed to protect a domestic industry from foreign competition." 2 The
Agreement establishes criteria and procedures to distinguish the former
from the latter, which is not always an easy task, as illustrated by the ten-
year dispute between the United States and the EU over the 1987 EU ban
on U.S. beef from cattle fed with growth-inducing hormones.'
3. Definition of SPS Measures
The SPS Agreement provides a comprehensive definition of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. An SPS measure is any measure
applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within
the territory of the Member from risks arising from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, or disease-
causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within
the territory of the Member from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the
territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases
Ho See SPS Agreement, supra note 99; David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817 (1994).
. See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, pmbl.
112 See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and
WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231, 237 (1997).
3 See WTO Panel Report, European Communities-EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4.
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carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the
territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or
spread of pests. 114
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees,
regulations, requirements, and procedures governing inter alia, (1) end
product criteria; (2) processes and production methods; (3) testing,
inspection, certification and approval procedures; (4) quarantine
requirements including relevant requirements associated with the transport
of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival
during transport; (5) provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling
procedures and methods of risk assessment; and (6) packaging and
labeling requirements directly related to food safety."5
Whether a measure is an SPS measure depends on its intent. If a
measure is not intended to protect against one of the risks just mentioned,
then it is not an SPS measure." 6
4. Scientifically-Based Measures
The basic right of Members under the SPS Agreement is the ability
to take SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health. This right is qualified by three provisos. Such
measures (1) must be applied only to the extent necessary, (2) must be
based on scientific principles, and (3) must not be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, except that such measures may be imposed
temporarily, when evidence is insufficient, pending receipt of additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk."7
Article 2.3 reiterates the threshold inquiry of the GATT Article XX
chapeau, namely, that SPS measures must not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail and must not constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade." '8 A Member's failure to satisfy Articles 2.2 and 2.3
114 SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A, para. l(a)-(d).
"5 See id. Annex A, para 1. See also Echols, supra note 105, at 194.
'"See Echols, supra note 105, at 213 n.22.
"1 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.2, 5.7.
"s See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.3.
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would in itself constitute a violation of GATT, regardless of the measure's
consistency with the remainder of GATT.
A Member is free to establish its own level of sanitary and
phytosanitary protection, including a "zero risk" level if it so chooses.' 9
Regardless of the level of risk a Member chooses to adopt, however, a
measure must be based on scientific principles and on sufficient scientific
evidence.'2° The judgments to be drawn from that evidence are left to the
Member because scientific certainty is rare. Many scientific
determinations require judgments among competing scientific views (e.g.,
whether or not global warming is taking place; if it is, whether the cause is
attributable to humans; and, if so, what the proper response is).
There is obviously a good deal of "play in the joints" of the SPS
Agreement.
5. Use of International Standards
The SPS Agreement requires Members to harmonize their SPS
measures by adopting international standards where such standards exist.'2
Such international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are
developed by several international bodies. The most important are (1) the
Codex Alimentarius Commission (the Codex), established in 1963 andjointly administered by the World Health Organization and the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization, with over 130 members;' 2  (2) the
" See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.2, 5; Zane 0. Gresham & Thomas A.
Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality: The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Federal and State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1995).
120 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.2.
121 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art 3.1 (" [m]embers shall base their sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on international standards . . .") (emphasis added). These
international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are further defined in Annex
A:3 of the SPS Agreement to include those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
International Office of Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant
Protection Convention.
'22 The Codex Alimentarius Commission has issued more than 200 commodity standards
and approximately 2,000 maximum limits for pesticide residues. See WTO, Comm. on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Complete List of Codex Standards, Codes of
Practice, Guidelines and Related Texts, G/SPS/GEN/29 (Oct. 1, 1997), available in
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
General information about the Codex Alimentarius Commission, including the
contents of the Codex Alimentarius, is available from the Commission's website at
<http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/economic/esn/codex/codex.htm> (visited Oct. 25,
1998).
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International Office of Epizootics (OIE), founded in 1924 and charged
with the tasks of developing a worldwide livestock reporting system and
expediting trade in livestock without increasing livestock disease;1 23 and
(3) the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC),
an agreement intended to prevent the spread of plant pests.
24
Although the SPS Agreement generally obligates Members to
adopt international standards where they exist, the Agreement further
provides that Members may adopt more stringent standards if, based on
scientific justification, the relevant international standard fails to provide
an adequate level of protection.'23
Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement offers an incentive for the
adoption of international standards by establishing a rebuttable
presumption that a national SPS measure based on an international
standard is not only necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health, but also is consistent with GATT.'26 At the same time, the SPS
Agreement recognizes the politically sensitive nature of SPS measures for
Members that desire to give their consumers and environment the highest
levels of protection. The drafters of the SPS Agreement bowed to pressure
from environmental groups that feared that the SPS Agreement would lead
to a ratcheting down of national standards if international standards
became the mandatory maximum levels of protection a Member could
"2 See International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for
Epizootics, 57 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1925). General information
about the governing body, the International Committee, including its publications, is
available from its website at <http://www.oie.org> (visited Oct. 25, 1998).
24 International Plant Protection Convention, 150 U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force April
3, 1952). General information about the Convention is available from the Food and
Agriculture Organization's website at <http://www.fao.org> (visited Oct. 25, 1998). See
WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, International Standards for
Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/GEN/31 (Oct. 1, 1997), available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4.
25 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3. The Committee on SPS Measures has
established a system under which standards, guidelines, and recommendations developed
by the Codex, OIE, and IPPC that have a major trade impact are to be monitored. A list
of standards, guidelines, and recommendations that have a major impact on international
trade is to be established by the Committee. It may invite the appropriate international
standards-setting body to consider reviewing the existing standard, guidelines, or
recommendation. See WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Procedure to Monitor the Process of International Harmonization, G/SPS/l 1 (Oct. 22,
1997).
26 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.2. For a discussion on burden of proof in
SPS disputes, see Barcel6, supra note 109, at 774-75.
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adopt. This fear was based in part on the status of the Codex, the OIE, and
the IPPC Secretariat as arbiters of food safety and animal and plant health
issues. In the eyes of environmentalists, these organizations' deliberations
are largely influenced by transnational corporations." 7 Thus, despite the
encouragement to adopt international standards, Article 3.3 permits
Members to adopt measures that result in a higher level of protection if a
scientific justification exists.'28 Consequently, a Member's ability to adopt
standards higher than those promulgated by these organizations is
assured.'29
6. Mutual Recognition of Standards
Because a range of SPS measures may be available to achieve the
same level of protection, there may be differences among Members' SPS
measures at the same level of protection. Article 4 requires Members to
accept the measures of other Members as equivalent, even if they differ
formally from those of the importing Member, if the exporting Member
demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing Member's
appropriate level of protection. 3 ' Members are further obligated to enter
into consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral
agreements on recognition of equivalence of specified SPS measures. 'i"
Experience suggests that recognition of equivalence is indeed very
difficult to achieve even among countries that are economically integrated.
For example, consider the experience of the EU which in 1996 imposed a
ban on exports of UK beef and related products from cattle possibly
infected with "mad cow" disease. The EU imposed the ban over the
objections of the UK that its beef products posed no health risk and a
threat to withdraw from the EU."I
In a more progressive vein, 1996 amendments to U.S. legislation
on poultry and meat inspections authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
27 See PHILLIP EVANS & JAMES WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GATT 23 (1994).
128 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3.
129 See id.
30 See id. art. 4.
'3' See id. art. 4.2.
132 See Jeffrey Ulbrich, EU Lifts Export Ban on British Beef London Must Institute Series
of Safeguards Against Cattle Disease, WASH. POST, June 22, 1996, at A21; Fred
Barbash, Britain Fights Back Over Ban on Beef Exports; Major Says He Will Buck
European Union Until 'Mad Cow' Linits Are Suspended, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at
A27.
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certify that poultry and meat inspection systems of other countries are
equivalent to those of the United States.' In 1997, the EU and the United
States reached a framework agreement on veterinary equivalency. 
4
7. Risk Assessment
Because the levels of protection established by international bodies
are regarded as the minimum level attainable, Article 5 permits Members
to maintain higher levels of protection than those based on international
standards. 3 A Member must have scientific evidence to justify such
higher levels of protection or must show that it is "the appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection" as determined under the criteria of
Article 5.'6 As long as there is a scientific justification for a particular
SPS standard, a Member is free to choose its own level of protection after
determining that the health or safety risk is genuine. '  The SPS
Agreement does not require "downward harmonization" through the
adoption of less stringent SPS measures.'38
An example of more stringent domestic standards are the U.S.
Delaney Clauses, repealed in 1996, that prohibited the introduction of food
or color additives in processed foods if the substances posed any risk of
cancer in humans or animals."' The Delaney Clauses established a level
of protection that reflected a congressional decision that there should be
zero risk of cancer to humans from the substances those clauses covered.
That congressional determination was based on scientific evidence
available at the time of its enactment and a risk assessment (i.e., an
' See Poultry Products Inspection Act § 17(d), 21 U.S.C.A. § 466 (1996); Federal Meat
Inspection Act § 20(e), 21 U.S.C.A. § 620 (1996). The United States and the EU have
been engaged in intense negotiations to conclude mutual recognition agreements on food
and labeling requirements. See U.S., EU Fail to Meet MRA Deadline; New Talks Slated
for Later This Month, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (1997). See generally Elliot B.
Staffin, Trade Barriers or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental
Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205
(1996).
".. See U.S. and EU Agree on Framework On Veterinary Equivalency Except for Poultry,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 807 (1997).




"' See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). See also
21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1994).
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evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human life or health,
even though the risk of carcinogenesis was slight). The evidence and
assessment resulted in a level of zero risk of carcinogenesis."°
Under pressure from domestic farm groups, Congress repealed the
Delaney Clauses in the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996' ' because
advances in detection techniques had developed to the point that pesticide
residues that fell far below levels considered to pose a serious health threat
could be detected. A new health-based standard that permits less than a
one in one million lifetime risk of cancer was enacted to replace the zero-
risk standard set by the Delaney Clauses.'42
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement identifies specific criteria to be
used in evaluating the assessment of risk to human, animal, or plant life or
health: (1) available scientific evidence; (2) inspection, testing, and
sampling techniques; (3) relevant ecological and environmental
conditions; (4) the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; and (5) relevant
product and production measures (PPMs).4 3 In the case of risks to animal
and plant life and health, the economic impact and effectiveness of SPS
measures for both the exporting and importing Members also are to be
considered.'" In all events, the objectives of minimizing negative trade
effects, of avoiding discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade, and
of adopting measures that are not more restrictive of trade than necessary
to achieve the appropriate level of protection are to guide Members when
imposing a level of protection higher than that provided under
international standards.""
If a Member believes that another Member's SPS measure violates
the Agreement, the burden rests on the complaining Member initially to
identify a specific alternative measure that is reasonably available. A
responding Member need not take steps that are deemed to be
unreasonable. Next, the complaining Member must demonstrate that the
alternative measure would make a significant difference in terms of its
negative effect on trade. Once again, the responding Member is not
expected to adopt an alternative measure if it would make only an
insignificant difference on the impact on trade.'4 6
40 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
'41 Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
142 See id.
"' See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.2.
144 See id. art. 5.3.
''5 See id. arts. 5.4-5.6.
'" See id. arts. 5.6 n.3, 5.8.
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8. Conformity Assessment Procedures
Conformity assessment procedures (i.e., control, inspection, and
product approval procedures) are to be conducted under guidelines found
in Annex C of the SPS Agreement.' 7 These procedures closely parallel
those contained in the TBT Agreement. "I Procedures are to be undertaken
and completed without undue delay and are to be nondiscriminatory vis-a-
vis the procedures for the domestic like product.4 9
The concept of disease-free areas and zones within an exporting
Member is to be recognized by importing Members.'50 This concept
ensures that exports of a particular product are not banned on a country-
wide basis, if it can be shown that the exporting Member has implemented
effective quarantine or buffer zone measures. '
9. Transparency
Article 7 and Annex B establish a number of transparency
obligations. Among them is a requirement that SPS measures be
published promptly and that a period for comment be made available
before SPS measures take effect.'52
10. Dispute Settlement
As is the case for all WTO disputes, the consultation and dispute
settlement procedures of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII, as amplified by
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, apply to disputes under the SPS
Agreement. "' If a dispute under the Agreement involves scientific or
technical issues, the panel is directed to seek advice from experts chosen
by the panel in consultation with the parties.' 4
"4 See id. art. 6.
s See id.; TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 5-9.
"4 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex C: 1(a).
o See id. art. 6.
'5 See id.
.52 See id. art 7, Annex B:5.
'5' See id. art. 11.
4 See id. art. 11:2. For example, in the 1997 WTO Hormone Beef panel proceeding, the
panel consulted scientific experts. See WTO, Panel Proceeding, European Communities
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA at 112-
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11. Administration
A Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is
established to provide a forum for regular consultations.' The Committee
is responsible for maintaining close contact with the relevant international
bodies in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection. Articles 3.5
and 12.4 of the SPS Agreement require the Committee to develop a
procedure for monitoring the process of international harmonization and
the use of international standards, guidelines, or recommendations. 5 6
Members must notify the Committee on SPS Measures of new, or
modifications to existing, SPS regulations that are not substantially the
same as an international standard and that may have a significant effect on
international trade. As of the end of 1996, the Committee had received
396 such notifications from 31 WTO Members.'57 Article 12.7 directs the
Committee to review the operation and implementation of the Agreement
three years after its entry into force.'58
12. Implementation at Sub-Federal Level
Under Article 13 of the Agreement, Members are responsible for
ensuring that their sub-federal levels of government and non-governmental
organizations responsible for setting standards comply with the provisions
of the Agreement.'59 Members are required to formulate and implement
positive measures and mechanisms in support of observance of the
Agreement by sub-national government bodies.'
159, Annex (Aug. 18, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. See
generally Wirth, supra note 110.
m See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 12.1.
56See id., arts. 3.5, 12.1, 12.4.
117 See WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Report of the Committee
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/L/1 18 (Oct. 15, 1996), available in WTO
Doc. Website, supra note 4.
"' See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 12.7; WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Procedure to Review the Operation and Implementation of the
Agreement, G/SPS/10 (Oct. 21, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4;
OFFICE OF THE USTR, REVIEW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON
THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES (May 1998), available
in USTR Website, <http://www.ustr.gov> (visited Jan. 21, 1999).
's" See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 13.
60 See id.
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State and local governments within the United States remain free
to set their our SPS standards under the terms of the Agreement.'' They
are under no obligation to adopt federal standards, unless Congress so
mandates under its commerce clause power.' 62
13. Extraterritoriality
The definition of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in Annex A
of the SPS Agreement-"measures to protect human or animal life or
health within the territory of the Member"'6 -settles an issue regarding
the extraterritorial application of SPS measures that arose in the unadopted
GATT panel report on Restrictions on Imports of Tuna.)" The panel
concluded that application of measures taken under Article XX(b) are
limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the country imposing the
measures.6  Conceding that the U.S. ban on imports of tuna was not a
disguised restriction on trade, but rather a bona fide measure designed to
protect dolphins inadvertently caught with tuna in purse-seine nets, the
panel still ruled that the U.S. measure could not extend beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. As noted by the GATT panel, if the rule were
otherwise, then
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life
or health protection policies from which other contracting
parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights
under the General Agreement. The General Agreement
would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework
for trade among all contracting parties but would provide
legal security only in respect of trade between a limited
number of contracting parties with identical internal
161 See id.
112 In 1997, tension was building between twelve states and the EPA over allegedly lax
enforcement of clean air and clean water regulations by the states. The EPA was
threatening to cut off federal funds and to limit the authority of those states to enforce
those laws. See States Feud with EPA Over Regulations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.
19, 1997, at 4.
163 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A (emphasis added).
164 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7, paras. 5.24-5.29, GATT B.I.S.D. (396
Supp.) at 198-200, 30 I.L.M. at 1619-20.
65 See id.
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regulations. 6
The GATT panel concluded that unilateral, extraterritorial
application by the United States of health regulations under Article XX(b)
is impermissible. 67 Nevertheless, under the SPS Agreement, a Member
may insist, for example, that imported food meet its health and safety
standards, provided those standards are based on science and risk
assessment.'
61
14. Relationship With the Agreement on Agriculture
Finally, the problem of misuse of SPS measures is especially acute
in connection with imports of agricultural products that are frequently the
target of legitimate, and not so legitimate, SPS measures.'69 There was
concern in some quarters that as the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture eliminates or reduces barriers to agricultural trade, 70 a new set
of SPS measures would be introduced as contingent protection, with the
sole purpose of protecting domestic agricultural producers from import
competition. To counter preemptively such a development the SPS
Agreement was negotiated in tandem with the 1994 Agreement on
Agriculture to ensure that the benefits of liberalized agricultural trade are
not diluted. Indeed, Article 14 of the Agreement on Agriculture
underscores the importance of not allowing unjustified SPS measures to
undermine the gains of the Agriculture Agreement. It provides:
"Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."''
I66Id. para. 5.27.
6 See id. para. 7.1.
.68 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.
"'v See Echols, supra note 105, at 192.
70 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 101; EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATION § 14.22 (1995).
'' Agriculture Agreement, supra note 101, art. 14. Article 14 of the SPS Agreement also
provides that least-developed country members may delay the application of the SPS
Agreement until 2000. Other developing countries were permitted to delay the
application of the Agreement until January 1, 1997, if necessary because of a lack of
technical expertise or infrastructure. No specific problems with regard to the
implementation of the Agreement by developing country have been brought to the
attention of the Committee on SPS Measures. See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art.
14. See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 14.41.
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E. The TBTAgreement
A second Uruguay Round Agreement providing a multilateral
response to trade-environment disputes is the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).' The TBT Agreement builds on the
fifteen-year experience of the Tokyo Round Standards Code.' The TBT
Agreement balances the ability of governments and the private sector to
implement legitimate standards and the procedures for assessing product
conformity with those standards against their unjustified use to protect a
domestic industry. The TBT Agreement establishes rules on
distinguishing legitimate standards and conformity assessment procedures
from protectionist measures and procedures in three areas: (1) the
preparation and adoption of technical regulations and standards; (2)
conformity assessment procedures and mutual recognition of other
countries assessments; and (3) information and assistance about technical
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures. 7 " Like its
predecessor, the TBT Agreement does not establish or prescribe standards,
technical regulations, or conformity assessment procedures. Rather, it
establishes general procedural requirements to be observed when adopting
or using such measures so they do not create unnecessary obstacles to
trade. '
The TBT Agreement excludes from its scope of coverage sanitary
and phytosanitary measures as defined in the SPS Agreement.'76 The SPS
Agreement similarly provides that it does not affect Members' rights
under the TBT Agreement with respect to measures outside the scope of
the SPS Agreement.' Despite their mutual exclusivity, the substantive
provisions of the two agreements mirror each other, in most respects.' A
significant difference between the SPS and TBT Agreements is the test for
determining whether a measure is impermissibly protectionist. Whereas
the TBT Agreement relies on a nondiscrimination test, " the inquiry under
172 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex IA.
'.. See McGOVERN, supra note 170, § 1.11.
' See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 2-4 (Technical Regulations and Standards),
arts. 5-9 (Conformity with Technical Regulations and Standards), arts. 10-12
(Information and Assistance). See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, 5 1.11.
"' See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.
176 See id. art. 1.5; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A, para. 1.
177 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 1.4.
171 See MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 7.2421.
171 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.1.
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the SPS Agreement is whether the measure has a scientific justification
and is based on risk assessment.' 0  A strict requirement of
nondiscrimination would not be practicable for SPS measures that
discriminate against imported goods based on their origin. Goods may
pose a risk of disease precisely because the goods come from a Member
where such disease is prevalent. The same risk might not be true for
similar goods coming from another Member. Discrimination is, therefore,
tolerated under the SPS Agreement, so long as it is not arbitrary or
unjustifiable. "'
1. Definitions
Besides incorporating all of the core principles of the Standards
Code, the TBT Agreement provides definitions of several key terms in
Annex 1 of the Agreement, thereby clarifying some ambiguities. The TBT
Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as a "[d]ocument which lays
down product characteristics or their related production processes and
methods ... with which compliance is mandatory."'' 2 A "standard" in turn
is defined as a "[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for
products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory."'83 The difference between the two is that
the former, being mandatory, is promulgated only by a government body.
The latter, being voluntary, may be issued not only by a governmental
body but also by recognized non-governmental standardizing bodies, such
as the Society of Automotive Engineers.
Like its predecessor, the TBT Agreement does not cover services,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, or government purchasing
specifications.'" However, unlike the Standards Code, the TBT
Agreement covers regulations and standards on production processes and
methods (PPMs) to the extent they relate to product characteristics, but not
as they relate to pollution caused by PPMs.8 5
'
8o See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.1.
18' See id. art. 5.
182 TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex 1, para. 1.
183 Id. Annex 1, para. 2.
184 See id. arts. 1.3-1.5.
.85 On the subject of PPMs and PPM-based trade measures, see OECD, PROCESSES AND
PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
USE OF PPM BASED TRADE MEASURES (1997).
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2. Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards
The TBT Agreement builds on the obligations of the Standards
Code with regard to the preparation, adoption, and application of technical
regulations and standards.' 86 The TBT Agreement first restates the MFN
and national treatment commitments. '87 The Agreement then directs
Members not to prepare, adopt, or apply technical regulations that are an
unnecessary obstacle to trade. 8  The Agreement defines "unnecessary" as
a regulation that is "more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would
create."' 89 Article 2.2 provides that in assessing risks, "relevant elements
of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of
products.""'
Members are encouraged to base their technical regulations on
international standards where they exist. 9' If Members do so, and the
regulation is for one of the legitimate objectives (i.e., national security, the
prevention of deceptive practices, the protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment),9' then any other
Member complaining about the regulation carries the burden of proving
the regulation creates an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.'93
This Article establishes a burden of proof comparable to the one found in
the SPS Agreement for Members challenging another Member's technical
standards.'94 The complaining Member must show that another measure
exists that (1) is reasonably available to the government; (2) fulfills the
government's legitimate objectives, and (3) is significantly less restrictive
to trade. "I With respect to the third element, the United States delegation
to the Uruguay Round negotiations sought to include a footnote similar to
186 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Code of Good Practice for Preparation,
Adoption, and Application of Standards, Annex 3.
'
8 7 See id. art. 2.1.
88 See id. art. 2.2.
9 See id.
'9g See id.
'9' See id. art 2.4.
192 See id. art 2.2.
i' See id. art. 2.5.
194 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 4.
" See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.2.
1998]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
that in the sixth paragraph of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. 96 Other
delegations, however, were unprepared to add any language to the TBT
Agreement in view of the time pressures to conclude the negotiations.'97
The leading international body involved in the drafting and
promulgation of international technical standards is the International
Standards Organization (ISO).'98 The ISO is a federation of ninety-one
national standards organizations whose standards are voluntary. The ISO
is currently developing two series of standards bearing directly on the TBT
Agreement. One series is known as the ISO 14000 series for
environmental management systems, environmental auditing systems, life-
cycle analysis, and environmental labeling.'99 These standards will have a
far ranging impact on environmental management programs of firms
located in Members adopting these standards.2"
The second series is known as ISO 9000, a series of quality
standards. These standards cover five areas in the production and
manufacturing process: (1) design, development, production, installation,
and servicing; (2) build-to-print, installation, and servicing without design;
(3) assembly and test; (4) implementation and control; and (5)
implementation of ISO 9000 (audits, certification, and registration). 0' The
196 This footnote provides:
[A] measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is
another measure, reasonably availablo taking into account technical
and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of...
protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade.
SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.6 n.3.
"' See URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 316, vol. 1, 103d Cong., at 656, 780, 790-91, 1126 n.24 (1994).
")8 See MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 7.23.
99 See generally RICHARD BARRETT CLEMENTS, COMPLETE GUIDE TO ISO 14000 (1996);
DON SAYRE, INSIDE ISO 14000: THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (1996); TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1996); Paula C. Murray, The International
Environmental Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an
Emerging Environmental Policy?, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577 (1997).
200 Information on the ISO 14000 series is available from the ISO's website at
<http://www.iso14000.com> (visited Oct. 25. 1998). See generally Rafe Petersen, ISO
14000 Internet Databases, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 613 (1997). Information on the work by the
U.S. member of the ISO on ISO 14000, the American National Standards Institute, is
available from its website at <http://www.ansi.org/home.html> (visited Oct. 25, 1998).
211 See generally JAYANTHA K. BANDYOPADHYAY, QS-9000 HANDBOOK (1996); ROBERT
T. CRAIG, THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDE TO ACHIEVING ISO 9000 CERTIFICATION (1994);
GREG HUTCHINS, THE ISO 9000 IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL (1994); JOHN T. RABBIT &
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ISO 9000 standards have been adopted by the U.S. automobile industry
where the Big Three require that suppliers of raw materials, component
parts, subassemblies, and service parts meet ISO 9000 quality standards."2
3. Regulations Based on Performance Characteristics
Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement retains the Code requirement
that drafted technical regulations be based upon product performance
rather than product design or descriptive characteristics."' The TBT
Agreement leaves it to each manufacturer to determine how best to
accomplish the goal of ensuring that the product will perform in a certain
manner.
20
4. Sub-Central Levels of Government
With respect to technical regulations and standards issued by state
governments, central governments are required to give notice of such
regulations and standards, thus enhancing transparency. 5 Central
governments are obligated further under Article 3 to "formulate and
implement positive measures and mechanisms in support of the
observance of the provisions of Article 2 (respecting the preparation,
adoption, and application of technical regulations by local government and
non-governmental bodies) by other than central government bodies.20 6
5. Code of Good Practice
Regarding the preparation, adoption, and application of standards,
the TBT Agreement includes a Code of Good Practice for the Preparation,
Adoption and Application of Standards 207 that is binding on central
PETER A. BERGH, THE ISO 9000 BOOK: COMPETITOR'S GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND
CERTIFICATION (1993); Lisa C. Thompson & William J. Thompson, The ISO 9000
Quality Standards: Will They Constitute a Technical Barrier to Free Trade Under the
NAFTA and the WTO?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 155 (1997). Information on ISO
9000 is available from the ISO's website at <http://www.iso9000.com> (visited Oct. 25,
1998).
202 See BANDYOPADHYAY, supra note 201, at 4.
203 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.8.
204 See id.
205 See id. art. 3.2.
206 See id. art 3.5.
207 See id. Annex 3.
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governments." 8 The Code of Good Practice was proposed by the EU
during the Uruguay Round.2°  It reiterates the obligations of the
Agreement applicable generally to central governments, and extends their
application to local governmental and non-governmental standardizing
bodies that elect to adopt the Code. 210 Eighty-four standardizing bodies
had accepted the Code of Good Practice at the end of 1997.1
6. Conformity Assessment Procedures
The TBT Agreement updates and expands disciplines on
conformity assessment procedures. Whereas the Standards Code applied
only to testing, Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement defines "conformity
assessment procedures" to include all aspects of conformity assessment,
including laboratory accreditation and quality system registration.22
Besides reiterating the national treatment commitment in carrying out
conformity assessment procedures," the TBT Agreement encourages
acceptance of conformity assessment procedures by other Members, even
when those procedures differ from their own."'
An issue of special concern to the United States was the formation
in the EU of a regional certification system for the mutual recognition of
quality assessments for electronics closed to outside suppliers. This
development raised fears in the United States that countries outside the EU
would not have open access to the certification procedures, thus putting
United States electronics industries at a competitive disadvantage in a
large and rapidly expanding market. Acceptance of test data generally by
foreign laboratories was a high priority for the United States as it entered
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Unless test results are mutually
recognized, suppliers will be forced to repeat tests before their products
can enter the territory of another Member. In this connection, Article 6.1
20 See id. art. 4.1.
209 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. No. 2403, OPERATION OF THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 58 (1991).
210 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 5-9.
211 See WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, First Triennial Review of the
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
G/TBT/5, at 3, para. 1 1 (Nov. 19, 1997) [hereinafter WTO, First Triennial Review],
available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
212 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex 1, para. 3.
213 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 5.1.
211 See id. art. 6.1.
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directs Members to recognize other Members' test results, whenever
possible."5  As WTO Members adopt internationally-recognized
accreditation standards for laboratory recognition that are promulgated by
bodies such as the ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission,
the issue of mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures
should ultimately be defused.
The Agreement makes the minimum derogation principle expressly
applicable to conformity assessment procedures by providing that
"conformity assessment procedures shall not be more strict or be applied
more strictly than is necessary to give the importing Member adequate
confidence that products conform with the applicable technical regulations
or standards, taking account of the risks non-conformity would create.
21 6
To that end: procedures must be undertaken and completed as
expeditiously as possible; the standard processing period must be
published and the documentation promptly handled; the location of
conformity assessments and sample selection must not be unnecessarily
inconvenient; and a procedure must be established for reviewing
complaints about the conformity assessment procedures."7
As is the case with technical regulations and standards, central
governments are obligated to take "such reasonable measures as may be
available to them," ensuring compliance by state and local government
bodies and non-governmental bodies with the Agreement's conformity
assessment procedures."'
Article 6.3 addresses accrediting persons, in the exporting
Member, to perform conformity assessment procedures that are
satisfactory to the importing Member. From the perspective of an
importing WTO Member, unless the exporting Member's testing
laboratories have been accredited by authorities of the importing Member,
the validity of test data may be suspect. In this connection, Article 6.3
encourages Members to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of
agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each other's
conformity assessment procedures.2 9  Mutual recognition agreements
eliminate the need for duplicative product testing, inspection, or
certification in both the exporting and importing Member. To that end, the
25 See id.
216 Id. art. 5.1.2.
217 See id. art. 5.2.
218 See id. arts. 7, 8.
219 See id. art. 6.3.
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United States and the EU concluded mutual recognition agreements in
1997.220
7. Enquiry Points
Article 10 of the TBT Agreement endeavors to make national
product regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures
transparent by establishing "enquiry points" where all reasonable enquiries
may be directed for obtaining relevant documents.22 '
8. The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade
Article 13 establishes the Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade to oversee the operation of the Agreement and to conduct an annual
review.222 Pursuant to Article 14, disputes arising under the Agreement are
resolved under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the umbrella
arrangement for resolving all GATT-WTO disputes.223
9. Triennial Review
Finally, Article 15.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that "[n]ot
later than the end of the third year of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and at the end of each three-year period thereafter, the
Committee shall review the operation and implementation of this
Agreement ... ,22 The TBT Committee completed its first triennial
220 In June 1997, the United States and the EU concluded a package of mutual
recognition agreements (MRAs) in six sectors covering approximately $50 billion in two-
way trade. The MRAs will be phased in and fully implemented in 18 months for
recreational craft, two years for telecommunication and electronic products, and three
years for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. See Agreement on Mutual Recognition
Between the United States of America and the European Communities (visited Feb. 15,
1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/nra/mral.pdf>. Under the 1993 Maastricht
Treaty on European Union, the European Communities or "EC" became the European
Union. The Maastricht Treaty, however, did not vest the EU with international legal
personality. Consequently, the entity that represents the 15-member EU in its trade
relations with third countries is still referred to as the European Communities or EC.
22' See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 13. See also McGOVERN, supra note 170, §
7.245.
222 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 13.
223 See id. art. 14.
224 Id. art. 15.4.
416 [Vol. 22:375
ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
review at the end of 1997. In that review, the Committee reached a
number of conclusions: (1) an adjustment of the rights and obligations of
the Agreement and amendments to its text are not necessary; (2) insofar as
transparency and notification of national regulations and administrative
decisions are concerned, Members as a whole have not implemented their
Article 15.2 commitments satisfactorily; and (3) multiple product testing
and certification have a restrictive effect on trade and, therefore, the
principles of "one standard, one test," and "one certification, one time"
should be pursued.22
F. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Before the adoption of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),226 the successor agreement to
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, government subsidies to firms for the
purpose of complying with pollution abatement laws received no special
treatment. Products of firms receiving such subsidies, if not generally
available to firms throughout the country, were subject to countervailing
duties if they were exported to another GATT contracting party and
caused injury to a domestic firm.227 The SCM Agreement changes this
result on a limited basis.
In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations serious
consideration was given to expanding the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code to
authorize transitional assistance to firms for pollution abatement
expenditures. That proposal was adopted in Article 8 of the SCM
Agreement, which makes environmental subsidies non-actionable,
provided narrowly drawn criteria are met.
Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that assistance to
promote adaptation of existing facilities228 to new environmental
requirements imposed by law or regulation that result in greater
constraints and financial burdens on firms are non-actionable, provided the
assistance meets the following five criteria:
(1) it is a one-time, non-recurring measure;
225 See WTO, First Triennial Review, supra note 211, at 2, 7.
226 SCM Agreement, supra note 102.
227 See GATT, supra note 6, art. VI.
228 The term "existing facilities" is defined as "facilities which have been in operation for
at least two years at the time when new environmental requirements are imposed." SCM
Agreement, supra note 102, art. 8.2(c) n.33.
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(2) it is limited to twenty percent of the cost of adaptation;
(3) it does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted
investment, which must be fully borne by firms;
(4) it is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned
reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any
manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and
(5) it is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment
and/or production processes. 29
All environmental subsidies must be notified in advance to the
WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in sufficient
detail to permit monitoring for compliance with the SCM Agreement. 20 If
a Member believes that an otherwise non-actionable environmental
subsidy is having a seriously adverse effect on a domestic industry, then
the Member may seek a determination of the matter from the SCM
Committee. 3'
The SCM Agreement contains a sunset provision on environmental
subsidies of five years, unless the SCM Committee agrees to extend it. 32
G. The Agreement on Agriculture
A second Uruguay Round Agreement also permits environmental
subsidies in limited circumstances2 Under the Agreement on
Agriculture, developed-country Members agree to reduce their domestic
agricultural subsidies twenty percent from 1986-88 base-period levels by
2000.1 These reductions are based on an Aggregate Measurement of
Support (AMS), which is a calculation of support payments received
during the base period. 3 ' Generally excluded from the AMS calculation
are support programs that have minimal trade-distorting effects on
agricultural production. 36  Expressly excluded are payments received
229 See id.
230 See id. art. 8.3. The U.S. implementing legislation is located at 19 U.S.C. §
1677(5B)(D)(ii).
231 See SCM Agreement, supra note 102, art. 9.1.
232 See id. art. 3 1.
233 The SCM Agreement's provisions on actionable domestic subsidies does not cover
agricultural subsidies. See id. art. 5.
234 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 101, art.6.
235 See i(. art. 1(a).
236 See id. Annex 2:1.
418 [Vol. 22:375
ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
under environmental programs."'
To qualify for exclusion from the AMS calculation, the
environmental program payments must be made under a clearly defined
government environmental or conservation program and must be
dependent upon the fulfillment of specific conditions under the program. 38
The payment must be limited to the additional costs or loss of income
involved in complying with the government program. 39
Under the Article 13 "peace clause" of the Agreement on
Agriculture, no countervailing duty action may be brought against such
environmental subsidies during the nine-year implementation period of the
Agreement.24
H. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
Criticisms of the dispute settlement process under GATT 1947 are
numerous, and explain in part why unilateral measures were sometimes
used in resolving trade-environment disputes. The most frequently
recurring complaints about dispute settlement under GATT 1947 included
the following:
* GATT lacked an integrated dispute settlement procedure,
with the Tokyo Round Codes containing separate dispute settlement
mechanisms.
* GATT disputes were sometimes resolved through the grant of
waivers.
* Small countries were handicapped in achieving effective results
against large countries.
" The GATT panel process was lengthy and subject to delaying
tactics.
* GATT contained no provision for the automatic establishment
of a panel.
* Inadequate staff and experts often hamstrung panels in their
factfinding.
* The insistence on approval of panel reports by consensus
permitted the losing country to block adoption of reports.
* Effective enforcement and sanctions were almost nonexistent,
237 See id. Annex 2:12.
23 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id. art. 13.
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with the exception of bilateral retaliation.
0 GATT did not require notification of the implementation of a
panel recommendation. 141
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU) addresses almost all of these criticisms. As noted
in DSU Article 3.2, "[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system. ' 242 To that end, the DSU establishes an integrated, rules-
based dispute settlement process with a right of appellate review. The
DSU virtually assures that all panel or Appellate Body reports will be
adopted expeditiously and without modification.13
241 For an analysis of dispute settlement under GATT 1947 and criticisms of that process,
see generally William J. Davey, The GA TT Dispute Settlement System: Proposals for
Reform in the Uruguay Round, in WORKSHOP ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS OF GATT (1992); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 56-80 (1990); PIERRE PESCATORE,
HANDBOOK OF GAIT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1992); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GAIT AND
THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS (USITC Pub. 1793, 1995); William J. Davey, Dispute
Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, A Statistical
Profile of the GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1
(1993); Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GA TT Panel Works and Does
Not, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1987, at 53.
Full texts of adopted GATT 1947 panel reports are available from the WTO's
website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
242 DSU, supra note 103, art. 3.2.
243 For additional analyses of the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally FRANK
W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995); Grant Aldonas, The World
Trade Organization: Revolution in International Trade Dispute Settlements, DISP.
RESOL. J., Sept. 1996, at 73; Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding. Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416 (1996); Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net
Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095 (1994); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
69 (1997); Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute
Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 183 (1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights. Institutional
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996);
Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round. Lawyers Triumph Over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389 (1995).
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DSU Article 1 integrates the dispute settlement, process of the
GATT-WTO system by extending the DSU's scope of coverage to all
disputes brought under any of the GATT-WTO Agreements.'" With the
exception of certain special or additional rules contained in eight of the
WTO multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) listed in Appendix 2 of the
DSU, the rules and procedures of the DSU apply to all disputes. 5
In a flank attack on unilateral actions taken by the United States
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,46 DSU Article 23, which is
captioned "Strengthening of the Multilateral System," flatly prohibits
Members from making unilateral determinations on the following matters:
(1) whether an Uruguay Round agreement has been violated; (2) whether
another Member has failed to implement a DSB recommendation within a
reasonable period of time; or (3) whether the level of suspension of
concessions is appropriate.17 The DSU is the exclusive mechanism for
resolving these issues, absent the mutual agreement of the disputing
Members.248
The DSB observed in its 1996 annual report that "[t]here has been
an evident tendency to use the DSU in settling trade disputes in
accordance with the aim of Article 23 of the DSU ... ."' Trade areas that
are not the subject of an MTA (e.g., foreign direct investment) are outside
the scope of the DSU. They may, therefore, be the subject of a Section
301 proceeding. 5°  Nevertheless, with regard to trade-environment
244 See DSU, supra note 103, art. 1.1, app. 1. The parties to the Civil Aircraft Agreement
have not yet agreed to submit disputes arising under that Agreement to the DSB.245 See id. art. 1.2. For example, Article 11.2 of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provides that in disputes involving scientific or
technical issues, WTO panels should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel. See
SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 11.2.
246 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994).
247 See DSU, supra note 103, art. 23.
24' DSU Article 25 authorizes disputing Members to agree mutually to resolve their
dispute through binding arbitration in lieu of DSU panel proceedings. See id. art. 25.
249 DSB 1996 Annual Report, on file with author.
250 But see Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a)(2) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
3512(a)(2)) which provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed-
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any
law relating to-
(i) the protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health,
(ii) the protection of the environment, or
(iii) worker safety, or
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disputes, considering the breadth of the SPS Agreement, the TBT
Agreement, and GATT Article XX, there is little room for argument that a
trade-environment dispute is beyond the jurisdiction of the GATT-WTO
system.
I. The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment
As the Uruguay Round negotiators became increasingly aware of,
and perhaps embarrassed by, the lack of attention environmental issues
received in the Round, the negotiators resolved that the interaction of trade
and the environment should receive more systematic consideration by the
WTO. To that end, the Decision on Trade and Environment was included
in the Uruguay Round Final Act.2" ' The decision calls for the creation of a
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), the successor body to the
moribund GATT Committee on Trade and Environment. 52 The CTE has
the following terms of reference:
* identify the relationship between trade
measures and environmental measures in order to promote
sustainable development; and
• make appropriate recommendations on
whether any modifications of the provisions of the
multilateral trading system are required, compatible with
the open, equitable, and nondiscriminatory nature of the
system. "'
The CTE is charged with the tasks of investigating the links between trade
and the environment, making recommendations on how to ease trade-
environment conflicts, and developing a work program. 5 '
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States,
including section 2411 of this title, unless specifically provided for in
this Act.
I. See generally C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System. 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209
(1997).
25 See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994 on Trade and Environment, 33
I.L.M. 1267 (1994).
212 See id. at 1268.
253 id.
254 See Hunt, supra note 95, at 178-81; Jennifer Schultz, The GATT/WTO Committee on
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1. WTO and CTE Relations with NGOs
Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within the
environmental community complain that the work of the WTO and the
CTE is closed to them.55 The United States has pressed for making the
work of the CTE, in particular, and the WTO in general, more open and
transparent to the public. In this connection, in July 1996, the WTO
General Council adopted a decision, "Guidelines for Arrangements on
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.""25 Recognizing the
important contribution that NGOs can make in increasing public
awareness regarding its activities, the WTO agreed to improve
transparency and to develop better lines of communication with NGOs in
several respects. First, the WTO agreed to derestrict documents more
promptly than in the past and to make them available on the WTO's on-
line computer network."7 Second, direct contacts with NGOs by the WTO
Secretariat through symposia also are encouraged. For example, in May
1997, the WTO Secretariat organized a symposium with NGOs on trade,
environment, and sustainable development.258 Third, observer status at
CTE meetings has been extended to the Secretariats of CITES, the
Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and the Framework Convention
on Biological Diversity.
The WTO Secretariat periodically has held informal meetings with
NGOs concerned with matters relating to the WTO's work on trade, the
environment, and sustainable development. The first such meeting was
Trade and the Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 423,
432-34 (1995); Kristin Woody, The World Trade Organization's Committee on Trade
and Environment, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 459, 463 (1996).
255 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996) [hereinafter
Charnovitz II]; Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996).
256 See Trade and Environment Bulletin No. 16 (visited Oct. 25, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/teol6.html>.
257 Formal procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents were
adopted by the General Council on July 18, 1996. See Procedures for the Circulation
and Derestriction of WTO Documents, WT/L/160/Rev.1 (1996) (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/te016.htm>.
25 For a summary of the proceedings, see WTO Symposium on Trade, Environment and
Sustainable Development, Press/TE 019 (Aug. 14, 1997) available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4.
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held in September 1996, at which approximately thirty-five NGOs
representing environment, development, and consumer interests
attended.259 Many participants expressed disappointment with the WTO's
Guidelines to the extent they fall short of the NGOs' goal of complete
WTO transparency and public accountability. Of special concern was the
lack of access for NGOs to WTO meetings. Additionally, concern was
raised regarding the number of documents that did not have to be
•derestricted for up to six months. NGOs did, however, applaud the
WTO's creation of the publication, Trade and Environment Bulletin, as a
useful step toward increased transparency and improved dialogue.26 °
Whether and how to accommodate the desires of NGOs for greater
participation in the work of the WTO remains an unresolved issue, at least
for NGOs. To what extent, if any, should NGOs participate in the policy
work of the WTO and its committees? Second, to what extent, if any,
should NGOs participate in the WTO dispute settlement process, either as
parties, intervenors, amicus curiae, witnesses, or observers?26
Regarding the first question, if the model for greater NGO
participation in the policy work of the WTO is the role played by NGOs in
other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the
International Labor Organization, or CITES, then NGOs have a good
argument for increased participation in that facet of the WTO's work.
Regarding the second question, NGOs insist on participatory rights
in the WTO dispute settlement process, even to the point of having
standing to initiate panel dispute proceedings as complaining parties.
Currently, NGOs have no right to participate formally in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. The ability to provide WTO panelists with
additional information could hardly be a bad thing, if fully informed
decision making is the desideratum. NGO participation in the WTO
dispute settlement process as amicus curiae could prove useful.
Permitting NGO participation at the party or intervenor level, however,
could only have the effect of burdening an ever-growing WTO panel
docket,262 delaying the dispute settlement process, and, even worse,
259 See Trade and Environmental Bulletin No. 16, supra note 256.
260 See id.
2 6 See Charnovitz II, supra note 255, at 340; Glen T. Schleyer, Note, Power to the
People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution
System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (1997).
262 As of December 1998, the WTO had received 154 consultation requests involving 117
distinct matters. An overview of the state-of-play of WTO disputes is available from the
WTO's website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
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creating disenchantment with that process among its intended users, WTO
Members. Recalling that one of the major complaints about GATT 1947
was the poor state of its dispute settlement process, avoiding the mistakes
of the past is critical to the future success of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding. Thus, the argument for direct NGO participation in the
WTO dispute settlement process is, on balance, not especially compelling.
In the WTO panel proceeding, Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas,263 lawyers representing private parties
attempted to attend the panel meetings. Consistent with GATT practice
and WTO dispute settlement proceedings, only representatives of
governments may attend panel meetings.216 Because private lawyers are
not subject to DSU disciplinary rules, their presence in panel meetings
could give rise to concerns about breaches of confidentiality.
Although private parties representing private interests have no
right to participate directly in WTO panel proceedings, in United States -
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, several
environmental NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus briefs with the panel
that defended the U.S. import ban on shrimp. The panel concluded that
under Article 13.2 of the DSU, only information that the panel seeks (i.e.,
actually solicits) may be considered by a panel. Nevertheless, the panel
invited the United States, if it so desired, to include the NGO submissions
as part of its own submission.26 The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's
decision to permit the United States to include the NGO submissions as
part of its own submission, but reversed the panel's other conclusion,
holding that a panel is free to accept unsolicited submissions from
interested groups if such information would be helpful to the panel in
reaching its decision.26
2. The CTE's 1996 Report
The CTE was directed to make a progress report at the WTO's first
263 WTO, Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/RIUSA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/RJGTM,
WT/DS27/RIHND, WT/DS27/R/MEX (1997).
264 See id. para. 7.11; DSU, supra note 103, app. 3:2. See generally Schleyer, supra note
261.
26 See Report of the WTO Panel, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 7.8 (1998).
266 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/ABIR, at 39, para. 110 (1998).
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biennial meeting of the Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in
December 1996.267 The long-awaited inaugural report of the CTE came as
a major disappointment for those observers who had expected more
ambitious results.268 In the view of traders, the CTE Report was very
cautious in its conclusions and recommendations. Some WTO ministers
expressed disappointment with the Report's failure to resolve most of the
ten agenda items that the CTE addressed.269 Some environmental groups
savaged the Report for giving the WTO dispute settlement process
primacy over any applicable dispute settlement mechanism in an MEA in
cases where the WTO and the MEA had concurrent jurisdiction over a
trade-environment dispute. 20 Regardless of one's political persuasion, the
Report looks every bit the compromise document, that is, one designed to
offend no one and thus guaranteed to displease everyone.
Two important assumptions guided the work of the CTE in the
preparation of its 1996 Report: (1) WTO competence for policy
coordination in this area is limited to trade; and (2) if problems of policy
coordination are identified by the CTE, then they are to be resolved in a
way that upholds and safeguards the principles of the multilateral trading
system. The CTE Report addressed the following ten items, offering
conclusions and recommendations on several of them.
First, the CTE addressed "[t]he relationship between the provisions
of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental
purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental
agreements."27 ' Noting that governments endorsed Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration that unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided, the
CTE endorsed multilateral solutions to trade concerns. '72 The CTE urged
267 See WTO, WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Concludes its Work and
Adopts its Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, PRESS/TE 015, para. 1 (Nov.
18, 1996).
268 See WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and
Environment, WT/CTE/I (Nov. 12, 1996) [hereinafter CTE 1996 Report], available in
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. For a summary of CTE activities during 1995, see
Comm. on Trade and Env't, Summary of Activities of the Committee on Trade and
Environment (1995) Presented by the Chairman of the Committee, WT/CTE/W/17 (Dec.
12, 1995) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
269 See Ministers Voice Disappointment with Weakness of CTE Report, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1925 (1996).
270 See id.
27 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 1 & para. 171.
272 See id. para. 171.
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cooperation between the WTO and the institutions established under
MEAs.
Second, the CTE examined "[t]he relationship between
environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures with
significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading
system." '273 While this issue is perhaps the most important-and certainly
the knottiest-of all the items addressed by the CTE, the CTE dodged it
by noting that further examination and analysis of these policies and
measures is required. The CTE made no conclusions or
recommendation. 4
Third, the CTE considered "[t]he relationship between the
provisions of the multilateral trading system and charges and taxes for
environmental purposes," '275 and "requirements for environmental purposes
relating to products, including standards and technical regulations,
packaging, labeling, and recycling. 2 76 Under this agenda item the CTE
focused on voluntary eco-labeling programs. The CTE viewed such
programs as a positive development, subject to concerns over transparency
in their preparation, adoption, and application.277
Fourth, the CTE reviewed "[t]he provisions of the multilateral
trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for
environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements
which have significant trade effects. '2 7' The CTE concluded that no
modifications to existing WTO transparency rules were required to ensure
adequate transparency for existing trade-related environmental measures.
The Committee recommended that the Secretariat compile all notifications
of trade-related environmental measures and collate them in a single
database accessible to WTO Members. 79
Fifth, the CTE discussed "[t]he relationship between the dispute
273 Id. item 2 & para. 179.
274 See id. paras. 180-81.
275 Id. item 3A & para. 182.
276 Id. item 3B & para. 183.
277 See id. paras. 183-84. See generally Staffim, supra note 133. In April 1997, the CTE
published an overview of the current work being done within the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, the International Trade Center, the OECD, UNCTAD, the United Nations
Environment Program, the United Nations Industrial Development Program, and the ISO
on eco-labeling. See WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Eco-Labelling: Overview of
Current Work in Various International Fora, WT/CTE/W/45 (Apr. 15, 1997) available
in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
27 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 4 & para. 187.
279 See id. para. 189-92.
1998]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and those found
in multilateral environmental agreements.""28  This agenda item was
watched closely by NGOs, especially environmental groups. The CTE's
resolution of it caused a stir. The CTE recommended that in the event a
trade-environment dispute arises between WTO Members that also are
parties to a controlling MEA, WTO Members have the right to bring the
dispute to the WTO for resolution. The CTE noted:
While WTO Members have the right to bring disputes to
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, if a dispute arises
between WTO Members, Parties to an MEA, over the use
of trade measures they are applying between themselves
pursuant to the MEA, they should consider trying to resolve
it through the dispute settlement mechanisms available
under the MEA.8
The CTE thus encouraged such parties to resort to the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the MEA, but gave primacy to the DSU. The United
States took exception to the CTE's conclusion that "[t]here is no clear
indication for the time being of when or how they [i.e., trade measures
included in MEAs] may be needed or used in the future." '282 From the
United States' perspective, there is no legal impediment for WTO
Members that also are parties to an MEA to abide by the dispute resolution
mechanism of the MEA and bypass resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding.283
Sixth, the CTE analyzed "[t]he effect of environmental measures
on market access . . . and environmental benefits of removing trade
restrictions and distortions."28 ' This agenda item was the centerpiece of
the CTE Report for developing-country Members. The CTE's focus was
on ways in which the WTO can contribute to making international trade
and environmental policies mutually supportive. Such policies, said the
CTE, should include trade liberalization and development and
environmental policies determined at the national level for the promotion
280 Id. item 5 & paras. 170-79.
281 Id. para. 178.
282 Id. para. 174(i).
283 See Environment: EPA Hopes to Shift WTO Panel Focus Away from Trade Provisions
in Environnental Pacts, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 19 (1997).
284 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 6 & para. 195.
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of sustainable development.285 Recognizing that an open, equitable, and
nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system and' environmental
protection are essential to promoting sustainable development, the CTE
expressed concern that environmental measures might be used to deny
developing countries market access to developed-country markets.86 The
CTE offered no concrete recommendations, however.
Seventh, the CTE dealt with the issue of exports of domestically
prohibited goods." 7 It recommended that the WTO Secretariat gather
relevant information on this issue. The Committee also encouraged
Members to provide technical assistance to developing countries, often the
export target for such goods. 88
Eighth, the CTE examined relevant provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement. 89 The Committee noted the importance of technology transfer
of environmentally-sound technologies and products to developing
countries to enable them to meet the terms and conditions stipulated in
MEAs.2 9
Ninth, the CTE discussed "[t]he work program envisaged in the
Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment," ' ' but was unable to
identify any measures that Members arguably might want to impose for
environmental purposes to trade in services not covered already under the
health and safety exceptions of GATS Article XIV(b) 292
In its final agenda item, the CTE considered "[i]nput to the
relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations with
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in
Article V of the WTO." '2 93 The Committee acknowledged the benefit of
closer consultations with NGOs, and urged greater transparency in the
work of the Committee. The CTE extended observer status to
intergovernmental organizations, including those responsible for one or
more MEAs.294
285 See id. para. 196.
286 See id. para. 197.
287 See id. item 7 & para. 200.
288 See id. paras. 203, 205.
289 See id. item 8 & para. 206.
290 See id. para. 207.
291 Id. item 9 & para. 210.
292 See id. para. 210.
293 Id. item 10 & para. 212.
294 See id. para. 217.
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3. The CTE's Work Program
The Ministerial Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference contains the following reference to trade
and the environment:
The Committee on Trade and Environment has
made an important contribution towards fulfilling its Work
Programme. The Committee has been examining and will
continue to examine, inter alia, the scope of the
complementarities between trade liberalization, economic
development and environmental protection. Full imple-
mentation of the WTO Agreements will make an important
contribution to achieving the objectives of sustainable
development .... The breadth and complexity of the issues
covered by the Committee's Work Programme shows that
further work needs to be undertaken on all items of its
agenda, as contained in its report.295
One of the highest priorities for the CTE should be better integration of the
GATT-WTO system with MEAs. To that end, the work program of the
CTE will have to address: (1) discrimination among products based on
process and production methods (PPMs); (2) the relationship of GATT
and the WTO Agreements to MEAs; (3) the circumstances under which
trade measures may be used on environmental grounds; and (4) the scope
of the Article XX exceptions when invoked on environmental grounds.
None of these issues was thoroughly addressed or resolved in the CTE's
1996 Report. The United States has identified these four issues as high
priority items. 296 The CTE's work program for 1997 included all of the
agenda items listed in its 1996 Report.29'
J. GA TT and WTO Panel Reports Dealing with Environmental Disputes
295 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 16 (Dec. 13,
1996) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
296 See USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 89, at 1291.
297 See WTO, The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Establishes Its Work
Programme and Schedule of Meetings for 1997, PRESS/TE 017 (March 26, 1997)
available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. Updates on the progress of the CTE are
available from Trade and Environment News Bulletins, which are posted on the WTO's
website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
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While the trade-environment dispute settlement scorecard has sent,
at times, environmentalists into apoplectic fits, the fact remains that an
effective, binding dispute settlement mechanism exists for resolving trade-
environment disputes to which the United States has unequivocally
committed itself. Even if the results of that process have left
environmentalists shaking their heads, the process is one that strengthens
multilateral approaches to resolving such disputes.
1. The Tuna/Dolphin Dispute
The most notorious GATT panel decision involving trade measures
taken on environmental grounds concerned the United States' import ban
on tuna from Mexico." 8 The United States imposed the import ban under
provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act limiting the number of
dolphins that may be killed when harvesting tuna using the purse-seine
method.?9 The United States justified its ban as being a necessary
measure to protect animal life and to conserve exhaustible natural
resources under Article XX(b) and (g), respectively."° Mexico countered
that the ban violated the national treatment obligation of Article III and
was an illegal quantitative restriction in violation of Article XI.1'
The panel agreed with Mexico that the United States violated the
national treatment obligation insofar as the tuna harvesting regulations
were concerned. The regulations did not cover tuna products per se, but
rather the method by which tuna were caught."' In the panel's view, the
only regulations that are permissible under Article III are those that: (1)
regulate the imported product and not the method used to produce or
process the product; and (2) do not discriminate against the imported
product in favor of the domestic product.0 3 The U.S. regulations did not
pass muster under either prong of this test because the regulations
condemned the method of harvesting tuna, rather than the imported
product per se.
298 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We
Prosper and Protect? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1409-22 (1992).
299 See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 S 101, 16 U.S.C. §1371 (1994).
" See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(b) & (g).
3o See id. arts. III, XI.
302 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7, paras. 5.9, 5.11-5.12.
303 See id. paras. 5.11-5.12.
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In addition, the U.S. domestic tuna fleet knew in advance the
allowable dolphin kill. The Mexican fleet, on the other hand, had to guess
at that figure. The fleet could learn what the figure was only after it had
caught its tuna because the figure for foreign catches was based on a
percentage of the actual dolphins killed by the United States fleet during
that fishing season. The GATT panel found that this methodology
discriminated in favor of the domestic fleet and, therefore, further violated
Article III's national treatment obligation."°
Regarding the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions, the panel
conceded that those exceptions do not expressly prohibit the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.30 5 At the same time, the panel noted that if the
U.S. interpretation was accepted, that is, that United States regulations
could be applied extraterritorially, then Country A could unilaterally
impose on any other country its own health and safety measures "from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing
their rights under the General Agreement."" ° The GATT panel rejected
the unilateral approach that the United States took with Mexico, finding it
contrary to GATT multilateralism, and thus making the ban not
"necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b).3 °7 The United States
should have taken a different tack, the panel suggested, such as attempting
to negotiate an international agreement with Mexico."'
Many of the legal issues analyzed in the 1991 panel report were
reprised in 1994 in another dispute involving the United States embargo
on imported tuna from countries that had unacceptably high dolphin-kill
rates. In a complaint brought by the EU against the United States, a
GATT panel once again agreed that the Marine Mammal Protection Act
violates the national treatment commitment of Article III?.0
The postscript to the Tuna/Dolphin dispute is that pursuant to the
1991 panel's suggestion that a bilateral or multilateral approach be taken
by the United States, the Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin
304 See id. para. 5.15.
305 The Mexican fishing did not occur in U.S. waters. See id. para. 5.24-5.29.
... Id. para. 5.27.
307 See id. para. 5.28.
308 See id.
309 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; see also Steve Chamovitz, Dolphins
and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,567
(1994); Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities for GA TT-Compliant
Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247 (1996).
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Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean was concluded in 1992.10 Mexico
and the United States are active participants in the work of the Review
Panel and Scientific Advisory Board established under that Agreement.31'
The Agreement establishes a per-vessel limit on dolphin mortalities that is
reduced each year,"' requires an observer on larger tuna purse-seine
vessels,"' and establishes a research program to develop new fishing gear
and technologies to reduce, and, if possible, to eliminate, dolphin
mortality.""
2. Other GATT Panel Reports
Although the 1991 Tuna/Dolphin decision is the best-known of the
Article XX(b) and (g) GATT panel reports, it was preceded by three
GATT panel reports dealing with import bans taken ostensibly on
environmental and/or resource conservation grounds. 1' Two of those
earlier GATT panel reports involved the interpretation of Articles XX(g)
(resource conservation measures) and XI (the general prohibition against
quotas).
In the first report, issued in 1982, Canada challenged a United
States import ban on tuna from Canada. 16 The United States defended its
action as a measure taken under the Article XX(g) exception for
conservation of fish stocks.317 Canada countered that the ban was imposed
in retaliation for Canada's seizure of American-flagged fishing vessels
caught taking tuna without permission within Canada's 200-mile exclusive
economic zone off its Pacific coast.31
The GATT panel concluded that the United States ban could not be
defended under Article XX(g) because the United States had not taken any
310 See Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean,
June 1992, 33 I.L.M. 936 (hereinafter Dolphin Mortality Agreement].
311 See id., apps. II & IV.
312 See id., pmbl.
313 See id. para. 12.
314 See id. app. IV.
315 For a discussion of the GATT dispute settlement process prior to 1994, see Judith H.
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Settling Disputes in the GA TT The Past, Present, and Future,
24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990).
316 See GATT Panel Report, United States- Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (adopted Feb. 22, 1982)
[hereinafter Tuna Restrictions Report].
3 See id. para. 3.5.
318 See id. para. 3.13.
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parallel domestic measures to limit the tuna catch of the United States
domestic fleet. The ban, therefore, constituted an impermissible
quantitative restriction in violation of Article XI 19
The second GATT panel report also dealt with the interpretation of
Article XX(g) 2° In that 1988 report, the United States complained about a
blanket export ban on unprocessed herring and salmon imposed by
Canada. Because Canada had not placed any domestic restrictions on
Canadian consumption of herring and salmon, the Canadian export ban
was not "primarily aimed" at conservation, in the view of the GATT panel.
The panel rejected Canada's argument that the so-called quality exception
under Article XI:2(b) justified the ban. 2' Canada's export ban was across-
the-board and did not permit shipments that might comply with the
standards. 22
The third GATT panel report involved a Canadian and EC
complaint against a U.S. surcharge imposed on imported oil and chemicals
to fund the Superfund environmental cleanup law . 23  Because the
additional taxes on imported oil were higher than the comparable taxes on
domestically produced oil, Canada argued that the Superfund tax violated
GATT's national treatment obligation. 2
"' See id. para 4.1-4.16.
320 See GATT Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (adopted Mar. 22, 1988)
[hereinafter Herring and Salmon Panel Report].
321 See id. para 4.2-4.3.
322 In the aftermath of the GATT panel report, Canada removed the export restrictions,
but substituted regulations that required herring and salmon caught in Canadian waters to
be landed in Canada before being exported. The United States brought a complaint
under the Chapter 18 dispute resolution procedures of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. The United States complained that although the new regulations were not a
direct export ban, they had that effect because of the additional time and expense
incurred in off-loading and processing the fish in Canada before export. The NAFTA
panel concluded that the Canadian regulations were not primarily aimed at conservation,
were not exempted under Article XX(g), and thus constituted an impermissible
quantitative restriction in violation of GATT Article XI, which the CUSFTA
incorporated through Article 407. See Ted L. McDorman, International Trade Law
Meets International Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, 7 J.
INT'L ARB. 107 (1990).
323 See GATT Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (adopted June 17, 1987) [hereinafter
Taxes on Petroleum Report].
324 See id., para. 3.1; GATT, supra note 6, art. 111:2. Article 111:2 prohibits the imposition
of taxes that discriminate in favor of the like domestic product relative to imports. Article
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The GATT panel accepted Canada's position with regard to the tax
on imported oil. 25 It agreed, however, with the United States that the tax
on nonpetroleum chemical imports constituted a legitimate border-tax
adjustment permitted under Article 11:2(a).326
The last Article XX(g) panel report issued under GATT 1947 was
the unadopted Taxes on Automobiles report.2 The panel examined United
States taxes on automobiles, domestic and imported, that are based on the
fuel efficiency of the vehicle as determined under the Corporate Average
Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards. The panel concluded that they were
GATT-consistent in part when assessed on the basis of the product per
se.328 However, the panel also concluded that penalties imposed under
CAFE rules on producers failing to meet CAFE standards for their
automobile fleets violated the Article III national treatment commitment.
Those penalties were not tied directly to the specific imported product.329
In summary, GATT panels have refused to give an importing
country carte blanche to restrict trade on environmental and conservation
grounds. They could not have done so without seriously compromising
GATT's goal of promoting liberal trade. GATT 1947 never ruled out all
trade-based responses to environmental concerns, provided those
responses satisfied the criteria of either the health and safety exception of
Article XX(b), or the natural resources conservation exception of Article
111:2 provides in part: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products ......
35 See Taxes on Petroleum Report, supra note 323, para. 5.1.12.
326 See Taxes on Petroleum Report, supra note 323, para. 5.2.10. GATT Article II:2(a)
provides:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from
imposing at any time on the importation of any product:
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently
with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like
domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.
GATT, supra note 6, art. 11:2(a).
327 See Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, WT/DS31/R
(Mar. 14, 1994) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4 [hereinafter Taxes on
Automobiles]; Eric Phillips, Note, World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827 (1996).
328 See Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 327, para. 5.45.
329 See id. paras. 5.39-5.55, 5.59-5.66; see also Steve Charnovitz, The GATT Panel
Decision on Automobile Taxes, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 921 (Nov. 2, 1994).
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XX(g). °30
Many of these issues were revisited in the first panel report issued
under WTO auspices, Standards for Reformulated Gasoline.3 1
3. The Reformulated Gasoline Dispute
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline addressed
the consistency of United States environmental rules regulating gasoline
with Article XX of GATT.3 32
a. The Panel Report
In 1995, Brazil and Venezuela complained to the United States
about regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under Clean Air Act amendments enacted by
Congress in 1990.133 The EPA regulations, entitled Regulations on Fuels
and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline,3 provide that in geographical areas not meeting national ozone
330 Dissatisfied with what they perceived to be too limited a range of responses to
environmental issues, critics of GATT proposed a variety of amendments both to GATT
and to U.S. trade laws during the Uruguay Round. A number of bills and resolutions
were introduced in Congress to address not only purported environmental shortcomings
of NAFTA, but also to reform the GATT-WTO system so that environmental issues
would receive greater consideration. See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 91-92; Hurlock,
supra note 7, at 2113-17.
3 ' See WTO, Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline
Panel Report], reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra
note 4.
332 See id. The panel report was appealed to the DSU Appellate Body, which in turn
affirmed most of the panel's determinations. For an analysis of the Reformulated
Gasoline dispute, see Dominique M. Calapai, International Trade and Environmental
Impact: The WTO Reformulated Gasoline Case, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 209 (1996). The texts of
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports are available from the WTO's website. See
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. For a proposal on how environmental disputes should
be resolved by the WTO, see Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and Environment: How
Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations Under GA TT Articles III and
XX?, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 441 (1996).
333 The Clean Air Act amendments pertaining to "reformulated gasoline for conventional
vehicles" are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994).
134 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.40-80.91 (1998).
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requirements, only reformulated gasoline may be sold. 35 In other areas,
the sale of conventional gasoline is permitted. Reformulated gasoline
must meet at least three compositional and performance specifications: (1)
its oxygen content must not be less than 2 percent;336 (2) its benzene
content must not exceed 1 percent by volume; 7 and (3) the gasoline must
be free of heavy metals, including lead and manganese.338  The
performance specifications require a fifteen percent reduction in emissions
of certain organic compounds and toxic air pollutants, and no increase in
emissions of nitrogen oxides."
The statute and implementing regulations establish separate toxic-
emission baselines for each refiner and blender, using 1990 as the baseline
year and data supplied by the refiner or blender.3"" An individual baseline
is used for each refiner or blender to determine whether the refiner's and
blender's gasoline is compliant. In the absence of reliable data, the EPA
establishes a statutory baseline applicable to those refiners and blenders
based on average gasoline quality in the United States in 1990.1'"
Importers of gasoline were assigned the statutory baseline, unless
they could establish their individual baselines using 1990 data. For
domestic refiners unable to compile reliable 1990 data, two alternative
methods for calculating individual baselines were permitted that were not
made available to importers. 2 In the EPA's view, those alternative
methods inherently apply only to refiners (the "Gasoline Rule").3 3 For
importers that are also foreign refiners, the alternative methods for
determining individual baselines were made available to them, provided
they exported seventy-five percent of their gasoline to the United States in
1990 (the "75-percent Rule")."
Venezuela and Brazil argued that the EPA regulations violated
GATT in at least four respects. First, the regulations violate the Article I
MFN commitment because they confer an advantage upon a particular
3 See id. §§ 80.70-80.74.
336 See id. S 80.4 1(a) & (g).
... See id.
338 See id. § 80.4 1(h)(i).
339 See id. § 80.41.
340 See id. § 80.9 1(a)(i).
34 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 2.5.
342 See id. para. 2.6.
141 See id. para. 2.8.
344 See id. para. 2.7.
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group of countries (in this case, upon one country, Canada).4 5 Second,
they violate the national treatment provision of Article III because
imported gasoline has to comply with a more stringent statutory baseline,
whereas domestic gasoline only has to comply with the less stringent
United States refiner's individual baseline.4 6 Third, they violate the MFN
and national treatment obligations of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement3 7 because the Gasoline Rule creates an unnecessary obstacle to
international trade . 4  Fourth and finally, they are not justified under any
of the GATT Article XX exceptions.4 9
The United States responded, first, that the regulations are
consistent with GATT Article I because they are neutral on their face and
apply to all imported gasoline regardless of country of origin." Second,
the United States argued that the regulations are consistent with Article III
because on average both importers and domestic refiners have to satisfy
approximately the same 1990 United States gasoline quality baseline."'
Third, the United States claimed, the regulations are outside the scope of
the TBT Agreement because they are not "technical regulations" within
the meaning of the Agreement."' Fourth and finally, in any event, the
regulations fall within the exceptions of GATT Article XX(b), (d), and
(g).353
i. Consistency with Article III
The panel first examined the contention that the Gasoline Rule
violates Article III:4 ' At the outset the panel rejected the United States
311 See id. para. 3.5-3.10.
346 See id. para. 3.11-3.35.
317 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 2.1, 2.2.
348 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para 3.73-3.83. In view of
its findings under GATE 1994, the panel did not reach the issues raised under the TBT
Agreement. See id. para. 6.43.
341 See id. para. 3.1, 3.37-3.70. The EC and Norway made formal presentations in support
of Venezuela and Brazil. See id. paras. 4.1-4.11.
350 See id. para. 3.8.
311 See id. paras. 3.17-3.20.
352 See id. paras. 3.74-3.79.
313 See id. para. 3.4; GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(b), (d) & (g).
"' In considering whether the 75% Rule violates the MFN commitment, the panel
deferred on the ground of "mootness," i.e., that the Rule was not currently in force
because no importer had qualified under it by the deadline set by the EPA. See
Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.19.
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argument that on average the treatment provided to imported gasoline is
equivalent. The panel noted that this amounted to an argument that less
favorable treatment in one instance could be offset by correspondingly
more favorable treatment in another instance."' This same argument was
advanced and rejected in the 1989 panel report in Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. Such an interpretation of Article III, in the panel's view,
"would lead to great uncertainty about the conditions of competition
between imported and domestic products and thus defeat the purposes of
Article III. '356
ii. Unjustified under Article XX(b)
Having concluded that the EPA regulations violate the national
treatment obligation of Article III, the panel turned to the question whether
they nevertheless are justified under one or more of the Article XX
exceptions. First, under the human health exception of Article XX(b), the
United States had to satisfy the following three-prong test:
(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for
which the provision was invoked fell within the range of
policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(2) that the inconsistent measures for which the
exception was invoked were necessary to fulfil [sic] the
policy objective; and
(3) that the measures were applied in conformity
with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article
XX.
3 5 7
Regarding the first prong, it was undisputed that the United States policy
was to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline, a
policy squarely concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life
or health.35 Turning to the question of whether the inconsistent measure
was "necessary," the panel relied on the interpretation of that term in the
311 See id. para. 6.14.
356 GATT Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, para. 5.14 (1989) [hereinafter Section 337 Panel Report].
' Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.20.
... See id. para. 6.21.
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Section 337 panel report in the context of Article XX(d):
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent
with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of
Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not
inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it.
By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent
with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures
reasonably available to it, that which entails the least
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions. "9
In other words, if consistent or less inconsistent measures were reasonably
available to the United States, the "necessary" prong of the Article XX(b)
test would not be met. For example, in the Section 337 case, the GATT
panel condemned general exclusion orders issued by the International
Trade Commission as not necessary because they were overly broad. On
the other hand, that same panel approved limited exclusion orders as being
justified even though they were otherwise inconsistent with Article II1:4. 16
The Reformulated Gasoline panel concluded that one alternative
would be a unitary statutory baseline applicable to all refiners and
blenders. In lieu of that, the panel suggested that the EPA compute
individual baselines for gasoline importers derived from evidence of the
individual 1990 baselines of foreign refiners with whom the importers
currently deal.16' Even though that methodology could result in formally
different regulation of imported and domestic products, the panel added
that Article III:4's requirement to treat an imported product no less
favorably than the like domestic product is satisfied if the different
treatment results in maintaining conditions of competition for the imported
product no less favorable than those of the like domestic product.162
In response to U.S. objections that verification of foreign refiners'
baselines was not administratively feasible, the panel replied that data
359 Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 356, para. 5.26; accord GATT Panel Report,
Thailand -Restrictions on Importation of Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT B.I.S.D.
(37th Supp.) at 200, para. 75 (1990).
360 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 356, para. 5.32.
311 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.25.
362 See id.
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verification in other analogous international trade law enforcement
contexts was demonstrably feasible. Consequently, the panel was
unconvinced that any special difficulty existed in the imported gasoline
context that was sufficient to warrant the United States statutory baseline
method for importers.3 63 The panel noted, for example, that the data that
would have to be verified under the panel's proposed alternative method
for determining importers' baselines was no less susceptible to verification
than data submitted to the United States in enforcing domestic
antidumping duty law."6 The United States relied on data in the
antidumping duty context that would be similar to the data submitted to
substantiate compliance with the Gasoline Rule. If importers failed to
submit accurate or unverifiable information, then the United States would
be justified in resorting to a statutory baseline.165  In addition, the
imposition of penalties on importers that submitted false or inaccurate
information would be an adequate deterrent, according to the panel.36
iii. Unjustified Under Article XX(d)
Having concluded that the EPA regulations were not justified
under the Article XX(b) exception, the panel next focused on whether the
regulations might nevertheless satisfy the Article XX(d) exception.367 In
order to justify a measure otherwise inconsistent with Article II1:4 under
the border enforcement exception of Article XX(d), the party invoking the
exception bears the burden of proving the following three elements: (1) the
measure must secure compliance with laws or regulations themselves not
inconsistent with GATT; (2) the inconsistent measure must be necessary
to secure compliance with those laws and regulations; and (3) the measure
must be applied in conformity with the Article XX chapeau, i.e., not
applied in a manner which would constitute either a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.368
The panel concluded that since the various baseline methods of the
Gasoline Rule did not themselves "secure compliance" with the baseline
363 See id. para. 6.26.
i64 See id. para. 6.28.
365 See id.
366 See id.
367 See id. paras. 6.29, 6.30.
368 See id. para. 6.31.
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system, i.e., they were not a law enforcement mechanism or procedure per
se, they failed to meet the first of the three criteria.369 The baseline
methods, therefore, were outside the scope of the Article XX(d)
exception. 70
iv. Unjustified under Article XX(g)
The final argument raised by the United States in support of the
Gasoline Rule was that it was justified under the exhaustible natural
resources exception of Article XX(g)3 " In order to prevail under this
exception, a responding party has the burden of proving the following four
elements: (1) the policy in respect of the measures for which Article
XX(g) is invoked falls within the range of policies related to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (2) the measure is related to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (3) the measure is made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption; and (4) the measure is applied in conformity with the Article
XX chapeau. 72
Turning to the first of these four elements, the panel agreed with
the United States that its policy was related to the conservation of an
exhaustible natural resource, namely, clean air, lakes, streams, parks,
crops, and forests, all of which could be exhausted by air pollution.373 In a
critical concession to the United States, the panel agreed that even though
air was a renewable resource if adequate pollution abatement controls
were put in place (unlike, for example, fossil fuels), that did not preclude it
from being an exhaustible natural resource for purposes of Article
XX(g). 374
In addressing the second and third elements, the panel in essence
conflated the analysis. The second element asks whether the baseline
methods of the Gasoline Rule are "related to" the conservation of clean
air. In answering this question, the panel agreed with the 1987 Herring
369 See id. para. 6.33.
370 See id.; accord GATT Dispute Panel, EEC-Regulations on Imports of Parts and
Components, May 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132, paras. 5.12-5.18
(1991).
"' See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.35.
372 See id.
371 See id. para. 6.36.
... See id. para. 6.37; accord Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para.
4.4; Tuna Restrictions Report, supra note 316, para. 5.13.
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and Salmon panel report that the term "related to" is synonymous with
"primarily aimed at."37  While a trade measure does not have to be
necessary or essential to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
in order to satisfy the Article XX(g) exception, it must at least be
"primarily aimed at" the conservation of such resources in order to "relate
to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g).
By a parity of reasoning, the panel observed that the term "in
conjunction with" used in the third element of the Article XX(g) exception
has to be interpreted in a way that ensures that the scope of action under
Article XX(g) is limited to the pursuit of policies aimed at the
conservation of natural resources. 7 6 Accordingly, the panel reached a
conclusion that can best be described as cryptic and circular: a measure is
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption if the measure also is aimed primarily at rendering effective
such restrictions. 77
The panel then moved to the question of whether the Gasoline Rule
was aimed primarily at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
The panel was unable to see the connection between discriminatory
treatment of imported gasoline chemically identical with its domestic
counterpart, and the United States objective of improving air quality.378
The panel therefore concluded that the Gasoline Rule that treated imports
less favorably than the domestic like product was not primarily aimed at
the conservation of clean air. 79
b. The Appellate Body Report
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,380
the United States notified the Dispute Settlement Body on February 21,
1996, of its decision to appeal the ruling of the panel that the baseline
methods of the Gasoline Rule do not constitute a measure relating to the
371 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.39; accord Tuna
Restrictions Report, supra note 316; Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 327; see also
Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para 4.6.
376 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.39.
317 See id.
378 See id. para. 6.40.
319 Id. para. 6.40. In light of its finding, the panel deemed it unnecessary to determine
whether the measure was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." Id. para. 6.41.
380 DSU, supra note 103, art. 16.
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conservation of clean air within the meaning of Article XX(g)38 ' The
Appellate Body affirmed the panel's report, but on different grounds.31 2
The Appellate Body criticized the panel's reasoning as opaque,
observing that the panel incorrectly analyzed Article XX(g) by asking the
wrong question.383 In the Appellate Body's view, the panel had to first
find that the measure provided less favorable treatment in violation of
Article 111:4 before it could even begin to consider whether the measure
was excepted under Article XX(g).384 After answering that threshold
question in the affirmative, the panel should not have asked again whether
the less favorable treatment of imported gasoline was primarily aimed at
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 5 Instead, the panel
should have asked whether the "measure"-the baseline methodology of
the Gasoline Rule-was aimed primarily at the conservation of clean air. 86
i. Measures "Relating To" Conservation
The Appellate Body turned to the specific question of whether the
baseline methodology "relates to," that is, whether it is "primarily aimed
at," the conservation of clean air.387 It answered this question in the
affirmative.388 Examining the baseline methodology against the backdrop
38 See GATT Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 605, 613 (1996)
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report] available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4. See also Maury D. Shenk, International Decisions-United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 669
(1996) (analyzing the Appellate Body report).
A preliminary procedural issue addressed by the Appellate Body was whether
Venezuela and Brazil properly raised on appeal the issue of the correctness of the panel's
finding that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource. Neither country had cross-
appealed that finding, but instead raised it for the first time in their Appellees'
Submissions. See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra, at 615. The
Appellate Body agreed with the United States that Venezuela and Brazil had raised this
issue in a procedurally improper manner that was inconsistent with the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/ABIWP/1 (Feb. 16, 1996) available in WTO Doc.
Website, supra note 4.
382 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 633.
383 See id. at 619-20.
114 See id.
385 See id.
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of the Gasoline Rule as a whole, the Appellate Body found a substantial,
not merely an incidental or inadvertent, relationship between the baseline
methodology and the conservation of clean air.389
ii. "In Conjunction With " Domestic Restrictions
Because the panel did not consider it necessary to address the other
elements of the Article XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body addressed
the third element of Article XX(g) (i.e., whether such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption).390 The Appellate Body interpreted this phrase as requiring
that the measures concerned must impose some restrictions on both
imported gasoline and domestic gasoline.391 As the Appellate Body noted,
"[t]he clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of
restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or
consumption of exhaustible natural resources.""' 2 That requirement did not
demand, however, that the same restrictions be applied to both. In other
words, equality of treatment is not required. If equal treatment were
required, the Appellate Body noted, then the measure probably would not
be inconsistent with Article 111:4 in the first place, thus eliminating the
need for the Article XX(g) exception.393 The only thing required to satisfy
the third element is that some restrictions be placed upon the domestic like
product.394
The Appellate Body rejected Venezuela's suggestion that the
measures must have some demonstrable effect on conservation.39 The
Appellate Body did agree that if a specific measure could not in any
possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, then the
measure could not be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural
resources. 
396
iii. The Article XX Chapeau
389 See id.
31 See id.
391 See id. at 624.




396 See id at 625-26.
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Having concluded that the baseline methodology came within the
terms of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body took up the question of
whether it also met the requirements of the Article XX chapeau that is
applicable to all Article XX exceptions. "7  Unlike the enumerated
exceptions which address the substance of a challenged measure, the
chapeau is concerned with the manner in which such measures are
applied.398 The chapeau was added to Article XX in order to prevent
"abuse of the exceptions" that might frustrate or defeat the other GATT
obligations. 99
The chapeau prohibits the application of a measure, otherwise
satisfying one or more of the Article XX exceptions, if it constitutes: (1)
"arbitrary discrimination" between countries where the same conditions
prevail; (2) "unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where the
same conditions prevail; or (3) a "disguised restriction" on international
trade."' One ambiguity in the chapeau is whether the phrase "between
countries where the same conditions prevail" refers to conditions between
an importing and exporting county (national treatment), conditions
between two or more exporting countries (MFN), or both."' At the oral
hearing, the United States argued that the phrase refers to both
alternatives.4"2 The Appellate Body agreed with the United States,
considering that the opening clause of the chapeau provides that "nothing
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party ... ."I" In other words, the
exceptions listed in Article XX relate to all of the GATT obligations-
national treatment, MFN, and others."
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel finding that more than
'9' See id. at 626.
39' See id.
""' See id.
400 See id. at 627.
401 See id. at 627-28.
402 See id.
403 Id. at 628 (citing GATT, supra note 6, art. XX) (emphasis in original).
404 See id. The Appellate Body also noted that the term "countries" is unqualified: it
does not say "foreign countries" or "third countries." See id. at 628 n.46. This interpre-
tation contradicts two other GATT panels that have considered the chapeau as being
merely an MFN obligation and concluded that the measures in question were not
discriminatory because they treated all exporting countries the same. See GATT
Conciliation Panel, United States-mports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies,
May 26, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107, para. 55 (1984); Tuna Restrictions
Report, supra note 316, at 91, para. 4.8.
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one alternative course of action was available to the United States. The
United States could have applied a statutory baseline across the board, or it
could have made individual baselines available to importers. ' The
Appellate Body, like the panel, rejected the United States argument of
administrative burden and inconvenience in verifying the accuracy of
information submitted by importers.4 °  While cooperation would be
required on the part of importers and foreign refiners in this regard, the
Appellate Body faulted the United States for not having first attempted to
conclude some cooperative arrangement with the governments of
Venezuela and Brazil.407 The Appellate Body also faulted the United
States for having taken into consideration the costs domestic refiners
would have incurred had statutory baselines been applied to them
immediately, while not giving the same consideration to foreign refiners.08
The Appellate Body held, accordingly, that in its application the
baseline methodology constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" as well as
a "disguised restriction" on international trade.4' The United States
measure thus failed to meet the requirements of the Article XX chapeau.
410
c. Summary
The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX signals a fresh
approach to resolving Article XX disputes. GATT panels had tended to
focus on the enumerated paragraphs of Article XX, carefully parsing their
language in answering the question whether a measure falls within the
scope of one of those exceptions. Contrary to the practice of earlier GATT
panels, which have tended to give the individual paragraphs of Article XX
a narrow construction, the Appellate Body started with the language of
Article XX(g) and gave it a fairly generous construction in favor of the
United States. The Appellate Body did so in order to avoid hindering the
pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources. 4
As generous as the Appellate Body was in giving the enumerated
Article XX exceptions a construction favorable to the United States, the
405 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 629.
406 See id. at 629-630.
407 See id. at 630-3 1.
408 See id.
409 See id. at 632-33.
4' See id.
4l1 See id. at 619 (citing Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para. 4.6).
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Appellate Body was as grudging in its construction of the Article XX
chapeau. It closely scrutinized the challenged measure under the Article
XX chapeau to ensure that the paragraph (g) exception was not being
abused.' What struck the Appellate Body about the baseline
methodology relative to the chapeau was that the measure was both
patently discriminatory and clearly avoidable; that is, equally effective
alternative measures were available that were nondiscriminatory and less
trade restrictive.' 3 While prior GATT panels have reached the same
conclusion in the context of specific Article XX exceptions, their analysis
has been limited to the Article XX paragraphs that use the terms
"necessary" or "essential.""' The Appellate Body adopted the novel
approach of making that same inquiry in the context of the chapeau, which
does not use either of those terms.
d. Epilogue
In early 1997, Brazil and Venezuela complained that the United
States was dragging its feet in bringing the Gasoline Rule into compliance
with GATT."1 5 At the January 22, 1997 meeting of the Dispute Settlement
Body, Venezuela and Brazil contended that the United States would not
meet the fifteen-month deadline for compliance with the Appellate Body
report. On August 20, 1997, the United States reported to Brazil,
Venezuela, and the DSB that final regulations amending the regulations at
issue had been implemented."6 The United States thus completed the
implementation process within the fifteen months required under Article
21.3 of the DSU. Under the EPA's new rule, foreign gasoline refiners are
entitled to individual baselines, but only refiners in Brazil, Venezuela, and
Norway have expressed an interest in having an individual baseline.
412 See id. at 22-29, 35 I.L.M. at 626-33. See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 13.11.
"3 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 632-33.
414 See, e.g., GATT Conciliation Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200
(1991); GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted, 1993); Section 337 Panel Report, supra
note 356.
45 See Brazil, Venezuela Claim U.S. Slow to Implement Gasoline Ruling, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 161 (1997).
416 See WTO, Status Report Regarding Implementation of the Recommendations and
Rulings in the Dispute, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, Panel Report (WT/DS2/R) (Jan. 29, 1996) and Appellate Body Report
(WT/DS2/AB/R) (Apr. 29, 1996) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4.
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4. The Hormone Beef Dispute
The first WTO panel dispute to address the consistency of a
Member's health measures under the SPS Agreement was decided in
1997. The panel ruled in EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (the Hormone Beef dispute)," 7 that EC measures
restricting the importation of beef from cattle that were fed growth
hormones violate the SPS Agreement.
a. Background
The events leading up to the WTO panel proceeding span ten
years. Following consumer concerns over the safety of hormone-fed beef,
in 1987 the EC imposed a ban on imports of animals and meat from
animals fed six specific growth-promoting hormones. 1" The United States
objected to this ban on the ground that the six hormones had been found
safe for use in growth promotion by every country that has examined
them. Canada brought a nearly identical complaint against the EC.
Furthermore, not only did the Codex Alimentarius Commission review
five of the six hormones and find them to be safe, but the EC itself twice
commissioned experts to review these same five hormones, and on both
occasions the experts found them to be safe.4' 9 Three of the hormones are
417 GATT Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) available in WTO
Doc. Website, supra note 4 [hereinafter Hormone Beef Report-U.S.]; GATT Panel
Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Complaint by
Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Hormone Beef Report-Can.].
Both Canada and the United States brought WTO complaints against the EC's measures
affecting livestock and meat. See generally Steve Chamovitz, The World Trade
Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1781
(1997).
418 For additional background on the dispute, see generally Office of the USTR, WTO
Hormones Report Confirms U.S. Win, Press Release 97-76, Aug. 18, 1997; Kristin
Mueller, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone Treated Beef Trade Dispute
Between the United States and the European Union, I DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97 (1996);
Wirth, supra note 110; Allen Dick, Note, The EC Hormone Ban Dispute and the
Application of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Standards Code, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 872 (1989).
49 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 2.17-2.25, 2.33; Hormone Beef
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 2.17-2.25, 2.33.
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naturally occurring in animals and humans, while the other three are
artificially produced.
The United States raised the matter under the Tokyo Round
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code) in March
1987. Bilateral consultations between the United States and the EC failed
to resolve the dispute. Contending that the EC ban was not supported by
scientific evidence, the United States requested the establishment of a
technical experts group under Article 14.5 of the Standards Code to
examine the question. The EC rejected this request, stating that the issue
was outside the scope of the Code.
On January 1, 1989, the United States imposed retaliatory
measures of 100% ad valorem duties on imports of certain EC-origin
goods. A joint U.S.-EC Task Force reached an interim agreement that
permitted imports of United States beef that was certified hormone-free.
The United States, in return, lifted some of its retaliatory tariffs. In June
1996, the EC requested the establishment of a WTO panel to examine the
matter. A month later the United States removed the balance of its
retaliatory tariffs pending the outcome of the panel proceeding. To
determine whether there was a scientific basis for the EC ban, the panel
appointed three scientific experts to advise the panel, pursuant to Article
11.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article 13 of the DSU1 20
b. The Panel Report
i. Governing Law
Both the United States and the EC invoked the SPS Agreement, the
TBT Agreement, and GATT in support of their respective positions. As a
threshold matter, the panel considered whether the SPS Agreement, which
entered into force on January 1, 1995, could apply to measures that predate
it. The panel concluded that under the general rules of treaty interpretation
found in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
EC measures are continuing situations that were enacted before the SPS
Agreement entered into force, but which did not cease to exist after that
date. The panel found no contrary intention in the SPS Agreement; in fact,
it found that the Agreement generally applies to measures enacted before
420 For the experts' analysis and conclusions, see Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note
417, paras. 6.1-6.241; Hormone Beef Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 6.1-6.240.
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its entry into force but which are maintained in force after that date. 2'
Having found that the SPS Agreement is applicable to the dispute,
the panel next concluded that the TBT Agreement a fortiori was
inapplicable. By their terms, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement
are mutually exclusive. 22
Finally, with regard to the applicability of GATT, the panel found
that there is no requirement in the SPS Agreement that a prior GATT
violation be established before the SPS Agreement applies. Moreover,
even if a measure were to pass muster under GATT, it still would have to
be examined for consistency with the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the
panel limited its examination to the consistency of the EC measure under
the SPS Agreement.23
ii. Burden of Proof
The United States argued that the burden of proof rested on the EC
to provide evidence that there is a risk to be protected against and that
there has been a risk assessment. The EC responded that the burden of
proof rests on the party challenging the consistency of a sanitary measure
under the SPS Agreement to provide evidence that the use of the
hormones in dispute is safe and without risk. 24 The panel stated in this
connection that:
[T]he initial burden of proof rests on the complaining party
in the sense that it bears the burden of presenting a prima
facie case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. It is,
indeed, for the party that initiated the dispute settlement
proceedings to put forward factual and legal arguments in
order to substantiate its claim that a sanitary measure is
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. In other words, it is
for the United States to present factual and legal arguments
that, if unrebutted, would demonstrate a violation of the
421 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.25-8.26; Hormone Beef
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 8.25-8.3 1.
422 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 1.5; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 1.4;
Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, para. 8.29; Hormone Beef Report-Can.,
supra note 417, para. 8.32.
423 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.31-8.42; Hormone Beef
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 8.34-8.45.
424 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.49-8.50.
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SPS Agreement. Once such a prima facie case is made,
however, we consider that, at least with respect to the
obligations imposed by the SPS Agreement that are
relevant to this case, the burden of proof shifts to the
responding party.25
Accordingly, the United States had the burden of presenting a prima facie
case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. Once that initial burden
was met, the burden would shift to the EC to demonstrate that its measures
did not violate the SPS Agreement.
iii. Measures Based on International Standards
The panel began its analysis with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement
that requires Members "to base their [SPS] measures on international
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist .. -426
Annex A:3(a) of the SPS Agreement defines "international standards,
guidelines or recommendations" as those established by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission relating to veterinary drug residues.2 7 In
accordance with Article 3.1, if such Codex standards exist with respect to
the six hormones in dispute, then, the panel stated, a sanitary measure
taken by a Member should either be based on these standards or be
justified under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.428
Unless a Member's measure reflects the same level of protection as
the standard, it is not "based on" that standard and violates Article 3.1.
The panel found that Codex standards exist for five of the six hormones in
issue.4 29 The panel further found that the EC measures resulted in a
different level of protection than would be achieved by measures based on
the Codex standards.4"' The EC measures, accordingly, were not based on
the Codex standards for purposes of Article 3.1.
iv. Measures Not Based on International Standards
425 Id. para. 8.51.
42, See id. para. 8.56; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.1.
427 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, para. 8.5; SPS Agreement, supra note
99, Annex A:3(a).
421 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, para. 8.57.
429 See id. paras. 8.69-8.70.
430 See id. paras. 8.72-8.73, 8.77.
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Even though a Member's measures are not based on international
standards, they are not inconsistent with the SPS Agreement ipso facto.
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement provides an exception to Article 3.1.
Article 3.3 permits Members to introduce measures that result in a higher
level of protection than would be achieved under international standards, if
there is a scientific justification for them, or it is the level of protection a
Member determines to be appropriate after making a risk assessment under
Article 5 of the Agreement. There is a scientific justification if, based on
available scientific information, a Member determines that the
international standards are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of
protection."3' This concept is sometimes referred to as "the acceptable
level of risk." '432
Once the United States established that the EC measures were not
based on an international standard, the burden shifted to the EC to prove
that its measures are justified under Article 3.3 and meet the risk
assessment criteria of Article 5.433 A risk assessment is "the evaluation of
the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from
the presence of ... contaminants ... in food, beverages or feedstuffs." 34
The EC thus had the burden of identifying the adverse effects on human
health caused by the presence of hormones in meat products, and then, if
any such adverse effects existed, evaluating the potential or probability of
occurrence of these effects. '35
After considering all of the sources cited by the EC in support of
the first prong of the two-pronged risk assessment test, the panel
concluded that none of the scientific evidence cited by the EC indicated
that an identifiable risk arises for human health from the use of the growth
hormones in issue. '36 In fact, all of the studies cited by the EC indicated
that such hormones are safe when used in accordance with good practice.
Once the risks are assessed, the next step is risk management (i.e.,
the decision by a Member as to what risks it can accept or its "appropriate
level of sanitary protection"). If a risk assessment is based on scientific
evidence, then a Member can set its own acceptable level of risk, provided
the level is not arbitrary or unjustifiable, takes into account the objective
4" See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3 n.2.
432 See id. Annex A:5; Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, para. 8.79.
411 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.87-8.89.
14 SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A:4.
415 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.98-8.100.
436 See id. para. 8.124.
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of minimizing negative trade effects, and is not a disguised restriction on
international trade.437
Because there was no scientific evidence of an identifiable risk
associated with the growth hormones, the panel found that no basis exists
under the SPS Agreement for the EC's adoption of any measure to achieve
any level of protection. If it were otherwise, then the obligations of
Article 5 would be eviscerated. Assuming arguendo that such scientific
evidence did exist, the panel continued, the EC measures were arbitrary,
unjustifiable, discriminatory, and a disguised restriction on trade in
connection with naturally occurring hormones. 38 The panel concluded
that the measures distinguished between products with higher hormone
residues that are endogenous or naturally occurring, such as eggs and soya
oil that were not subject to an import ban, and the imported meat and meat
products with lower hormone residues that are endogenous as well. 39
With regard to the synthetic hormones, the EC measures set a "no residue"
level for those hormones when used as growth promoters, but set an
unlimited residue level for naturally occurring hormones. Because the EC
could not justify the significant difference in treatment, the panel was
drawn to the conclusion that the measure was arbitrary, unjustifiable, and
discriminatory."'
The panel summed up:
(i) The European Communities, by maintaining
sanitary measures which are not based on a risk
assessment, has acted inconsistently with the
requirements contained in Article 5.1 of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.
(ii) The European Communities, by adopting arbitrary
and unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of
sanitary protection it considers to be appropriate in
different situations which result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade, has
acted inconsistently with the requirements contained
in Article 5.5 of the Agreement on the Application
... See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.3, 5.4, 5.5.
"' See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.161, 8.197, 8.203, 8.206.
439 See Hormone Beef Report-U.S., supra note 417, paras. 8.194, 8.197, 8.203.
440 See id. para. 8.206.
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of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
(iii) The European Communities, by maintaining
sanitary measures which are not based on existing
international standards without justification under
Article 3.3 of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, has acted
inconsistently with the requirements contained in
Article 3.1 of that Agreement."'
Claiming that the panel had distorted the scientific evidence and
misinterpreted several key articles of the SPS Agreement, the EC sought
appellate review of the panel report."2
c. The Appellate Body Report
On January 16, 1998, the Appellate body issued a lengthy report
affirming, modifying, and reversing the findings and conclusions of the
panel, but agreed that the EC import ban on meat products produced using
growth-promoting hormones violates the SPS Agreement."3  The
Appellate Body addressed ten issues on appeal: (1) whether the panel
correctly allocated the burden of proof; (2) whether the panel applied the
appropriate standard of review under the SPS Agreement; (3) whether the
precautionary principle is relevant in interpreting the SPS Agreement; (4)
whether the SPS Agreement applies to measures enacted before the entry
into force of the WTO Agreement; (5) whether the panel made an
objective assessment of the facts pursuant to DSU Article 11; (6) whether
the panel acted within the scope of its authority in its selection and use of
experts; (7) whether the panel correctly interpreted Article 3.1 and 3.3 of
the SPS Agreement; (8) whether the EC measures are "based on" a risk
assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement; (9)
whether the panel correctly interpreted and applied Article 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement; and (10) whether the panel appropriately exercised judicial
economy in refraining from making findings on the consistency of the EC
411 Id. para. 9.1. See Fare Trade, ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 20. For criticisms of the
panel's decision, see Chamovitz, supra note 255.
12 See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), AB-1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) paras. 1, 7
[hereinafter Hormone Appellate Body Report].
443 See id. para. 253.
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measures with Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement."
i. Allocating the Burden of Proof under the SPS Agreement.
In addressing the panel's allocation of burden of proof, the
Appellate Body concluded that the panel erred in placing the initial burden
on the EC to prove that its measures are justified under the exceptions
provided for in Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement." The panel put that
burden on the EC because its measures were not based on international
standards.446 The Appellate Body found that even though the EC measures
were not based on international standards, that fact did not relieve the
United States and Canada from the burden of establishing a prima facie
case showing the absence of the risk assessment required by Article 5.1
and the failure of the EC to comply with the requirements of Article 3.3.7
ii. The Standard of Review
The EC argued that the panel should have applied a standard of
review in evaluating the consistency of the EC measures under the SPS
Agreement that gives deference to the factual findings of the competent
EC authorities." 8 In response to the EC's argument, the Appellate Body
found the SPS Agreement to be silent on this point and so turned to Article
11 of the DSU." 9 Article 11 provides in pertinent part that "a panel should
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements . *."..",o Thus, the
applicable standard of review is neither de novo nor one of total deference,
but rather an intermediate "objective assessment of the facts" standard.
The Appellate Body concluded that the panel applied the appropriate
standard of review.4 5'
iii. Relevance of the Precautionary Principle
414 See id. paras. 9-39.
445 See id. para. 108.
411 See id. paras. 103-104.
441 See id. para. 108.
448 See id. paras. 13-15.
441 See id. paras. 114-18.
450 DSU, supra note 103, art. 11.
"' See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 119.
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The panel rejected the EC's contention that the precautionary
principle should be adopted and used to override the explicit terms of
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.5" The EC argued that the
precautionary principle has become a customary rule of international law,
that its measures were precautionary in nature, and that they, therefore,
satisfied the risk assessment requirements of the Agreement. '53
The Appellate Body refused to take a position on whether the
precautionary principle is a customary rule of international law or merely
an emerging principle that has yet to ripen into such a rule.54 The
Appellate Body did find that the precautionary principle is reflected in
various provisions of the SPS Agreement, especially in Article 3.3 that
recognizes a Member's right to establish its own appropriate level of
sanitary protection, which may be higher than international standards."
The Appellate Body nevertheless concluded that, whatever its legal status,
the precautionary principle cannot override the express terms of Articles
5.1 and 5.2.456
iv. Application of the SPS Agreement to Pre-1995 Measures
The EC measures were enacted before the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995. The Appellate Body rejected the
EC's argument that the temporal application of the SPS Agreement is
restricted to events that occurred after 1995. The EC cited Article 28 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that "[a]bsent a contrary
intention, a treaty cannot apply to acts or facts which took place, or
situations which ceased to exist, before the date of its entry into force.4 57
The Appellate Body continued that the SPS Agreement does not contain
any provision limiting its temporal application. 58 Moreover, Article XVI:4
of the WTO Agreement provides that "[e]ach Member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
452 See id. para. 125.
'" See id. para. 12 1.
411 See id. para. 123.
'55 See id. para. 124.
456 See id. para. 125.
157 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 128.
458 See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 128.
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obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. '5 9 Accordingly, the
Appellate Body affirmed the panel's finding with regard to the temporal
application of the SPS Agreement.'
v. The Panel's Objective Assessment of the Facts
The EC claimed that the panel disregarded, distorted, and
misrepresented the evidence the EC submitted.4 6' The Appellate Body
noted at the outset that under Article 17.6 of the DSU its scope of review
is limited to questions of law. The Appellate Body added, however, that if
the panel deliberately disregarded, distorted, or misrepresented such
evidence, then it failed to make an objective assessment of the facts as
required under Article 11 of the DSU.462 The Appellate Body noted that
such conduct would be a denial of fundamental fairness and due process. 63
The Appellate Body reviewed the expert scientific evidence and
the panel's analysis of it. The EC charged that the panel failed to refer to
all of the evidence presented. The Appellate Body responded that "[t]he
Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts
advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to
which statements are useful to refer to explicitly." The Appellate Body
reviewed the panel's assessment of the evidence and conceded that the
panel had misquoted some experts and failed to consider some of the
evidence.4 65 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body concluded that the mistakes
the panel made did not amount to manifest misrepresentation, deliberate
distortion, or egregious disregard of the evidence. In the end, the
Appellate Body accorded the panel great deference in fact findings.
vi. The Selection of Experts
The panel consulted experts in their individual capacity rather than
establish a review group to examine the scientific evidence. Noting that
459 DSU, supra note 103, Art. XVI:4. See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note
442, para. 128.
460 See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 130.
46 See id. para. 131.
462 See id. paras. 132-33.
413 See id. para. 133.
464 Id. para. 138.
465 See id. paras. 135, 138, 140-42.
4
.
6 See id. paras. 139, 141, 144.
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nothing in Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement or Article 13.2 of the DSU
prohibits a panel from seeking information from individual experts, the
Appellate Body concluded that "both the SPS Agreement and the DSU
leave to the sound discretion of a panel the determination of whether the
establishment of an expert review group is necessary or appropriate. '67
The parties to the dispute acknowledged that the panel consulted with
them in the appointment of the experts.
vii. The Interpretation of Articles 3.1 and 3.3
The Appellate Body rejected the panel's conclusion that the term
"based on" in Article 3.1 is synonymous with "conform to" and that,
therefore, Article 3.1 requires WTO Members to harmonize their SPS
measures with international standards. "It is clear to us," the Appellate
Body stated, "that harmonization of SPS measures of Members on the
basis of international standards is projected in the Agreement, as a goal,
yet to be realized in the future."68
With regard to the panel's interpretation of Article 3.3, the
Appellate Body noted that if there is scientific justification, Article 3.3
permits a Member to adopt SPS measures that achieve a higher level of
protection than would measures based on a relevant international
standard. 9 The EC contended that no risk assessment is necessary under
Article 5.1, so long as there is a scientific justification for the higher level
of protection. 70 The Appellate Body noted that Article 3.3 is not a model
of drafting clarity: it pointed to the last clause in the Article that requires
that such measures "shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of
this Agreement." 7' Accordingly, the Appellate Body agreed with the
panel that the EC must undertake a risk assessment to conform with
Article 5 of the Agreement. 2
viii. Basing SPS Measures on a Risk Assessment
The Appellate Board evaluated the EC's compliance with the
... Id. para. 147.
468 Id. para. 165 (emphasis in original).
469 See id. para. 172.
470 See id. para. 174.
471 See id. para. 175.
472 See id. para. 176.
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Article 5.1 requirement of risk assessment, and it noted that for SPS
measures to be "based on" a risk assessment, some rational nexus must
exist between the supporting scientific evidence and an identifiable risk to
human health or safety. 73  Against that interpretative backdrop, the
Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EC relied upon scientific
reports that did not rationally support the EC import prohibition. 74
ix. Article 5.5 and Discriminatory Trade Measures
Three elements are necessary to establish a violation of Article 5.5
of the Agreement. 75 First, the Member imposing the measure must have
adopted its own level of protection, rather than an international standard.
Second, that level of protection must exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable
differences in its treatment of different situations. Third, the arbitrary or
unjustifiable differences must result in either discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. 6
The Appellate Body focused on the second and third prongs of this
three-part test and agreed that the levels of protection established by the
EC were arbitrary and unjustifiable in some instances, (e.g., the different
levels of protection for carbadox and olaquindox).4 7  The Appellate Body
next turned to the question of whether these levels of protection resulted in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade, and it rejected the
panel's conclusion that such discrimination existed:
We are unable to share the inference that the Panel
apparently draws that the import ban on treated meat and
the Community-wide prohibition of the use of the
hormones here in dispute for growth promotion purposes in
the beef sector were not really designed to protect its
population from the risk of cancer, but rather to keep out
US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and thereby to
protect the domestic beef producers in the European
Communities. 78
171 See id. para. 193-94.
474 See id. paras. 197, 200.
475 See id. para. 214.
476 See id.
477 See id. paras. 226-35.
171 Id. para. 245.
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Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that the panel's finding of
discrimination was unjustified and erroneous as a matter of law. 79
x. Issues Reserved by the Panel
The final issue the Appellate Body addressed was the panel's
refusal to decide the claims of the United States and Canada under Articles
2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement .4 " The Appellate Body found this issue
moot in view of the panel's other findings and conclusions.4 ' In the
interests of judicial economy, the Appellate Body held that the panel did
not err when it refrained from making findings on Articles 2.2 and 5.6.82
d. Summary
This important precedent requires an importer to show that
scientific evidence suggests that a product poses a health risk. A rule that
required the exporter to show that the product is safe would have dealt a
serious blow to the SPS Agreement and open trade because such a
standard would be nearly impossible to meet. These reports also show that
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is capable of resolving technically
complex trade-environment disputes.
5. The Shrimp/Turtle Dispute
a. Background
In a reprise of the issues addressed in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute,
the WTO was asked to determine the GATT-consistency of a U.S. import
ban on shrimp from India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. The
Endangered Species Act lists as endangered or threatened with extinction
five species of sea turtles that live in U.S. waters and on the high seas.
U.S. shrimp trawlers are required to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) in
their nets when they fish in areas where a significant likelihood of
encountering sea turtles exists. Under Section 609 of the Endangered
419 See id.
480 See id. paras 247-52. The United States and Canada cross-appealed from that decision.
481 See id. paras. 250-52.
482 See id. para. 252.
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Species Act, '83 shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect
certain sea turtles may not be imported into the United States unless the
harvesting nation is certified to have a regulatory program and an
incidental turtle-take rate comparable to that of the U.S. shrimpers. 8 ' For
all practical purposes, in order to be certified under Section 609, countries
having one of the five species of endangered sea turtle within their
jurisdiction must require their shrimpers to harvest shrimp using TEDs.485
b. The Panel Report
i. NGO Submissions
Several environmental NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus briefs
with the panel that defended the U.S. import ban on shrimp. The panel
concluded that under Article 13.2 of the DSU, only information that the
panel seeks (i.e., actually solicits) may be considered by a panel.
Nevertheless, the panel invited the United States, if it so desired, to
include the NGO submissions as part of its own submission.4 86
ii. Unjustifiable Discrimination in Violation of Article XX
Having found the import ban to be a violation of the GATT Article
XI prohibition against quantitative restrictions on imports, the panel turned
its attention to GATT Article XX. Employing a "chapeau-down"
483 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994).
484 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB- 1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 2-6 (1998).
485 Litigation involving the U.S. implementation of the shrimp import ban was brought in
the U.S. Court of International Trade. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 942 F.
Supp. 597 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (holding that State Department regulations allowing the
import of shrimp from certain non-certified countries violates Section 609), vacated, 147
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1996) (holding that shrimp harvested by manual methods that does not harm
sea turtles can be imported from non-certified countries), vacated, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). For an analysis of the CIT decisions and the WTO dispute, see Paul Stanton
Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International
Trade, 15 U.C.L.A.J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 57 (1996-97). See also New Role for NAFTA:
Saving Fish? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1996, at 1; Timothy E. Wirth, Take the
Final Step to Protect Dolphins, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1996, at 19.
486 See Report of the WTO Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 7.8 (1998).
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analytical approach, the panel did not inquire whether the U.S. measure
was provisionally justified under either Article XX(b) or (g). Instead, the
panel focused exclusively on the Article XX chapeau. With that focus, the
panel concluded that the U.S. import ban unjustifiably discriminated
against shrimp imports from the complaining Members, in violation of the
Article XX chapeau. The panel rested its conclusion on the view that if
the U.S. import ban was upheld, it could undermine the multilateral
trading system.
In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of
Article XX were to be followed which would allow a
Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its
market for a given product upon the adoption by the
exporting Members of certain policies, including
conservation policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral
framework for trade among Members as security and
predictability of trade relations under those agreements
would be threatened. 87
Accordingly, the panel stated, in light of the context of the term
"unjustifiable" and the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the
U.S. import ban constitutes unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail. 88
c. The Appellate Body Report
i. NGO Submissions
In connection with the NGO submissions, the Appellate Body
found that the panel's reading of Article of the DSU was too narrow.
We find, and so hold, that the Panel erred in its legal
interpretation that accepting non-requested information
from non-governmental sources is incompatible with the
provisions of the DSU. At the same time, we consider that
the Panel acted within the scope of its authority under
487 Id. para. 7.45.
488 See id. para. 7.49.
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Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU in allowing any party to the
dispute to attach the briefs by non-governmental
organizations, or any portion thereof, to its own
submissions. '89
The Appellate Body thus concluded that a panel is free to accept
unsolicited submissions from interested groups if such information would
be helpful to the panel in reaching its decision.
ii. The Article XX Analysis-Introduction
The Appellate Body was critical of the panel's analytical approach
to Article XX. First, the Appellate Body noted, the general design of a
measure is to be distinguished from its application." The general design
of a measure is relevant in determining whether the measure falls within
one of the Article XX exceptions following the chapeau. 9  The
application of the measure is to be examined in the course of determining
whether it violates the chapeau. '92 The panel's analysis was flawed,
according to the Appellate Body, because it "did not attempt to inquire
into how the measure at stake was being applied in such a manner as to
constitute abuse or misuse of a given kind of exception."'493
The Appellate Body reiterated that an Article XX analysis is a two-
step process: (1) determine whether the measure satisfies any of the
exceptions listed in the paragraphs of Article XX following the chapeau,
and (2) appraise the same measure under the chapeau.""' The sequence is
important: "The standard of 'arbitrary discrimination', for example, under
the chapeau may be different for a measure that purports to be necessary to
protect public morals than for one relating to the products of prison
labor." '495
iii. The Article XX(g) Exception
489 Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998) para. 110 [hereinafter Shrimp-
Turtle Appellate Body Report].




'9' See id. para. 118.
495 Id. para. 120.
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Article XX(g) covers measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."96
First, the Appellate Body concluded that textually Article XX(g) is not
limited to non-living natural resources, but extends to living resources as
well.497  Rejecting Malaysia's "original intent" argument that Article
XX(g) was intended to cover non-living resources only, the Appellate
Body stated:
The words of Article XX(g), "exhaustible natural
resources," were actually crafted more than 50 years ago.
They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about
the protection and conservation of the environment....
130. From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the
WTO Agreement [explicitly acknowledging the objective of
sustainable development], we note that the generic term
"natural resources" in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its
content or reference but is rather "by definition,
evolutionary. 498
Moreover, the Appellate Body added, two adopted GATT 1947 panel
reports41 found fish to be an "exhaustible natural resource" within the
meaning of Article XX(g). Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that
measures to conserve exhaustible resources, whether living or non-living,
may fall within Article XX(g).1° The Appellate Body further found that
sea turtles are an exhaustible natural resource.
Turning next to the issue of whether the U.S. measure was one
"relating to the conservation of' exhaustible natural resources, the
Appellate Body found a substantial relationship between Section 609 and
496 GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(g).
... See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 489, para. 128.
498 Id. paras. 129-130.
499 See Tuna Restrictions Report, supra, note 316; Herring and Salmon Panel Report,
supra note 320.
500 See Shrimp- Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 489, para. 13 1.
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its implementing regulations, on the one hand, and the conservation of sea
turtles, on the other. "The means [TEDs] are, in principle, reasonably
related to the ends [the conservation of sea turtles]."5 '
Addressing the last Article XX(g) criterion-that the measure is
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption-the Appellate Body found that this requirement was easily
satisfied.1 2 U.S. shrimpers who fail to use TEDs face serious civil and
criminal penalties, including forfeiture of their trawlers. "We believe," the
Appellate Body concluded, "that, in principle, Section 609 is an even-
handed measure." 503
iv. The Article XX Chapeau
Having concluded that Section 609 is provisionally justified under
the Article XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body next tackled the thorny
issue of whether Section 609 violates the Article XX chapeau. Reflecting
on the preambular language of the WTO Agreement that calls for "the
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development," and the creation of the Committee on Trade and
Environment and its terms of reference, the Appellate Body noted that
these developments "must add colour, texture and shading to our
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this
case, the GATT 1994."'  Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found it
unacceptable
for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to
require other Members to adopt essentially the same
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain
policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory,
without taking into consideration different conditions which
may occur in the territories of those other Members."0
The Appellate Body added that the protection and conservation of highly
migratory species of sea turtles demands concerted and cooperative efforts
"° Id. para. 14 1.
502 See id. para. 144.
503 Id.
504 Id. para. 153.
505 Id. para. 164 (emphasis in original).
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on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed by sea turtles.
With the exception of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection
and Conservation of Sea Turtles, the United States had failed to exhaust
multilateral efforts, in the Appellate Body's view."° Rather than attempt
to exhaust international mechanisms, the United States instead pursued the
unilateral application of Section 609. In a footnote, the Appellate Body
underscored this point with the observation that the United States, a party
to CITES, made no attempt to raise the issue of sea turtle mortality due to
shrimp trawling in the CITES Standing Committee. 07 The Appellate Body
also faulted the United States for acting in a discriminatory manner vis-a-
vis shrimp exporting Members, 08 as well as for the lack of adequate
transparency in the administration of the Section 609 certification
procedures.0 9
Anticipating the firestorm of criticism that its decision would
create within the environmental community, the Appellate Body launched
a preemptive first strike in the following closing observations:
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to
underscore what we have not decided in this appeal. We
have not decided that the protection and preservation of the
environment is of no significance to the Members of the
WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the
sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot
adopt effective measures to protect endangered species,
such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we
have not decided that sovereign states should not act
together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either
within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment.
Clearly, they should and do."'
In sum, the Appellate Body found Section 609 flawed chiefly in the
manner in which the United States administered it, not with the substance
506 See id. paras. 167-168, 171-172.
507 See id. para. 171.
'o' Central and South American shrimp exporters were given preferential treatment under
Section 609 vis-a-vis shrimpers from the four Asian complaining Members. See id. para.
175.
'09 See id.
510 Id. para. 185 (emphasis in original).
4671998]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
of the law per se or its objectives.
6. The Salmon Dispute
a. Background
In 1996 Australia imposed an import ban on uncooked salmon
from the Pacific rim of North America ostensibly to prevent the
introduction of certain exotic diseases in the country. Fresh, chilled, or
frozen salmon could be imported into Australia only if it was heat treated
prior to importation into Australia. Canada complained that the import
ban violated the SPS Agreement to the extent that the Australian import
prohibition was not based on a risk assessment conducted in conformity
with Article 5 of the Agreement.
b. The Panel Report
The panel agreed with Canada that Australia violated Articles 5.1
and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement by not conducting or relying on a proper
risk assessment when imposing the import prohibition on ocean-caught
Pacific salmon."' The panel concluded that because the heat-treatment
requirement was not based on a risk assessment, it violated the SPS
Agreement."'
The panel also concluded that Australia's import prohibition
violated Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because it made an arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinction between the SPS measures applicable to salmon
products, which were subject to more onerous standards, and those
measures applicable to four categories of other imported fish and fish
products, which amounted to a disguised restriction on international
trade." 3
c. The Appellate Body Report.
The central question presented to the Appellate Body was the same
as the one presented in the Hormone Beef dispute: Did Australia carry out
"' Report of the WTO Panel, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS I8/R (June 12, 1998) para. 8.59 [hereinafter Salmon Panel Report].
112 See id. para 8.63.
"' See id. paras. 8.133-8.134, 8.160.
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a proper risk assessment under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement? While
agreeing with the panel that Australia's import prohibition on Pacific
salmon violates the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body reversed the
panel's finding that the SPS measure at issue was the heat-treatment
requirement, rather than the import prohibition. 14 Australia contended that
a 1996 Final Report constituted a risk assessment for purposes of Article
5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 5  Turning to the definition of "risk
assessment" in Annex A of the SPS Agreement," 6 the Appellate Body
found that a proper risk assessment must (1) identify the diseases whose
entry or spread the Member wants to prevent, (2) evaluate the probability
of entry of a pest or disease, not just the possibility of such entry, and (3)
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied."7 Because the
1996 Final Report did not contain (1) an evaluation of the likelihood of
entry, establishment or spread of the diseases of concern, or (2) an
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these
diseases according to the SPS measures which might be applied, the 1996
Final Report could not qualify as a risk assessment."8 Australia, therefore,
acted inconsistently with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
The Appellate Body also upheld the panel's finding that
Australia's import prohibition was arbitrary, unjustifiable, and a disguised
restriction on international trade."' The Appellate Body did, however,
reverse the panel's finding that Australia violated Article 5.6 of the SPS
Agreement relating to alternative SPS measures that are reasonably
available to the Member. Because no evidence was offered to show what
level of protection could be achieved by each of the four alternative SPS
measures mentioned in the 1996 Final Report, it was not possible to state
definitely that Australia had or had not violated Article 5.6.
514 See Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, AB-1998-5, WT/DSI8/AB/R, at 72, para. V.7 (1998) [hereinafter Salmon
Appellate Body Report].
"' See id. para. V.8. The 1996 Final Report concluded that imports of uncooked salmon
should be prohibited in order to prevent the introduction and spread of exotic diseases
within Australia.
516 Annex A:4 defines "risk assessment" in part as "[t]he evaluation of the likelihood of
entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing
Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and
of the associated potential biological and economic consequences ....
5
'See Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 514, para. V. 10-12.
518 See id. at 76, 79.
5 See id. at 93.
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In important dictum the Appellate Body reconfirmed that Members
have the right to determine their own appropriate level of SPS protection.
However, the "appropriate level" is to be distinguished from the actual
SPS measure adopted. The SPS measure adopted has to be rationally
related to achieving the appropriate level of protection. Also, whatever
appropriate level of protection a Member chooses, a Member cannot
choose "zero risk" as an appropriate level of protection under the SPS
Agreement. The Appellate Body clarified that
[I]t is important to distinguish ... between the evaluation
of "risk" in a risk assessment and the determination of the
appropriate level of protection. As stated in our Report in
European Communities--Hormones, the "risk" evaluated in
a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical
uncertainty is "not the kind of risk which, under Article 5.1,
is to be assessed." This does not mean, however, that a
Member cannot determine its own appropriate level of
protection to be "zero risk." 2
The Appellate Body's decision is instructive in answering the question of
what constitutes a proper risk assessment in the context of the spread of
pests and diseases. Together with the EC Hormones decision on what
constitutes a proper risk assessment in the context of additives or
contaminants to food, the Salmon decision is an important addition to
WTO jurisprudence under the SPS Agreement.
III. NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. Introduction
For proponents of free trade in North America, the 1991 GATT
Tuna/Dolphin report52' could not have come at a more inopportune time.
That report preceded by just a few months the conclusion of the NAFTA
negotiations between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It cast a
dark shadow over its prospects in Congress.
NAFTA 22 has been the target of spirited attacks, the most vigorous
520 Id. at 75 (footnote omitted).
52 Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7.
122 NAFTA, supra note 8.
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of which have come from labor and environmental groups. Labor groups
emphasized that low wage jobs in the United States would move south to
Mexico. Environmentalists also delivered heavy salvos. 23 They claimed
that Mexico, whose environmental laws are not aggressively enforced,
would become a pollution haven to which "dirty" U.S. industries would
quickly relocate to avoid the more stringent U.S. air and water standards.""
Environment and labor side agreements concluded in 1993 allowed
NAFTA to ride out the storm of anti-trade sentiment that swept the United
States following the Tuna/Dolphin decision.525 In 1997, President Clinton
released the three-year review of the operation and effect of NAFTA.2 6
523 See generally Environmental Groups Coalition Proposes Stronger NAFTA
Safeguards, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (1992); Public Citizen Says NAFTA
Summary Falls Short on Many Key Environmental Issues, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1502
(1992). Environmentalists even brought unsuccessful court challenges against NAFTA.
Compare Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding that the U.S. Trade Representative's Office is not required to prepare an
environmental impact statement for NAFTA pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act), and Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that NAFTA is not final agency action and, therefore, not
subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act),
with Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes,
including the National Environmental Policy Act, does not apply where the conduct
regulated by the statute occurs primarily in the United States and the extraterritorial
effect of the statute will be felt in Antarctica, a continent without a sovereign). See also
Christina J. Bruff, NAFTA Meets NEPA: Trade and the Environment in the 1990s, 34
NAT. RES. J. 179 (1994); Dana E. Butler, The Death Knell of the Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement: A Critique of Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 122 (1994); Peter Fitzgerald & Vania
J. Leveille, When the National Environmental Policy Act Collides with the North
American Free Trade Agreement: The Case of Public Citizen v. Office of the United
States Trade Representative, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMEN. 751 (1994).
524 For an evaluation of Mexico's environmental laws, regulations, and their enforcement,
see DANIEL MAGRAw, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 445,
583 (1995). See generally USTR Hills Says There Will Be No "Downward
Harmonization" Under NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (1992); Brenda S. Hustis,
The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 589 (1993); Joel L. Silverman, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A
Blueprint to Prevent Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA's Unheralded "Eco-
Dumping" Provisions to the New World Trade Organization, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
347 (1994).
525 See MAGRAW, supra note 524, at 15.
5 6 See Letter of Transmittal from the President to Congress, Study on the Operation and
Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (1997) (visited Oct. 1, 1998)
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Chapter 4 of that review, The North American Environment: Cooperation,
Institutions, and Enforcement, makes three assessments. First, it notes that
Mexico is improving enforcement of its environmental laws. Second, two
NAFTA institutions, the Border Enforcement Cooperation Commision
(BECC) and North American Development Bank (NADBank) are helping
communities along the U.S.-Mexico border area design and fund
infrastructure projects that will improve conditions for border residents. 27
Third, another NAFTA institution, the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) has launched a number of environmental projects that
will benefit the North American environment.5 28
B. NAFTA's Environmental Provisions
Originally NAFTA had no single chapter exclusively dedicated to
environmental issues. The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC)529 closed this gap. 3 NAFTA does, however,
address trade and environment issues in its preamble and in the various
chapters. 3'
1. The Preamble
NAFTA's preamble identifies fifteen goals. 32 Four of them have
important environmental aspects. These goals are: (1) to promote trade
liberalization in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation; (2) to promote sustainable development; (3) to strengthen
<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/index.html> [hereinafter Operation and Effect of NAFTA].
527 See id.
528 See id.
59 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 9, 12, 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
131 See MAGRAW, supra note 524, at 81.
13' For additional analyses of these provisions and of the Environmental Side Agreement,
see OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1993), reprinted in MAGRAW, supra note 524; Joseph G. Block
& Andrew R. Herrup, The Environmental Aspects of NAFTA and Their Relevance to
Possible Free Trade Agreements Between the United States and Caribbean Nations, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1994); Colin Crawford, Some Thoughts on the North American Free
Trade Agreement, Political Stability and Environmental Equity, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
585 (1995); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling
Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 691 (1993).
532 See NAFTA, supra note 8, pmbl.
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the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations;
and (4) to create new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards within North America. 33
2. Article 104
Article 104, Relation to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements, together with Annex 104.1, provides that in the event of any
inconsistency between NAFTA and three MEAs (i.e., CITES, the
Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention), or the U.S.-Mexican
Agreement on Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (since
replaced by the Border XXI Program, described below), the obligations of
the latter prevail."
3. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
NAFTA Chapter Seven, Agriculture and Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, contains two sections." Section A deals with
agricultural trade, including market access for agricultural products and
government subsidies. 6 Section B deals with sanitary and phytosanitary
measures. 37 Like the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, Chapter 7:B does
not impose any specific standards on the Parties. Instead, Chapter 7:B
establishes guidelines to ensure that parties take SPS measures for
scientific reasons and not for trade protection.38
Under Chapter 7:B, each Party has the right to adopt any SPS
measure it deems necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant
life. A Party may establish any level of protection it desires, so long as
scientific evidence exists to support the measure, and the Party has made a
risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances. 39 Once the Party has
established a need for protection, the appropriate level is left to each Party
to decide.4 0 In other words, the appropriate level of protection is a value
judgment, not a scientific one.
... See id.
114 See id. art. 104 & annex 104.1.
"' See id. art. 701-24.
536 See id. art. 701-708.
3 See id. art. 709-24.
538 See id. art. 712.
"9 See id. art. 712.1-.3.
540 See id. arts. 712, 715.
1998] 473
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
The ability of a Party to set its own level of risk is tempered,
however. The Parties agree that SPS measures will not be adopted and
applied in a manner that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between
domestic goods and imported products." '
Article 714.1 attempts to minimize differences among the three
NAFTA Parties' SPS measures. It provides that an importing Party must
accept a measure of an exporting Party as equivalent if the exporting
Party's measure achieves the importing Party's level of protection. 4 2 The
Parties further agree that they will apply SPS measures only to the extent
necessary to achieve the appropriate level of protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility.5 43
Although the agreement encourages Parties to adopt international
standards where they exist, Article 713.3 permits the NAFTA parties to
adopt SPS measures that are more stringent than international standards.
This provision is important to environmental protection if a NAFTA Party
considers international standards to be inadequate. SPS measures are
presumptively valid if they conform to an international standard.5"
Nonconformity with an international standard alone, however, does not
establish a presumption of invalidity under NAFTA.54 In either event, a
Party challenging another Party's SPS measure bears the burden of
establishing the inconsistency.1 6
Article 717.4 provides that an importing Party may require
governmental approval for the use of an additive or for establishing a
tolerance for a contaminant prior to granting access to the importing
Party's domestic market for food, beverages, or feedstuff containing that
additive or contaminant. 7
Article 718 on transparency requires advance public notice and an
opportunity to comment on proposed SPS measures or amendments to
existing SPS measures." ' Article 718.4 requires a delay between the
publication of an SPS measure and its effective date.149
One key difference between Chapter 7:B and NAFTA Chapter
141 See id. art. 712.4.
542 See id. art. 714.2.
141 See id. art. 712.5.
144 See id. art. 713.2.
141 See id. art. 713.2.
546 See id. art. 723.6.
141 See id. art. 717.4.
548 See id. art. 718.1.
41 See id. art. 718.4.
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Nine on standards-related measures is the test used to determine whether a
measure is protectionist and, therefore, illegal. As described below,
Chapter Nine uses a test of non-discriminatory treatment.5" Chapter 7:B,
on the other hand, relies on a test of scientific evidence and risk
assessment.5 ' As noted above in connection with the Uruguay Round SPS
Agreement, a strict test of non-discrimination is not possible for SPS
measures because SPS measures must at times discriminate against
imported products from a particular country because such goods pose a
different health or safety risk than the same product from another
country.52 As long as the discrimination is not arbitrary or unjustifiable, it
is permissible under Chapter 7:B.
4. Standards-Related Measures
NAFTA Chapter Nine, Standards-Related Measures, complements
the Chapter 7:B environmental provisions. Article 903 affirms the Parties'
rights and obligations to each other under environmental and conservation
agreements to which they are a Party. Article 904.2 entitles each NAFTA
Party to establish the levels of protection it considers appropriate in
pursuing legitimate health, safety, and environmental protection objectives
and to set those standards at a level to be determined by the Party.
Unnecessary obstacles to trade are barred. 53 So long as the demonstrable
purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective, and the
measure does not exclude imports from a Party that meet that legitimate
objective, an environmental measure is not an "an unnecessary obstacle to
trade."554
In contrast with Article 712.3(b), which requires the Parties to base
SPS measures on an assessment of risk and scientific principles, Article
904 does not obligate the Parties to conduct a risk assessment or to base
their standards-related measures on a risk assessment.5" A Party may,
however, conduct such an assessment in pursuing its legitimate
objectives. 6
550 See id. art. 904.3.
"' See id. art. 712, 714.
552 See supra notes 105 through 171 and accompanying text.
... See id. art. 904.4.
114 See id.
... See generally id. art. 904.
556 See id. art. 907.1. When conducting a risk assessment, Article 907.1 directs the
Parties to consider (1) available scientific evidence; (2) intended end uses; (3) processes
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Article 904 not only reserves to the Parties the right to establish the
levels of protection they deem appropriate in pursuing legitimate
objectives of health and safety, 57 it also reserves to the Parties the right to
prohibit the importation of another Party's goods that fail to comply with
applicable standards-related measures of the importing Party. 58
Furthermore, an importing Party has the right to continue to prohibit the
importation of such products until completion of any domestic approval
procedure.559
In order to ensure that existing levels of high protection do not
move in a downward trajectory, Article 906.2 obligates the Parties to
harmonize ("make compatible" in the language of the Article) their
respective standards-related measures, but in doing so not to reduce the
level of environmental protection. 6 ° Article 906.2 ought to alleviate fears
that NAFTA heralds the demise of effective environmental protection in
North America, and, specifically, in the United States. Article 906.2 is
designed to prevent the feared "ratcheting down" of environmental
standards and enforcement to the lowest common denominator. At a
minimum, Article 906.2 establishes a standstill in existing environmental
laws and regulations within the United States. It calls for a ratcheting up
of such standards and enforcement levels in Mexico, to the extent that its
standards and enforcement levels are lower than, and thus incompatible
with, the standards and enforcement levels set in the United States.
Article 906.4 obligates an importing Party to treat as equivalent to
its own standards-related measures those of an exporting Party where it is
demonstrated that the latter's technical regulations adequately fulfill the
importing Party's legitimate objectives. 6'
Article 909 requires advance public notice and an opportunity to
comment of at least sixty days (in the case of federal measures) on
proposed new standards-related measures or modifications of existing
standards-related measures. 6 -
Article 914.4 on burden of proof parallels Article 723.6 by
providing that in any dispute over a standards-related measure, the burden
or production, operating, inspection, sampling or testing methods; and (4) environmental
conditions. See id.
... See id. art. 904.2.
558 See id. art. 904.1.
9 See id. art. 904.1.
560 See id. art. 906.2.
' See id art. 906.4.
552 See id. art. 909.1
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of proving an inconsistency with or violation of NAFTA rests with the
challenging Party 63
Finally, to oversee the harmonization effort, Chapter Nine
establishes a Committee on Standards-Related Measures whose functions
include "facilitating the process by which the Parties make compatible
their standards-related measures."' 64 In addition, businesses and firms
within the NAFTA Parties have decided not to wait for their governments
to act and have taken the initiative. They are engaged in on-going
negotiations to harmonize products standards and to conclude mutual
recognition agreements. 65
Before turning to the Environmental Side Agreement, the
environmental provisions in two other NAFTA chapters, Investment and
Dispute Settlement, will be analyzed.
5. Investment
One of the most serious misgivings harbored by NAFTA's
opponents-captured in part by Ross Perot's "giant sucking sound"
metaphor-is that Mexico will not only draw low-wage jobs from the
United States, but that it also will become a pollution haven for the
"dirtiest" U.S. industries. In connection with the latter, the fear is that
polluting U.S. industries will move operations to Mexico where they
purportedly can pollute at will. The Labor Side Agreement,16 concluded
concurrently with the Environmental Side Agreement5 67 after the NAFTA
negotiations were closed, is designed to address at least in part the first
concern. Chapter Eleven on investment deals with the second concern. 68
Article 1114, Environmental Measures, is an environmental sword
and shield. The sword, Article 1114.1, provides that nothing in NAFTA is
to be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with Chapter Eleven that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
563 See id. arts. 914.4, 723.6.
'64 Id. art. 913.2(b).
565 See NAFTA Industries Meet to Harmonize Standards, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 262
(1997).
566 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept, 8, 9, 12, 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
"' NAAEC, supra note 529.
568 See NAFTA, supra note 8, arts. 1 101-39 & Annexes.
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undertaken in an environmentally-sensitive manner. 69 The shield, Article
1114.2, bars the Parties from relaxing, waiving, or derogating from health,
safety, or environmental measures as a way of encouraging foreign
investment from another Party. 7
6. Chapter Twenty Dispute Settlement
The NAFTA Chapter Twenty dispute settlement provisions carve
out special procedures applicable to a challenge brought against a Party's
environmental measures. These procedures were included in response to
the Tuna/Dolphin panel report as a hedge against a replay of that GATT
panel proceeding within the NAFTA context.
As a general matter, NAFTA trade disputes may be resolved under
either NAFTA or WTO auspices at the option of the complaining Party.5 7
Two exceptions exist, however, to this choice-of-forum option. First,
Article 2005.3 provides that if the responding Party claims that its action
is governed by Article 104 (giving priority to the three MEAs and the
Border XXI Program in the event of a conflict between them and
NAFTA), and requests that the matter be resolved under Chapter Twenty,
the complaining Party thereafter can have recourse solely to the NAFTA
dispute settlement procedures. 7 1
Second, upon request of the responding Party, Article 2005.4
channels disputes arising under Chapters 7:B or Nine into Chapter Twenty
if they concern a measure: (1) that is adopted or maintained by a Party to
protect its human, animal, or plant life or health, or to protect its
environment; or (2) that raises a factual issue concerning the environment,
health, safety, or conservation, including directly related scientific
matters.73
What explains these special dispute resolution provisions giving
NAFTA preference over the WTO or other international bodies as the
forum for resolving the Parties' trade-environment disputes? At the time
NAFTA was concluded in 1992, the Uruguay Round negotiations on the
Dispute Settlement Understanding had not been completed. At that time it
was not clear to anyone, including the NAFTA Parties, whether the much-
569 See id. art. 1114.1.
570 See id. art. 1114.2.
571 See id. art. 2005.1.
512 See id. art. 2005.3.
5" See id. art. 2005.4.
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maligned GATT dispute settlement process would be improved and, if so,
whether dispute settlement under WTO auspices would present a
hospitable or hostile forum for resolving trade-environment disputes.
Given these uncertainties and the widespread dissatisfaction with the
GATT dispute settlement process-a dissatisfaction fueled in large part by
the Tuna/Dolphin decision574-the NAFTA Parties included exclusive
jurisdiction provisions in Chapter Twenty for environmental disputes that
otherwise would have fallen within the concurrent jurisdiction of NAFTA,
the WTO, and/or some other international forum.
Finally, environmental disputes also receive special treatment vis-
a-vis the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. The Commission, which is
comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties and charged with
the task of supervising the implementation of NAFTA and resolving
NAFTA disputes,5 must convene to resolve a NAFTA environmental
dispute if a complaining Party so requests." The Commission may seek
the advice of technical experts."' In the event the Commission is
unsuccessful in resolving the dispute within thirty days, any Party may
request the establishment of an arbitral panel whose reports are final and
binding. 78 Environmental disputes which are referred to a Chapter Twenty
arbitral panel may in turn be referred to scientific review boards to answer
factual issues concerning environmental, health, safety, or other scientific
matters. 79 In preparing its report, the arbitral panel must take the board's
report into account.8 0
C. The Environmental Side Agreement
NAFTA has been called "the 'greenest' trade agreement ever."581
The reason for this accolade is the NAAEC, or Environmental
... See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7.
... See NAFTA, supra note 8, arts. 2001.1, 2001.2(a) & (c).
576 See id. arts.2007.1, 2007.2, 2007.4.
... See id. art. 2007.5(a).
578 See id. arts. 2008.1, 2008.2.
579 See id. art. 2015.1. The board is selected by the panel from among highly qualified,
independent experts, after consulting with the disputing Parties. See id. art. 2015.2.
Panel proceedings also may involve the use of technical experts to provide information
and advice. See id. art. 2014.
580 See id. art. 2015.4.
" Daniel C. Esty, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons
from NAFTA, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 373, 379
(James Cameron et al. eds., 1994).
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Cooperation Agreement, signed one year after the conclusion of the
NAFTA negotiations. 8 It augments the environmental provisions of
NAFTA and its commitment to sustainable development. The NAAEC
also delivered a preemptive strike against anti-NAFTA lobbying efforts in
Congress by environmental and business groups in the United States.
The USTR took the lead in developing many of the Environmental
Cooperation Agreement's provisions, in collaboration with an
environmental negotiating sub-group co-chaired by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of State, with representatives from
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and Interior. The
sub-group consulted with concerned business and environmental groups.
As an executive agreement, implementing legislation or
congressional approval was not required. The NAFTA implementing bill,
however, made NAFTA's entry into force contingent upon an exchange of
.82 NAAEC, supra note 529. The NAAEC has generated a flood of legal commentary.
See generally PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996);
Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Peter E. Seley, "Green" Language in the NAFTA.
Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN
THE AMERICAS 375 (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994); MAGRAW, supra note 524;
Frederick M. Abbott, The NAFTA Environmental Dispute Settlement System as Prototype
for Regional Integration Arrangements, 4 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1994); Block &
Herrup, supra note 531; LaRue Corbin et al., The Environment, Free Trade, and
Hazardous Waste: A Study of the U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Problems in the
Light of Free Trade, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183 (1994); Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence
I. Sperling, The Network of Environmental Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation in
North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 INT'L LAW. 111 (1996); Jack I. Garvey,
Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side Accords on
Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (1995); Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to Investigate Violations of
Environmental Laws, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483 (1994); Reid A. Middleton, NAFTA &
The Environmental Side Agreement: Fusing Economic Development with Ecological
Responsibility, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1025 (1994); Kal Raustiala, The Political
Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement: The CEC As a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31 (1995); J. Owen
Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A
New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and the Environment, 5 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade,
Competition, Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 751 (1993); Christopher Thomas
& Gregory A. Tereposky, The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation-Addressing Environmental Concerns in a North American Free Trade
Regime, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1993, at 5 (1993).
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diplomatic notes among Canada, Mexico, and the United States stating
that the supplemental agreement on the environment had entered into
force. " ' Presidents Clinton and Salinas and Prime Minister Campbell
signed the NAAEC in their respective capitols on September 14, 1993.584
The NAAEC is applicable throughout the territory of the United
States and Mexico. The Agreement binds Canada with respect to all
matters subject to Ottawa's control. 85 Canada is committed to using its
best efforts to make the Agreement applicable to as many provinces as
possible.586  Canada is restricted in its ability to invoke the dispute
settlement process to the extent of provincial participation."' As of late
1997, only Quebec and Alberta have signed the Environmental
Cooperation Agreement. 8
The NAAEC does not amend any NAFTA provisions, but does
supplement the rights and obligations contained therein. The Agreement
specifically commits the Parties to effective enforcement of their
environmental laws, although its key feature is its institutional provisions.
The Agreement establishes the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC), whose competence covers any environmental or
natural resource issue that may arise among the NAFTA Parties. 89 In
addition, any environmental issue-from the protection of endangered
species to transboundary pollution-may be the subject of consultations
between the interested Parties under CEC auspices. 9
Despite its trailblazing features, the NAAEC has not received
583 See NAFTA Implementation Act § 101(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3311(b)(2) (1994). The
Act also authorizes the establishment of the multilateral and bilateral commissions and
administrative offices created under the NAAEC. See id. §§ 531-533, 19 U.S.C. §§
3471-3473.
584 See NAAEC, supra note 529, 32 I.L.M. at 1496.
585 See id. art. 41 & Annex 41; see also Zen Makuch, The Environmental Implications of
the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 387.
586 See NAAEC, supra note 529, Annex 41:7.
587 See id. Annex 41:3. The NAAEC dispute resolution provisions are not available to
Canada until provinces representing 55% of Canada's gross domestic product have
signed. This requirement means that Ontario's accession is critical.
588 Ottawa drafted the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation through which the provinces
commit to the NAFTA Environment Agreement. A text of the Canadian
Intergovenmental Agreement is available from Environment Canada at (819) 997-7475.
189 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 8.
'90 See id., arts. 22, 23.
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universal acclaim. Some fear that NAFTA, even with the Environmental
Cooperation Agreement, still will result in a "ratcheting down" of the
enforcement of environmental laws by the Parties. 9' One commentator
has described the Environmental Cooperation Agreement as "tepid,"
"lukewarm," an agreement that gives NAFTA's environmental provisions
"some dull teeth. 592 This criticism persists in the face of a comparative
study of Mexico's environmental laws, standards, and regulations
conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1993 that
concluded that the U.S. and Mexican environmental regulatory regimes
are designed to achieve comparable levels of protection.
1. Preamble and Objectives
The NAAEC's preamble reaffirms the international principle of
good neighborliness, that is, the responsibility of states to ensure that
activities within their territory do not cause damage to the environment of
neighboring states. The preamble also reaffirms the principles declared in
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration, discussed
above.593
The NAAEC has an ambitious agenda. Among its ten enumerated
objectives are protecting the environment, promoting sustainable
development, fostering cooperation on environmental law enforcement,
and promoting transparency and public participation in the development of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. 94
2. Obligations
The Agreement generally obligates the Parties to (1) prepare
reports periodically on the state of the environment, (2) promote education
in environmental matters, (3) promote the use of economic instruments for
the efficient achievement of environmental goals, and (4) consider
prohibiting the export to other NAFTA Parties of pesticides or other toxic
591 Statements and letters from interested business and environmental groups addressing
NAFTA and the environment, both in support of and in opposition to NAFTA, are
collected in MAGRAW, supra note 524, at 629-755.
592 See Joel L. Silverman, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A Blueprint to Prevent
Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA's Unheralded "Eco-Dumping" Provisions to the
New World Trade Organization, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 359, 364, 365 (1994).
-11 See NAAEC, supra note 529, pmbl.
5"" See id. art. 1.
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substances whose use is prohibited within the Party's territory.5 95
Article 3 directs the Parties to maintain high levels of
environmental protection.596 More specifically, Articles 4 and 5 require the
Parties to adopt fair, transparent, and impartial domestic administrative
and judicial procedures so that private parties who are nationals of the
Party have a means of redressing violations of that Party's environmental
laws.597 Decisions must be in writing and state the reasons on which they
are based. 59
Article 6 requires that private persons have a means of requesting
their government officials to investigate alleged violations of that Party's
environmental laws, as well as access to administrative and judicial
forums for enforcing that Party's environmental laws and regulations 99
NAFTA Parties, however, are not obligated to give nationals of another
NAFTA Party any access to their courts or administrative agencies.6
3. Institutional Provisions
Part Three of the NAAEC establishes the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, consisting of the Council on Environmental
Cooperation, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. °'
a. The Council
The Council is comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the
Parties and is required to meet at least once each year.602 The Council
serves as the CEC's governing body and performs the following functions:
(1) it serves as a forum for discussion of environmental matters; (2) it
oversees the implementation of the NAAEC; (3) it has oversight
responsibility for work of the Secretariat; (4) it addresses questions and
'9' See id. arts. 2.1, 2.3.
196 See id. art. 3.
597 See id. arts. 4, 5.
5" See id. art. 7.2(a).
599 See id. art. 6.1-6.3.
600 See id. art. 38.
61 See id. art. 8. For a summary of the CEC's operations through 1997, see Operation
and Effect of NAFTA, supra note 526, at 132-36.
602 See NAAEC, supra note 529, arts. 9.1, 9.3. See generally Jason Coatney, The Council
on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of "Effective Enforcement" Within the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 TULSA L.J. 823 (1997).
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differences that may arise between the parties regarding the interpretation
and application of the NAAEC; and (5) it approves the CEC's annual
work program and budget.6 °0
In connection with the CEC's annual cooperative work program,
five major themes have been identified as the focus for 1997 and
subsequent years: environmental conservation, protection of human health
and environment, enforcement cooperation, environment and trade, and
public outreach.0 4  Regarding environmental conservation, the CEC
Secretariat is coordinating efforts with NGOs to identify areas important
to the long-term viability of bird populations."5 The CEC also is
coordinating efforts to conserve marine ecosystems, including regional
implementation of the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land Based Activities, signed by 101 countries
in November 1995.606 Regarding the protection of human health and
environment, regional action plans are being developed for the
management and/or elimination of four toxic substances: PCBs, DDT,
mercury, and chlordane.6 7 A program also is being developed to monitor
and assess long-term air quality in North America, transboundary air
pollution, and greenhouse gases. 8
The CEC has oversight responsibility for the North American Fund
for Environmental Cooperation. The Fund was created in 1995, but with a
budget of less than $2 million.6"9 The Fund supports community-based
projects and studies on local environmental issues within the NAFTA
Parties.6 0 Thirty-five projects were approved under this program for 1996.
603 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 10.1.
604 The CEC 1997 work program includes projects on (1) environmental conservation, (2)
protecting human health and the environment, (3) environment, trade, and the economy,
(4) enforcement cooperation and law, and (4) information and public outreach. See
Comm'n on Envtl. Cooperation, Annual Program and Budget 1997, May 14, 1997
(visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org> [hereinafter CEC Website].





609 See CEC Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org/english/nafec/flyer.
cfm?format=2>.
6 " A summary of the projects approved by the CEC under the North American Fund for
Environmental Cooperation is available from CEC Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998)
<http://www.cec.org/english/nafec/index.cfm?format=- 1 >.
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Thirty-two projects have been approved for 1997.",.
b. The Secretariat
The CEC Secretariat is headquartered in Montreal and is headed by
an Executive Director who is appointed by the Council for a three-year
term."' The position rotates consecutively between nationals of the
NAFTA Parties. 13 In the performance of their duties, and in a striking
parallel to the independence that Commissioners appointed to the EU
Commission must have from their home governments, the Executive
Director and the Secretariat's staff must neither seek nor receive
instructions from any government or any other authority external to the
Council.614
The Secretariat is responsible for providing technical,
administrative, and operational support to the Council and to committees
and groups established by the Council.6 15 The annual program and budget
of the CEC is prepared by the Executive Director, subject to Council
approval. 16 The Secretariat also is responsible for preparing the CEC's
annual report. 17
Finally, under NAAEC Article 13, the Secretariat may prepare a
report on any matter within the scope of the CEC's annual work
program. 18 In response to a complaint from private groups concerning
massive migratory bird deaths at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico, the
Secretariat prepared an Article 13 report in 1996.69 In response to that
report, the NAFTA Parties negotiated a resolution that called for scientific
cooperation on the problem.'
c. The Joint Public Advisory Committee
611 See id.
612 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 11.1.
613 See id.
614 See id. art. 11.4.
615 See id. art. 11.5.
616 See id. art. 11.6.
617 See id. art. 12. The CEC's annual reports are available from its website. See CEC
Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org>.
611 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 13.
619 See id. arts. 13, 14.
620 See id. art. 13.
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The last of the three CEC institutions is the fifteen-member Joint
Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). As its name suggests, the JPAC
provides citizen advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of
the NAAEC, and technical, scientific, or other information to the
Secretariat.6"'
The NAAEC is maddeningly short on detail as to the role of the
JPAC. 22 Only one article, consisting of seven sections, is devoted to the
JPAC. Given the lack of infrastructure, the absence of clearly defined
functions, and the requirement that it meet only once a year, JPAC's role
within the CEC may be ad hoc.623
4. The Private Petition Process
The Secretariat may consider a submission from any NGO or
private person asserting that a NAFTA Party is failing to enforce
effectively its environmental laws.624 To be in proper form, a submission
must meet the following six criteria: (1) it must be in writing and in the
language designated by the Party that is the target of the submission; (2) it
must clearly identify the person or NGO making the submission; (3) it
must provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the
submission; (4) it must appear to be aimed at promoting environmental
enforcement rather than at harassing industry; (5) it must indicate that the
matter has been communicated in writing to the responsible authorities of
the Party and indicate the Party's response; and (6) it must be filed by a
621 See id. arts. 16.4, 16.5. Each NAFTA Party appoints five members. See id. art. 16.1.
622 See id. art. 16.
623 See id. art 16.3; see also Saunders, supra note 582, at 295-96. Additional information
on the JPAC and its members is available from the CEC website. See CEC Website,
supra note 604.
624 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.1. To assist persons in the preparation of Article
14 submissions, the Secretariat has prepared a booklet, GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS ON
ENFORCEMENT MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION. See CEC Website, supra note 604, at
<http://www.cec.org/english/citizen/Guide08.cfm?format=2>. For critiques of the
petition process, see Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., The North American Free Trade Agreement,
30 INT'L LAW. 345 (1996); Michael J. Kelly, Bringing A Complaint Under the NAFTA
Environmental Side Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, But
Movement in the Right Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71 (1996); Jay Tutchton, The Citizen
Petition Process under NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement: It's Easy to Use, but
Does It Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10018 (1996).
486 [Vol. 22:375
ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
person or NGO residing in a NAFTA Party. 25 Given the broad discretion
vested in the Secretariat in screening submissions, petitioners must
necessarily depend on the Secretariat's good faith administration of Article
14.
If a submission meets these six criteria, the Secretariat next
determines whether it merits a response from the target Party. 6 To guide
the Secretariat in this threshold determination of merit, Article 14.2
instructs the Secretariat to consider (1) whether the submission alleges
harm to the person or NGO making the submission; (2) whether the
submission raises matters whose further study would advance the goals of
the NAAEC; (3) whether private remedies are available under the Party's
laws and, if so, whether they have been pursued; and (4) whether the
submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports. 27
After the Secretariat concludes that the submission warrants
developing a factual record, it notifies the Council. The Council in turn
instructs the Secretariat whether to develop a factual record. 8 In
preparing a factual record, Article 15.4 provides that the Secretariat may
consider virtually any relevant technical, scientific, or other information
submitted by the NGO, by the responding NAFTA Party, by the Joint
62 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.1. As of late 1997, a total of 13 citizen petitions
had been received by the Secretariat under Article 14 (two in 1995, four in 1996, and
seven as of January 1998). The Secretariat maintains a Registry of Submissions on
Enforcement Matters. See CEC Website, supra note 604.
626 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.2.
627 See id. NAAEC Article 14.3 gives the affected Party up to 30 days, or 60 days where
exceptional circumstances warrant, to apprise the Secretariat whether private remedies
exist and have been pursued, and whether the matter is the subject of a pending
administrative or judicial proceeding. In the event of a pending domestic proceeding, the
Secretariat must terminate the Article 14 proceedings. See id. art. 14.3.
628 See id. art. 15.2. An affirmative vote of the Council requires a two-thirds majority. In
August 1996, for example, the Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual
record regarding the environmental impact assessment done on a public harbor terminal
in Cozumel, Mexico. As of September 1997, the Council had not yet directed the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record in any of the seven citizen petitions submitted in
1997. Four of those petitions involve Canada, one the United States, and two involve
Mexico.
Under Article 13, the Secretariat also has the option of preparing a report for the
Council on any matter within the scope of the annual program. In response to a
submission concerning massive migratory bird deaths at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico,
the Secretariat prepared an Article 13 report, which lead to a negotiated resolution of the
matter among the NAFTA Parties. See CEC Website, supra note 604.
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Public Advisory Committee, or developed by the Secretariat itself.629 The
Secretariat's function under Article 14 is inquisitorial, rather than
accusatorial.
A draft factual record is submitted to the Council for its comments
on accuracy. 30 Once the Secretariat completes the final factual record and
submits it to the Council, the Council may make it publicly available
within 60 days.3
For the petitioning private party, the Article 14 petition process
ends with the transmittal of the final factual record to the Council. The
NAAEC does not provide private remedies and does not create any private
right of action against a NAFTA Party.6 '  A petitioner must either
persuade its own government to pursue the matter further under NAAEC
Article 23, or persuade an NGO or private individual who is a national of
the offending NAFTA Party to pursue available domestic legal remedies. 3
As of December 1998, the Secretariat has received nineteen Article
14 submissions, concerning all three NAFTA Parties. 34 Three have
concerned the United States, six have concerned Canada, and four have
concerned Mexico.63 A few of those submissions have been rejected by
the Secretariat under Article 14.1 for not involving a failure by a Party to
enforce its environmental law (e.g., a 1995 Endangered Species Act
petition, a 1995 National Forest Logging petition, and a 1997 Canadian
Environmental Defence Fund petition).6
5. Information Exchange
Part Four of the NAAEC, Cooperation and Provision of
Information, requires the Parties at all times to endeavor to agree on the
interpretation and application of the NAAEC.637 Article 20.2 requires each
Party, to the maximum extent possible, to notify other Parties of any
629 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 15.4.
630 See id. art. 15.5.
63" See id. art. 15.7. A two-thirds vote in the affirmative is required. As one commentator
has noted, making the factual record publicly available is not the same as publishing and
disseminating it. See Kelly, supra note 624, at 81.
632 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 38.
633 See Kelly, supra note 624, at 82.
634 See supra note 582 and accompanying text.
635 See id.
636 See Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 355-56; Kelly, supra note 624, at 91-95.
W7 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 20.1.
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proposed or actual environmental measure that might affect materially the
operation of the Agreement. When requested by another Party, a Party
must provide promptly information and respond to questions pertaining to
any such proposed or actual environmental measure. 3 The Parties are free
to notify any other Party if credible evidence exists of possible violations
of the latter's environmental laws.639
Article 21 requires a Party to provide information to the Council or
the Secretariat when so requested that is necessary to the preparation of
reports or factual records. °40 If a Party declines the Secretariat's request, it
must notify the Secretariat of its reasons for doing so in writing. 6'1
6. Dispute Settlement
In addition to the mechanisms available to private persons to
submit petitions about a NAFTA Party's failure to effectively enforce its
environmental laws, Part Five of the Agreement creates a mechanism for
Party-to-Party dispute resolution in the event there has been "a persistent
pattern of failure by [a] Party to effectively enforce its environmental
law."62
Article 45 defines the three key terms "persistent pattern,"
"effectively enforce," and "environmental law."63 The term "persistent
pattern" is defined as "a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction
beginning after the date of entry into force of this Agreement."' Rather
than state when a Party has failed to "effectively enforce its environmental
law," Article 45.1 instead states when a party has not failed to "effectively
enforce its environmental law":
[W]here the action or inaction in question by agencies or
officials of that Party:
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in
respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or
638 See id. art. 20.3.
639 See id. art. 20.4.
64 See id. art. 21.1. If a Party deems a request from the Secretariat to be unduly
burdensome, it may notify the Council, which may in turn revise the Secretariat's request
by a two-thirds vote. See id. art. 21.2.
1 See id. art. 20.3.
642 Id. art. 22.1.
6413 See id. art. 45.
644 See id. art. 45.1.
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compliance matters; or
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters
determined to have higher priorities .... 64,
Finally, Article 45.2 defines "environmental law" as any statute or
regulation whose primary purpose is the
protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger
to human life or health, through
(i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the release,
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental
contaminants,
(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic
chemicals, substances, materials, and wastes..., or
(iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including
endangered species, their habitat, and specially
protected natural areas in a party's territory. 646
The term "environmental law" does not include any statute or regulation
the primary purpose of which is managing the commercial harvesting or
exploitation, including aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources. A
provision's primary purpose is determined by reference to that provision's
primary purpose, not to the primary purpose of the statute or regulation of
which it is a part.647
Article 22 establishes a Party-to-Party consultative mechanism by
which these issues are addressed first. In the event the consulting Parties
are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of their dispute
within sixty days, Article 23 permits either Party to request a special
session of the Council. 8 The Council may attempt to resolve the matter.
To that end, it may call upon technical advisors, establish working groups,
make recommendations, and have recourse to good offices, conciliation, or
mediation. 9 If the Council is unable to resolve the Parties' dispute, it may
645 id.
646 Id. art. 45.2.
641 See generally Fulton & Sperling, supra note 582, at 129-31; Garvey, supra note 582;
Raustiala, supra note 582, at 40-43; Thomas & Tereposky, supra note 582, at 27-32.
648 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 23.1.
649 See id. art. 23.4. In addition, Article 23.5 provides that if the Council decides that a
matter is more properly covered by another agreement to which the Parties are
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refer the Parties to arbitration in a narrow range of cases, described next.65
a. Arbitration
The NAAEC establishes a detailed, regularized arbitration
procedure for resolving Party-to-Party disputes.65' The arbitration
procedure is only available, however, where the alleged persistent pattern
of failure by the responding Party to enforce effectively its environmental
law relates to a situation involving "workplaces, firms, companies or
sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the
territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of the Party
complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by
persons of another Party.' 652
i. Panel Selection
Panelists are selected from a roster of forty-five individuals
established by the Council.653 Appointments to the roster are for three-year
renewable terms.6 ' Arbitral panels are comprised of five members .6  The
signatories, it shall refer the matter for appropriate action in accordance with such other
agreement. For example, if the dispute concerns the transboundary shipment of
hazardous waste, the Council might refer the Parties to the Basel Convention for
resolution of their dispute.650 See id. art. 24.1.
651 See id. arts. 24-32; Saunders, supra note 582, at 299-302. The third NAFTA Party
may intervene as a complainant as of right if it has a substantial interest in the matter. See
NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 24.2. In any event, upon proper notice to the disputing
Parties and the Secretariat, a nondisputing Party is entitled to attend all hearings, to make
written and oral submissions, and to receive the disputing Parties' written submissions.
See id. art. 29.
652 Id. art. 24.1.
653 See id. art. 25.1. Roster members are selected using the following four criteria: (1)
they must have expertise in environmental law or its enforcement, technical or
professional experience or expertise, or experience in resolving international trade
disputes; (2) they must be selected strictly on the basis of their objectivity, reliability, and
sound judgment; (3) they must be independent of, and not affiliated with or take
instructions from, any party, the Secretariat, or the JPAC; and (4) they must comply with
the code of conduct established by the Council. See id. art. 25.2. Roster members with a
conflict of interest in the particular dispute are disqualified from serving as a panelist. See
id. art. 26.1.
654 See id. art. 25.1(a).
555 See id. art. 27.1.
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panel chair is chosen by agreement of the Parties within fifteen days after
the Council votes to convene a panel. In the absence of such agreement,
the chair is selected by one of the disputing Parties, with the selecting
Party chosen by lot, but the chair may not be a citizen of the selecting
Party.6  Within fifteen days after selecting the chair, each Party to the
dispute selects two panelists who are citizens of the other disputing
Party.657 If a disputing Party fails to make its selection, panelists are
selected by lot from among roster members who are citizens of the other
disputing Party.68 This default selection provision creates an incentive for
disputing Parties to participate in the arbitral proceeding.
Panelists are selected normally, but not exclusively, from the
roster.' In the event an individual is selected as a panelist who is not on
the roster, a Party may exercise a peremptory challenge.* Similarly, if a
panelist has been selected from the roster whom another Party believes is
in violation of the code of conduct, that panelist may be removed if the
disputing Parties so agree.662
ii. Conduct of the Hearing
Panel proceedings are conducted under the Model Rules of
Procedure established by the Council.65 The Model Rules include a right
to at least one hearing before the panel, the opportunity to make written
initial and rebuttal submissions, and anonymity of panelists insofar as
which panel members are associated with majority or minority opinions.66
Unless the Parties otherwise agree, a panel's standard terms of reference
(i.e., its competence or subject matter jurisdiction) are as follows: "To
examine, in light of the relevant provisions of the Agreement, including
656 See id. art. 27.1(b).
117 See id. art. 27.1(c).
658 See id. art. 27.1(d).
659 In cases involving a dispute among all three NAFTA Parties, the selection of panelists
is modified. The responding Party selects two panelists, one who is a citizen of one of
the complaining Parties, and another who is a citizen of the other complaining Party.
The complaining Parties together choose two panelists who are citizens of the responding
Party. The default selection procedures are the same as those applicable in bilateral Party
disputes. See id. art. 27.2.
660 See id. art. 27.3.
661 See id.
662 See id. art. 27.4.
663 See id. art. 28.1.
664 See id.
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those contained in Part Five, whether there has been a persistent pattern of
failure by the Party complained against to enforce effectively its
environmental law, and to make findings, determinations and
recommendations in accordance with Article 31 (2)." '
Under Article 30, on request of a disputing Party or on its own
initiative, a panel may seek information and technical advice from any
person or body that it deems appropriate, subject to any terms or
conditions the disputing Parties may impose. 6
The panel submits an initial report and a final report. The initial
report is submitted within 180 days after the last panelist is selected.?7
The report is based on the submissions and arguments of the Parties,
together with any information furnished to the panel under Article 30.68
The initial report consists of (1) findings of fact, (2) the panel's
determination whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the
responding Party to effectively enforce its environmental law, and (3) in
the event of an affirmative determination, a panel recommendation for the
resolution of the dispute.669 A typical recommendation would suggest that
the responding Party adopt and implement an action plan sufficient to
remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.
A disputing Party may submit written comments to the panel on its
initial report within thirty days.67' In light of those comments the panel
may request the views of the other participants, reconsider its report, and
make any further examination that it deems appropriate.6
Article 32 requires the panel to submit its final report within sixty
days after its initial report. 673 The disputing Parties must in turn transmit it
to the Council within fifteen days, along with their comments, on a
confidential basis and the final report is published five days after it is
transmitted to the Council. 74
b. Implementation of Final Report
' Id. art. 28.3.
6 See id. art. 30.
667 See id. art. 31.2.
661 See id. art. 31.1-31.2.
669 See id. art. 31.2.
670 See id.
671 See id. art. 31.4.
672 See id. art. 31.5.
673 See id. art. 32.1.
674 See id. art. 32.2-32.3.
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If the panel's final report is affirmative, the disputing Parties are
free to conclude a mutually satisfactory action plan.675 If the Parties are
unable to reach such an agreement within sixty days after the final report,
or if there is disagreement over whether the responding Party is fully
implementing an action plan, a disputing Party may request that the panel
reconvene.
676
When a panel has reconvened under the first circumstance (i.e.,
failure to reach agreement on an action plan), the panel must either
approve the responding Party's action plan or establish one of its own that
is consistent with the responding Party's environmental laws. 67  The panel
also may impose a monetary penalty, where warranted, no greater than
.007 percent of the total trade in goods between the Parties during the most
recent year for which data are available. In determining the amount of
the assessment, the panel is to take into account the following factors: (1)
the pervasiveness and duration of the party's persistent failure to
effectively enforce its environmental law, (2) the level of enforcement that
could be reasonably expected of a party given its resource constraints, (3)
the reasons given by the party for not fully implementing an action plan,
(4) efforts made by the party after the final report to begin remedying its
pattern of non-enforcement, and (5) any other relevant factors. 679  Any
penalty is paid into the North American Fund for Environmental
Cooperation controlled by the CEC for the improvement of the
610environment.
When a panel reconvenes under the second circumstance (i.e.,
failure to implement an action plan), the panel must determine whether the
responding Party has, in fact, failed to implement fully the action plan."'
The panel may impose a monetary penalty if it determines that the Party
complained against has failed to implement fully the action plan. 82
611 See id. art. 33.
676 See id. art. 34.1. If no action plan is agreed upon, a request to reconvene is untimely
unless it is made within 120 days after the final report is issued. If an action plan was
agreed to but allegedly is not being fully implemented, a request to reconvene may be
made no sooner than 180 days after the action plan was approved. See id. art. 34.2-34.3.
677 See id. art. 34.4.
678 See id. art. 34.4, Annex 34.1.
679 See id. Annex 34.2.
680 See id. Annex 34.3.
68! See id. art. 34.5.
b82 See id. art. 34.5(b).
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Determinations of a reconvened panel, including penalty assessments, are
final.683
c. Suspension of Benefits
If a responding Party fails to pay a monetary assessment within
180 days, Article 36 permits a complaining Party to suspend the
application of NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater than that sufficient
to collect the monetary assessment.8 Suspension of NAFTA benefits may
include an increase in the rates of duty on goods from the responding
Party, not to exceed the lesser of (a) the rate that was applicable when
NAFTA entered into force, or (b) the applicable Most-Favored-Nation
duty rate on the date the Party suspends benefits.685
In considering what tariff commitments or other benefits to
suspend, a complaining Party first must attempt to suspend benefits in the
same sector as that in respect of which there has been a persistent pattern
of failure to enforce environmental laws (e.g., suspension of benefits on
agricultural goods in retaliation for non-enforcement of environmental
laws affecting agriculture).686 Failing that, a complaining Party may
suspend benefits in other sectors.687
The Council may reconvene the panel to determine whether the
monetary assessment has been paid or the action plan fully implemented.
In either case, the suspension of benefits is to be terminated.6 8 The
Council also may reconvene the panel to determine whether the
suspension of benefits is manifestly excessive.689
To date, there have been no requests to initiate the Article 23
dispute resolution process.
7. General Provisions
683 See id. art. 34.6.
684 See id. art. 36.1.
685 See id. Annex 36B. Special enforcement and monetary assessment collection
procedures apply to Canada that require panel reports to be filed with a Canadian court
and judgment entered thereon, which then becomes enforceable in Canada. See id.
Annex 36A.
686 See id. Annex 36B(2).
687 See id.
.88 See id. art. 36.4-36.5.
689 See id. art. 36.5.
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Part Six of the NAAEC contains a number of provisions of general
application. First, Article 37 makes clear that nothing in the Agreement
empowers a Party to undertake environmental law enforcement activities
in the territory of another Party.6" Second, Article 38 provides that no
Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic law against any
other Party on the ground that another Party has acted in a manner
inconsistent with the Agreement.69' In other words, the right of private
persons within one NAFTA Party to make submissions to the Secretariat
under Article 14 alleging that another NAFTA Party has failed to enforce
effectively its environmental law is exclusive.692 Third, Article 39 protects
from disclosure business confidential and proprietary information.69
Finally, Article 42 carves out a national security exception that permits
Parties to take any action they consider necessary for the protection of
their essential security interests relating to arms, munitions, and nuclear
694weapons.
D. US.-Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement
The United States and Mexico have concluded a supplemental
bilateral environmental agreement to develop environmental infrastructure
in the border area. 69 The Border Environment Cooperation Agreement
creates two institutions. The first is the Border Enforcement Cooperation
Commission (BECC), consisting of a Board of Directors, a General
Manager, a Deputy General Manager, and an Advisory Council.9 6 The
BECC's responsibility is to help border communities plan and develop
environmental infrastructure projects.69'
The second institution is the San Antonio-based North American
690 See id. art. 37.
9 See id. art. 38.
692 See id. art. 14.
693 See id. art. 39.
694 See id. art. 42.
695 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov.
16, 18, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545 (1993) [hereinafter BECC/NADBank Agreement]; see also
Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 356-57; Steinberg, supra note 112, at 245-53.
696 See BECC/NADBank Agreement, supra note 695, art. III, §§ 3-5.
697 See id. art. I § 1; Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 357. Additional information on the
work of the BECC is available on the internet. See BECC Website (visited Oct. 25,
1998) <http://cocef.interjuarez.com>.
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Development Bank (NADBank), which is responsible for generating
financial resources for infrastructure construction of pollution-control and
waste-water treatment facilities.6 98 NADBank was funded with $225
million by the U.S. and Mexican governments. These public funds are to
leverage up to $3 billion in private money in capital markets to finance the
construction of border environmental projects.619
The BECC has certified sixteen projects. NADBank has approved
the financing for four of these projects, two on each side of the border.
The BECC also has received a $10 million grant from the U.S. EPA to
identify, develop, and assist water-related projects in both countries. In
1996, the two countries signed an agreement to improve air quality in the
El Paso-Ciudad Juarez area. Some water pollution problems also were
being addressed in 1996 by the BECC and NADBank. Seven water
treatment plants had been certified by BECC as of 1996."°
E. U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program
Another bilateral spin-off agreement from NAFTA is the 1996
Border XXI Program designed to improve the environment of the U.S.-
Mexico border area. The program is the successor arrangement to the
Integrated Border Environmental Plan, a bilateral arrangement between
the United States and Mexico concluded in February 1992. That Plan in
turn built on the 1983 La Paz Agreement between Mexico and the United
States. 01 The Border XXI Program now forms the core of the U.S.
environmental cooperative relationship with Mexico."2 It is designed to
provide for the long-term protection of human health and the environment
along the U.S.-Mexico border area. Its objectives are (1) to strengthen
enforcement of existing environmental protection laws, (2) to reduce
pollution and improve the quality of the border area through new
initiatives, (3) to increase cooperative planning, training, and education,
'98 See Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, The North American Development Bank: Forging New
Directions in Regional Integration Policy, 60 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 301 (1994). See
generally, NADBank Website (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.nadbank.org>.
699 See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 247.
" For a summary of the activities of the BECC and NADBank, see Operation and Effect
of NAFTA, supra note 526, at 126-32. See also Robert Bryce, US and Mexico Tackle
Air Pollution, But Set Water Issues Aside, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 1996, at 4.
701 See Agreement on Cooperation for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827.
702 See Operation and Effect of NAFTA, supra note 526, at 116-23.
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and (4) to improve understanding of the border area environment.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING OPEN TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the United States and the
other Members of the WTO have committed to a comprehensive
international trade law regime under the auspices of which all trade-
environment disputes are to be resolved in a multilateral/bilateral forum.
The core GATT obligations not to discriminate against imports regardless
of their origin (the Article I MFN commitment), the obligation not to
discriminate against imports vis-a-vis the domestic like product (the
Article III national treatment obligation), and the commitment not to
impose quotas on imports (the Article XI prohibition on quotas) create a
legal framework that ensures that trade in goods will not be impeded.
Regardless of whether this legal regime now is deemed to be harmful to
the environment, the inescapable fact is that the United States and the
other WTO Members have made a legal commitment to these rules.
Unilateralism has been forsworn.
Beyond these three core GATT obligations, the Uruguay Round
Agreements dealing with SPS measures, technical measures, subsidies,
and dispute resolution put a substantial amount of flesh on the bare bones
of the core GATT commitments. As has been shown, the scope of these
agreements is broad. They establish a comprehensive legal regime that
regulates the imposition of border measures on the grounds of health,
safety, and other environmental concerns. The binding dispute settlement
mechanism established under the DSU gives WTO Members an adequate
forum for resolving trade-environment disputes bilaterally. Once again,
unilateral responses to trade-environment disputes are rejected.
In addition, the NAFTA environmental side agreement, NAECA,
is even broader in scope than the WTO agreements to the extent that it has
established an institutional framework for the study, negotiation, and
resolution of environmental issues among the three NAFTA parties.
Indeed, the cooperative nature of the NAFTA environmental programs
could serve as a possible model for the WTO membership.
As the foregoing has shown, the GATT-WTO system and NAFTA
have in place a number of institutional and substantive provisions
designed to address trade disputes in the context of the environment.
Their overarching goal is to prevent trade protectionism while at the same
time protecting the environment. Their institutional framework calls for
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the resolution of trade-environment disputes in a multilateral and/or
bilateral context. Unilateralism is rejected totally as an option.
The United States, as a signatory to both the WTO Agreement and
NAFTA, is obligated to perform its obligations under those agreements in
good faith. Its resort to unilateral trade measures to resolve trade-
environment disputes, in the face of international agreements that provide
a bilateral/multilateral dispute resolution mechanism for resolving such
disputes, violates international law. Beyond the question of the validity of
unilateral measures to resolve trade-environment disputes, as a policy
matter the United States has learned the hard way that unilateralism is a
double-edged sword. In its recent dispute with the EU over the use of
leghold traps, the United States came close to being on the receiving end
of a unilateral EU import ban on fur from animals caught with leghold
traps. It was only after extensive bilateral negotiations that the parties
were able to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of their dispute."'
The GATT-WTO rules are deeply sensitive to the fact that a
national regulation that is nominally for the protection of the environment
may be pretextual, that is, it may be nothing more than a thinly disguised
trade protectionist measure. The Stockholm Declaration" does not
directly address the question of the impact of environmental regulation on
growth and international trade. The Rio Declaration does provide in three
places a broad framework for harmonizing environmental and trade
concerns, essentially giving trade issues primacy over environmental
concerns in the event the two conflict." 5 In Principles 11, 12, and 16, the
Rio Declaration specifically wars that pursuing aggressive environmental
policies may have a potentially adverse impact on international trade.7 °6
First, Principle 11 states that "[environmental] [s]tandards applied
by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and
social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries."7 7 In
other words, Principle 11 reminds countries that when developing
international environmental standards, compare apples to apples. In
addition, Principle 11 mildly admonishes developed countries to avoid
"eco-imperialism" (i.e., the act of demanding that developing countries
703 See EU, U.S. Reach Accord on Phaseout of Leghold Traps, Averting Fur Import Ban,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2076 (1997).
704 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25.
70 See Rio Declaration, supra note 26.
706 See id. princs. 11, 12, 16.
707 Id. princ. 11.
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adopt excessively stringent, costly, and arguably inappropriate
environmental standards or risk import bans on shipments of goods to
developed countries). 7 8
Second, Principle 12 addresses the crux of the environment-trade
debate, namely, environmental measures that are disguised trade
protectionism. It weighs in on the side of trade:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to
better address the problems of environmental degradation.
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country
should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as
far as possible, be based on an international consensus.1°
Principle 12 has a substantive and procedural message. On the substantive
level, when trade measures are used in the name of environmental
protection, means and ends should be linked closely and causally. On the
procedural level, unilateralism and extraterritorial application of domestic
laws are unacceptable. Multilateral approaches and consensus building are
strongly encouraged.7
Third, Principle 16 expands on Principle I I's direction to compare
apples with apples, and Principle 12's charge to avoid unilaterally imposed
environmental measures that are a disguised form of trade protectionism.
Principle 16 counsels against the adoption of environmental policies that
might distort world trade patterns: "National authorities should endeavour
to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the
public interest and without distorting international trade and
70' See id.
7O' Id. princ. 12 (emphasis added).
710 See id.
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investment.""' Principle 16's "polluter pays principle" is tempered by
Principle 11 's warning to developed countries not to impose
environmental standards on developing countries and by Principle 12's
rejection of unilateralism and avoidance of trade protectionism in the name
of environmental protection.
If the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are reasonably accurate
reflections of world opinion on the interrelationship of trade and the
environment,7'2 then a consensus exists that economic growth should not
be sacrificed or the open world trading system wrecked in the name of
environmental protection. Both Declarations encourage states to reflect
carefully before pursuing economic policies that could damage the
environment. Conversely, both Declarations urge states to exercise
restraint and avoid environmental policies that could damage the world
trading system it took fifty painstaking years to build.7"
The GATT-WTO system predates the emergence of a significant
environmental movement by at least two decades."" Nevertheless, when
measured against its liberal trade philosophy, the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations are in large measure harmonious with the GATT-WTO
system. The two declarations stress the importance of balancing trade and
economic growth with environmental protection. Similarly, GATT-WTO
rules stress the importance of open, unrestricted trade, but recognize that
importing countries have legitimate health and safety concerns and, on
those grounds, may restrict or ban certain imported goods.
Few will quarrel that protecting the environment should be a high
priority for every country, and especially for the developed-country
Members of the WTO. Are the GATT-WTO system and NAFTA
obstacles to achieving this goal? Although environmentalists portray them
as being at best indifferent to environmental issues and at worst hostile to
them, can environmental concerns be accommodated adequately under the
GATT-WTO system?" 5
I" d. princ. 16.
712 The vote on the Stockholm Declaration was 103 countries for, zero against, and 12
abstaining. See BuRNS H. WESTON, ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 943 (1990). The Rio Declaration was adopted by consensus by the
175 countries attending the Rio Conference. See Kovar, supra note 30, at 119.
713 See Stockholni Declaration, supra note 25; Rio Declaration, supra note 26.
714 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 1289.
75 See generally K. Gwen Beacham, International Trade and the Environment:
Implications of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Future of
Environmental Protection Efforts, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 655 (1992);
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The need for greater integration of trade and environmental
policies is undeniable. As an initial matter, such policies need not be
mutually exclusive."' As one economist has observed, "[m]ost
environmental policies are not in conflict with basic GATT rules." 7 '
Environmentalists seem to have an endless list of grievances with the
GATT-WTO system. If their real concern is that liberal trade may reduce
worldwide environmental standards to the lowest common denominator,
then the problem lies with the market's failure to reflect environmental
costs in prices and in government subsidization of polluting industries."'
Resorting to trade sanctions to address environmental issues may
be misguided for several reasons. First, trade sanctions, such as a ban on
imported goods produced by polluting production processes and methods,
rarely, if ever, attack the root of the problem. Second, such trade
sanctions, when advocated by environmental groups with the support of
domestic business groups, may have as its primary aim trade
protectionism, not environmental protection. Such advocacy can be
especially pernicious because it is so socially respectable." 9  Trade
sanctions can in turn lead to an escalation of trade tensions that trigger
retaliatory trade responses from exporting countries.
Economic studies have shown, moreover, that tough environmental
standards at home do not, standing alone, cause companies to relocate
abroad."' Other factors, such as labor costs, transportation infrastructure,
market access, and political stability figure more prominently in the
Dunoff, supra note 298, at 1047; Jackson, supra note 14; Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming
U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185 (1994); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 268 (1997).
716 See, e.g., CONFRONTING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: PROSPECTS AND
PRACTICAL APPROACHES (ABA 1993); C. FORD RUNGE, ET AL., FREER TRADE,
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERESTS (1994); TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 581; DAVID VOGEL,
TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
(1995); Jonathan Scott Miles, Doing the Right Thing for Profit: Markets, Trade, and
Advancing Environmental Protection, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 611 (1996); Wold, supra note
56.
717 Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country
Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 327.
711 See id. at 325 n.3.
711 See Anderson, supra note 12, at 441.
720 See The Greening of Protectionism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 26.
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location/relocation decision."'
It is not surprising that international trade measures have become
the mechanism of choice for responding concretely to other countries'
behavior that threatens the environment. First, trade sanctions are high
profile and, therefore, potentially of great symbolic value. Second, trade
measures do not involve or threaten the use of armed force (excepting, of
course, "quarantines" such as the one imposed against Cuba by the United
States during the Cuban missile crisis or against Iraq during the Gulf War).
When trade sanctions are imposed, generally no soldier is deployed in a
theater of war and ordered to put his or her life in harm's way while
performing a combat role. Third, building a national or international
consensus on the need for or the wisdom of imposing trade sanctions
presents policy makers with a supremely delicate challenge.72 '
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly easier to build a consensus on unilaterally
initiating trade sanctions than it is to commit and deploy troops abroad
either unilaterally or multilaterally, absent an act of war by the target
country against the sending country or the special case of an Iraqi invasion
of a Kuwait."
Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise then that
environmentalists have borrowed a page from the national security and
human rights book and embraced import bans and restrictions as the
preferred method for forcing nations that trade with the United States to
adopt measures to protect the environment. Indeed, the use of trade
measures to enforce environmental standards can be compelling
particularly when international trade is the direct cause of the
environmental damage as, for example, with trade in hazardous waste or in
endangered species.
Although trade sanctions have an obvious and understandable
appeal, the one question environmentalists have either failed to ask or have
ignored is whether trade sanctions are effective. Do trade sanctions work?
The symbolic value of trade sanctions, highly touted in the human rights
arena, should not be discounted completely even when the ends are
721 See id.
722 A perennial example is the tug-of-war between Congress and Presidents Bush and
Clinton over China's continued most-favored-nation trade status. See Senate Sustains
President's Veto of Bill Conditioning MFN Status for China, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
518 (1992); Ann Scott Tyson, China Reacts to US Trade Decision, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 25, 1990, at 3.
723 See Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial
Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 263 (1992).
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environmental. At the same time, the role of symbolism should not be
overrated or overemphasized. Symbolism may be a necessary condition
for imposing trade sanctions against a country with a less than exemplary
environmental track record, as measured by U.S. standards. Symbolism
standing alone, however, should never be a sufficient condition for
imposing such sanctions.
Moving beyond symbolism, the primary focus needs to be on the
effectiveness of trade sanctions as a tool for achieving certain
environmental ends. The question that needs to be asked and answered in
the affirmative before unilateral trade sanctions are imposed is whether the
imposition of sanctions will cause the exporting country to change its
environmental policies. The effectiveness of trade sanctions ought to be
the initial focus and, ultimately, the bottom line. Otherwise, legitimate
environmental concerns, when coupled with strong trade protectionist
pressures at home, can result in the imposition of trade sanctions that are
imposed ostensibly on environmental grounds but which have the
potential for delivering a crippling blow to the world economy.
Environmental protection, in combination with trade
protectionism, can lead to an undisciplined, -discriminatory use of trade
sanctions. Consequently, when trade sanctions are invoked on
environmental grounds, they need to be used in a very disciplined and
discriminating fashion."" Once a country imposes trade sanctions, it may
be impossible to avoid the downward spiral of retaliation and counter-
retaliation, leading to an all-out trade war."5 In any such war, the
environment could be the big loser. An importing country's use of trade
restrictions to block imports in the name of environmental protection may
actually be at cross-purposes with the goal of environmental protection.
724 For a 1990 case study on the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool that
offers some insights to this question, see GARY C. HUFBAUER, ET AL., ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1990). To the question,
"Are economic sanctions effective?" Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott give a guarded
answer of "sometimes":
Although it is not true that sanctions "never work," they are of limited
utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the
target country to take actions it stoutly resists. Still, in some instances,
particularly situations involving small target countries and relatively
modest policy goals, sanctions have helped alter foreign behavior.
Id. at 92. The authors conclude that sanctions are seldom effective in bringing about
major changes in the policies of the target country.
7 5 See. e.g., Clayton Jones, Japan Fires a Shot Over the Bow of Clinton's "Managed
Trade, " CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 1993, at 1, 4.
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Such restrictions may promote environmental degradation by protecting
less efficient manufacturers and producers from more efficiently produced
imports.
In the name of environmental protection, a substantial volume of
import trade could be affected significantly through the use of trade
measures imposed ostensibly to advance environmental goals but which
are in fact pretextual and nothing more than disguised nontariff barriers to
trade. 26 Domestic business interests and unions anxious to erect barriers
to import competition from low-wage countries may drape themselves in
the green flag and join forces with environmental groups.7 Together they
may forge a coalition to pressure government regulators to keep the
playing field level by restricting imported products that are manufactured
or processed by heavily polluting industries in countries where
environmental controls are either less stringent, loosely enforced, or non-
existent.
One writer has compared this informal coalition among
protectionist domestic business interests, unions, and environmental
groups to an unholy alliance between the Baptists and the bootleggers. 8
The environmentalists are the Baptists who support prohibition on grounds
of morality and health. Business and labor groups are the bootleggers who
support prohibition in order to preserve jobs and their share of the
domestic market from import competition. The lesson here is beware of
domestic manufacturers and unions who lament the state of the
environment in other countries. The environment may not be their real
concern.
In short, instead of viewing free trade and environmental protection
as mutually reinforcing, environmentalists' working premise is that the
GATT-WTO system is an obstacle to environmental protection. Short of a
no-growth economic stance, this is a false premise. The GATT-WTO
system and free trade are not environmental villains. As explained by one
726 See John Dillin, With US Jobs at Stake, Congress Takes Wary View of Trade Pact,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1993, at 4 ("[S]ome Mexicans worry that the US will
use environmental standards as a form of protectionism against their products").
727 As reported in The Economist, "[o]ne recent attack on GATT by Public Citizen
[headed by Ralph Nader] was signed by over 300 groups. They included the
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, the United Methodist Church, the
American Cetacean Society and the Sierra Club." The Greening of Protectionism,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25.
728 See David Vogel, Discussant's Comments, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 245.
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economist, "Environmental problems arise from various types of market
(prices not reflecting environmental costs) and government failure
(subsidies to polluting activities) or lack of clear property rights.""' 9 In
other words, if GATT-WTO disciplines were honored less in the breach
and more in the observance, then the GATT-WTO system would be at
least a partial solution to the world pollution problem. By opening
markets and lifting government restrictions on trade as GATT directs,
resources will be consumed by the most efficient producers, causing less
damage to the environment in the long run.
'2' Sorsa, supra note 717, at 325 n.3.
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